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Sweden is seen as a forerunner in environmental and ecological policy.
Sweden and ecological governance is about policies and strategies for
ecologically rational governance, and uses the Swedish case study to ask
whether or not it is possible to move from a traditional environmental
policy to a broad, integrated pursuit of sustainable development, as
illustrated through the ‘Sustainable Sweden’ programme.
The study begins by looking at the spatial dimensions of ecological
governance, and goes on to consider the integration and effectiveness of
sustainable development policies. It analyses the tension between
democracy and sustainable development, which has a broader relevance
beyond the Swedish model, to other nation states as well as the
European Union as a whole.
In this book the author offers the latest word in advanced
implementation of sustainable development by a front-runner in
environmental and ecological policy. It will be useful for students of
environmental politics and sustainable development researchers.
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Preface
This study is about policies and strategies for ecologically rational
governance that are expected to achieve their final results in a
generation from now. In some sense my work on this subject
began more than a generation ago, when I wrote my dissertation
on the emergence of modern environmental administration in
Sweden. Some years later I did a comparative study of clean air
policies in Sweden and the US. I was overwhelmed by the wide
and generous reception of The Hare and the Tortoise, and had
great plans for continuing to do work within the area of compar-
ative environmental policy. 
Life took another turn, however, and a decade of work in
comparative housing policy came to pass before I returned to the
environmental issue. By now, the field had grown immensely. The
number of scholars and sub-fields was such as to make the earlier
comprehensive overview well nigh impossible. The object of study
had changed. Gone was the rather clear-cut sectoral environmen-
tal policy dealing with identifiable sources of pollution to
specified media. Centre stage began to be crowded with problems
of diffuse sources of environmental disturbances across sectors
and scales not amenable to action by single jurisdictions. Gro
Harlem Brundtland and her international group set the direction
for the future discourse by bringing sustainable development to
the political agenda, thus also providing a global framework for
the comparative study of environmental and ecological politics
and policies.
In these new waters, I was lucky to be guided by skilled and
inspiring pilots. When my Norwegian colleague in environmental
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policy research, Alf-Inge Jansen, invited me to a 1992 Drøbak
workshop on comparative environmental policies in Europe, it
was the beginning of a very stimulating friendship. We soon
joined with others in a comparative Nordic project, subsequently
reported in the volume Governing the Environment: Politics,
Policy, and Organisation in the Nordic Countries (1996). During
that project, and in the subsequent incisive encounters over the
final report from the Drøbak meeting, he never tired of discussing
and elaborating how one should really approach the political
study of what was then increasingly known as ecological
modernisation. 
Participation in the EU-sponsored concerted action Towards
the Ecological State further emphasised the need for new schol-
arly perspectives on ecologically relevant political action, and
gave new insights into different national responses. In the inter-
national joint research project Governance for Sustainable
Development: Addressing a Need for New Approaches and More
Effective Mechanisms I have enjoyed the immensely stimulating
discussions with the project co-ordinator William Lafferty and
the other participants. Not the least have these encounters made
me quite apprehensive as to the different national preconditions
and conceptions of environmental, ecological, and sustainable
development policies and measures, and the ways in which these
differences can be fruitfully approached in comparative studies.
Why then confine this study to one single nation? My choice of
Sweden as the case for an empirical study of how political systems
try to govern so as to ‘value democracy and individual autonomy
and still retain the integrity of the commons’ rests on two general
and one special argument. The first general argument is
consciously heuristic. Sweden is viewed in much of recent schol-
arly debate as a forerunner in environmental and ecological
policy. The Swedish government’s launching of the programme
for ‘Sustainable Sweden’ seemed to provide a critical case. If any
country has at all come anywhere near meeting such criteria for
ecologically rational government as the ones I have set out for this
study, Sweden might be that country. The second general argu-
ment is the need for cumulativity. Much has been written on how
ecological governance or an ecological state should be designed
and function. However, much less has been done to find out
empirically whether and how such governance is actually
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working. I am convinced that the results from a comparison
between the empirical ‘front’ case of Sweden and normative crite-
ria for ecologically rational governance derived from the political
theory (regardless of colour), might be able to add something to
the emerging, and increasingly necessary discourse on democratic
ecologically rational governance. As for the third, special argu-
ment, I have to admit that there is a streak of parochialism
involved here. Sweden is my home country. I hope to do justice
to the comparative advantage of having first-hand knowledge of
this political system and its policies for ecologically sustainable
development.
During the work on this book, I have enjoyed the privilege of
visiting several research milieus outside my home department. In
spring 1999, I worked at the Institute of Administrative and
Organisational Studies at the University of Bergen, where Alf-Inge
Jansen and his colleagues took time to discuss some of my
research problems. Later that spring, I visited Forschungsstelle für
Umweltpolitik at the Free University in Berlin, where Martin
Jänicke and his team probed my ideas in seminars and coffee
discussions. In spring 2000, I stayed with the Center for Clean
Technology and Environment Policy at Twente University, where
Hans Bressers and his colleagues arranged seminar discussions on
some of my research ideas. In the autumn of 2000, I taught at the
Institute for Public Administration and the Department of
Political Science at Åbo Akademi, where I got stimulating ideas
from my colleagues in the joint 1992–96 Nordic project, Ann-Sofi
Hermansson and Marko Joas. Work in the European Science
Foundation’s TERM II Committee brought me in touch with
Bernd Siebenhühner, who provided valuable comments on
Chapter 4. The comments on my first full draft provided by the
two editors of the MUP series Issues in Environmental Policy,
Duncan Liefferink and Mikael Skou Andersen, gave me a valu-
able nudge in the ribs to proceed further with the comparative
discussion of the final chapter.
The book owes much to the stimulating research environment
at Göteborg University’s Department of Political Science. It was
recently ranked superior in an international evaluation of
Swedish political science departments. Its bustling seminar
culture provided valuable inputs to my work. The General
Research Seminar, led by Bo Rothstein, commented on an early
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version of the study’s general problematic. The seminar on
Political Theory, led by Bengt-Ove Boström and Gunnar
Falkemark, and the seminar on Public Policy and Administration,
led by Jon Pierre, have been particularly valuable; designated
discussants and regular seminar participants engaged in incisive
and constructive discussions on different versions of several of the
chapters. My doctorate students – Sverker C. Jagers, Victor
Galaz, and Marie Uhrwing – earn special thanks on two accounts;
first, for their continuous support and valuable comments, and
second, for their sustained patience with my oftentimes absent-
minded look and inflected responses. Thanks are also due to
Kerstin Gidsäter for her patient and skillful adaptation of my
chapters into a manuscript ready for publication.
Last but certainly not least, I enjoy my home base. My wife
Solveig never tires of teaching me the intricacies of making our
garden provide rich yields, and how to keep it sustainable over
time. Our children and grandchildren enlighten and strengthen
us. They make us feel the duty of present generations to make the
Earth a sustainable base for human life. This book is dedicated to
our grandchildren and their possibilities to enjoy an ecologically
sustainable future, and to make their own autonomous choices
for the good life.
The study received generous financial support from the Bank
of Sweden Tercentenary Fund as well as from the Adlerbert
Foundation at Göteborg University.
Göteborg, Ascension Day, 2003
LJL
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1
Where the grass is greener: criteria
for ecologically rational governance
The (re)discovery of the tragedy of the commons raised a norma-
tive question that has haunted students and practitioners of
politics ever since: ‘How are we to govern ourselves so as to value
democracy and individual autonomy and still retain the integrity
of the commons?’ The question implies that the latter – inter-
preted as ecological sustainability – may prove a formidable
challenge to presently existing democratic systems of governance.
Practical political answers addressing the full spectrum of
sustainable development, and in particular its ecological aspects,
are now emerging. Sweden provides an interesting case of devel-
opment from environmental policy towards ecological
governance. In his acceptance speech as the new Leader of
Sweden’s Social Democratic Party in March 1996, the then
Minister of Finance Göran Persson proclaimed the achievement
of an ecologically sustainable society as a new and noble mission
for his party. Presenting his Cabinet Policy Platform two weeks
later, Prime Minister Persson stated that Sweden should be an ‘an
internationally driving force and a forerunner in the endeavours
to create an ecologically sustainable development’ (Swedish
Parliamentary Record 22 March 1996). To achieve this objective,
he and his party have alluded to the building of the democratic
Swedish welfare state, the People’s Home. Ever since the Social-
Democratic coming to power this metaphor has ‘envisioned a
democratic family in which all its members enjoyed equal status
and participated collectively in decision-making’ (Tilton
1990:128). Said Persson: ‘[Our party] once built the People’s
Home in broad consensus on the conditions for production,
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increased standards of living, and security for everyone. Now, we
have a similar mission. We will realise the vision of a green
welfare state ’ (see Persson 1997, italics added). 
The eighteen months following Mr. Persson’s Cabinet Policy
Declaration witnessed a dramatic moulding of ecological, socio-
economic and political aspects into a policy for an ‘Ecologically
Sustainable Sweden’, and the process of change continues. This
book aims at answering the following question: To what extent
do policy measures taken in Sweden to achieve ecologically
sustainable development shape and/or rearrange the structures
and processes of governance in such a way that the collective
outcome is ecologically rational and democratically acceptable
(see Barry 1999:104)?
Governance and ecological rationality
How do we achieve democratically legitimate and ecologically
rational governance? The suggestions offered by political philoso-
phers and social scientists point in many directions. There are
arguments for both more and less of market or state (see
Eckersley 1995). Pragmatic environmentalists think it is possible
to green contemporary democracies and their use of nature (see
Dobson 1990:73 ff.). Eco-anarchists argue that following aboli-
tion of the state, human beings will build ecologically adapted,
self-governing communities (see Bookchin 1982; Carter 1993).
Calls for more local government (see Dobson 1990:145 ff.) are
found alongside pleas for transferring governing powers to the
global level (Caldwell 1990). Some have spoken in favour of ecoc-
racy, i.e., rule by scientific expertise rather than rule by popularly
elected trustees (Ophuls and Boyan 1992). 
However, most of these suggestions can be questioned. On the
one hand, they fail on grounds of autonomy, i.e., a value at the
very core of liberal democracy (see Jagers 2002:90 ff.). Harsh
restrictions imposed on individual choice in the name of ecologi-
cal necessity seem to rule out individual control over the context
of choice. On the other hand, their effectiveness in achieving
sustainable development is questioned. Democratically elected
policy-makers are always under strong pressures to secure votes.
This tends to favour short, election-period incentives over longer-
term ecological balance measures (Milbrath 1984:27 f.; Porritt
2 Sweden and ecological governance
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1984:122 ff.: Dryzek 1995:299 f.). Even those rare real world
instances of governance that combine autonomy and freedom
with sustainable resource use seem to have built-in frailties
(Ostrom 1990). 
Sustainable use and management of the natural environment
and its resources is here seen as a problem of governance. This
refers to the ‘shaping and sustaining of the arrangements of
authority and power within which actors make decisions and
frame policies that are binding on individual and collective actors
within different territorial bounds, such as those of the state,
county and municipality’ (Hanf and Jansen 1998:3). The present
systems of governance have grown out of earlier political chal-
lenges and shifting power configurations in society. They thus
embody different institutional logics, and provide actors with
different frames for determining appropriate behaviour. Logics of
democratic decision-making, based on the value of citizen auton-
omy, are found alongside the logic of competitive markets, based
on the value of individual gain. The most profound struggle and
conflict in politics is about ‘the institutional logic by which the
various social activities should be regulated and over categories of
persons to which they should apply’ (Hanf and Jansen 1998:4 f.). 
Efforts to maintain a sustainable social-environmental rela-
tionship thus concern the design and logic of political institutions,
since they determine much of the actual policies for sustainable
development. To assess the extent to which environmental policy
measures shape and sustain arrangements of authority and power
that make the collective outcome ecologically rational and
socially acceptable, we need specific criteria for what constitutes
a system of ecological governance with an institutional logic of
ecological rationality. 
The concept of ecological rationality originally comprised only
functional aspects of ecological sustainability, i.e., the consistent
and effective provision of human life support (Dryzek 1987:34
ff.). But decisions on society-environment relations are made
under conditions of uncertainty. This indicates a need to include
also normative aspects that enable judgements on what is ‘use’ or
‘abuse’ of resources and on what is ‘just’ or ‘unjust’ distribution
of human life support, as well as on which decision-making
procedures are acceptable in terms of popular sovereignty and
autonomy (Barry 1999:107 ff.). The logic of ecological rational-
Where the grass is greener 3
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ity proceeds from the precautionary principle. This defines ‘a
range of outcomes that are impermissible, namely those that can
not be altered in the future’. It can be viewed as an ‘additional
self-binding character of democracy . . . [for] long-term collective
interest’ (Barry 1999:225). Ecological rationality is closely
connected to the learning and adaptive capacities of social insti-
tutions to cope with both substantial and value-related
dimensions of the society-environment relationship (see Jänicke
1997:11 f.). 
The multiple spatial scales of society-environment relation-
ships indicate that an ecologically rational system of governance
is a multi-level endeavour. From the debate on how to order the
relations between society and the natural environment we find
that several crucial dimensions are involved:
• Scale: Where and how should the boundaries of responsibility,
authority and sovereignty be drawn to best provide for both
autonomy and sustainability? How can institutions of gover-
nance be designed to achieve a balance between ‘cultural’
boundaries and ‘natural’ scales, extendible among and linking
jurisdictional levels upward/downward? 
• Time: How can political institutions be arranged to take
account not just of democratically relevant cycles such as elec-
tion periods, but also of different life cycles and time scales
important to the balance of ecosystems? How could institu-
tions be designed to legitimately deal with issues of
inter-generational safeguarding of natural resources and the
distribution of present sacrifices to achieve sustainability in the
future?
• Knowledge: How should a system of ecological governance be
designed to make sure that ecologically relevant scientific
knowledge is brought into resource-related decision-making
and still allow for the democratic accountability of public deci-
sion-makers?
• Integration: If a highly centralised and holistic ecology-centred
institutional structure of government is ruled out on grounds
of autonomy, and a narrow sectoral environmental adminis-
4 Sweden and ecological governance
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tration on grounds of sustainability, how could a multi-level,
multi-sectoral public administration for effective ecological
governance be designed to integrate both these objectives?
All these dimensions indicate a system of rational ecological
governance set up to meet the double standard of sustainability
and democracy. The scholarly debate indicates that democracy
and individual autonomy constitute the most crucial aspect of
ecological governance. On the one hand, analyses built on recent
comparative studies hold that democratically elected politicians
are locked into the logic of competition in global markets. The
necessity to secure continued economic growth and social welfare
for the citizen means they may have to tune down quests or poli-
cies for ecological sustainability coming from the electorate
(Jansen, Osland and Hanf 1998:313 ff.). On the other hand,
much of the literature on ecological politics argues that the rela-
tion between democracy and sustainability ought to be different.
Communicative rather than instrumental rationality should be
the procedural rule for democratic decision-making (Dryzek
1990:54). Ecological politics is said to entail new and widened
forms of citizen participation. Processes such as Local Agenda 21
are interpreted as a sign of this widened citizen involvement in
democratic ecological governance (see Eckerberg and Lafferty
1997). 
These aspects of ecologically rational governance present
several challenges to existing institutions and organisation of
public government. First, it is easily said that environmental prob-
lems should be dealt with on the scale where they occur.
However, the proper delineation of units of governance is not as
easily done. Second, it seems right in a normative sense to build
institutions for ecologically sustainable development on the prin-
ciples of intergenerational justice. However, this may be found to
clash with the objective of socio-economic justice within present
generations. Third, the rule of expert knowledge may be
disclaimed as illegitimate on grounds of autonomy. We must,
however, also recognise that resource management decisions
made without relevant knowledge may lead to ecologically irra-
tional governance. Fourth, constraints on the market motivated
by ecological reasons could thwart entrepreneurial creativity and
the development of new technologies conducive to sustainable
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resource management (see Sunstein 1990:86 f.). Fifth, while
ecological modernisation proponents hold that the economy-
ecology relation can be made a win-win solution, interventions in
resource use and management will almost inevitably clash with
notions of autonomy. This means that choices of institutions and
instruments for sustainable resource use must be made in ways
that secure their political legitimacy (Lundqvist 2001b). 
As the logic of ecological rationality is defined here, the pursuit
of sustainability is normatively constrained by the value of
democracy and individual freedom and autonomy. To enable
conclusions about the extent to which Sweden is approaching
ecologically rational governance, the following normative and
ideal-type set of criteria for such governance will be used:
• Ecologically rational governance is adapted to ecologically
relevant boundaries.
• Ecologically rational governance is adapted to natural eco-
cycles and to the safeguarding of inter-generational equality
without sacrificing norms of socio-economic justice embraced
by the present welfare state.
• Ecologically rational governance has institutional capacities to
interpret and effectively transform scientific sustainability-
directed arguments into integrated and collectively binding
policies and decisions legitimised by representative democratic
government.
• Ecologically rational governance is able to effectively bring
socio-economic activities within the scale of the ecological
resource base with minimum coercion and maximum consent
and without fettering initiatives conducive to efficient resource
use.
Empirical criteria for assessing the congruence of actual envi-
ronmental policy with this ideal type of ecologically rational
governance will be further discussed and formulated below. They
will be more fully operationalised at the beginning of each empir-
ical chapter. The questions I seek to answer are:
• To what extent are Swedish environmental policy develop-
ments since the 1990s compatible with the criteria for
ecological governance, i.e., with multilevel collective ecological
management based on the logic of ecological rationality?
6 Sweden and ecological governance
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• What has been the role of the state in this development, and
how has the state’s position within the governance of society-
environment relationships developed?
Ecological governance and scale
The territorial limits of government are traditionally drawn along
cultural and human-related lines. Language and ethnicity very
much determine borders between nations. Once developed from
nature-given conditions, boundaries at regional and local levels
increasingly reflect efforts to optimise political and administrative
jurisdictions in view of technological and infrastructural
economies of scale. This has meant that culturally and socio-
economically determined boundaries cut across life-supporting
ecosystems, such as sea basins, river catchments, and biotopes.
This ‘lack of fit’ (see Pritchard Jr. et al. 1998:14) does not favour
resource management patterns and practices compatible with
ecologically rational and sustainable governance.
This has led some to recommend the break-up of central
government in favour of self-governing, self-sufficient bio-regions
(see Sale 1984a and b). Apart from the somewhat astonishing
neglect of the value of individual autonomy in certain proposals,
one could muster empirical and instrumental counterarguments.
Natural regions and areas are today so interpenetrated and trans-
gressed by linked human activities at different spatial scales that
autonomy for such ‘ecologically’ geared governance over and
above present democratic institutions would be difficult to legit-
imise. These multi-level linkages furthermore indicate the
necessity to distribute authority and competence at different
scales and levels so as to provide for degrees of autonomy accept-
able also to actors with differing dependencies on, or even
conflicting interests in, the region’s resources. Secession – the bio-
regionalist solution to the sustainability problem – simply is not
acceptable on grounds of democracy and autonomy. 
It has been argued that because ecological problems are inher-
ently complex, non-reducible, variable, uncertain, spontaneous,
and collective in nature, ecological governance must be different
from conventional government (Dryzek 1987:26 ff.). A truly envi-
ronmental administration ought to be non-compartmentalised,
open, decentralised, anti-technocratic, and flexible (Paehlke and
Where the grass is greener 7
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Torgerson 1990:292 ff.). While these arguments point towards
flexibility in territorial terms, one should not abandon traditional
norms for administrative effectiveness and efficiency. An instru-
mental view of the public administration’s role in ecological
governance must thus find solutions to institutional design that
are (a) acceptable in terms of democracy and autonomy; (b) effi-
cient in achieving sustainable resource management, and (c)
adjusted to the realities of modern, larger-scale and inter-linked
social and economic entities and activities. 
One such idea embraced widely during the 1990s is that of
ecosystem management. This is defined as ‘the application of
ecological and social information, options, and constraints to
achieve desired social benefits within a defined geographic area
and over a specified period’ (Lackey 1998:22, 29). Directed
towards sustaining the health, productivity, and biodiversity of
ecosystems as well as human quality of life, it involves all relevant
stakeholders in defining sustainable alternatives for the environ-
ments in which they live, also integrating social and economic
needs. Eco-system management emphasises place- or region-based
objectives with scopes and approaches defined appropriately, and
developed in a participatory process, for each given unit (Szaro et
al. 1998:3 f.). 
This emphasis of ecosystem management on place- or region-
based objectives developed by participating stakeholders shows
its limitations as the sole territorial basis for building an ecologi-
cally sustainable society. Resource issues, however local the
resource, are linked to large-scale, or rather cross-scale, socio-
economic and political issues. This also indicates that centralised
management cannot be totally replaced by local ecosystem
management. The crucial problems of fit to scale for ecological
governance are thus how local ecosystem management units are
linked to institutions on higher levels without at the same time
losing their fit to the local resource or sacrificing individual
autonomy. This points to the need for inter-linked institutions.
To be effective in the cross-scale perspective just mentioned, local
institutions with recognised spheres of autonomy need connec-
tions to, and backing from, institutions at higher levels. This may
take the form of ‘nested enterprises’ (see Ostrom 1990: 101 f.).
Such nestedness does not necessarily imply a top-down perspec-
tive across the whole spectrum of relations. Neither does it imply
8 Sweden and ecological governance
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a tight, non-flexible distribution of authority (Pritchard Jr. et al.
1998:30 f.). 
With respect to the spatial dimension, the following criteria for
ecologically rational governance may be formulated:
• Governance is ecologically rational to the extent that ecosys-
tem-based management units, such as air sheds, water
catchments, or specific landscape types, have become constitu-
tive elements in the collective management of environment and
natural resources to achieve sustainability. 
• Ecological governance is spatially rational to the extent that it
defines the circles of participating stakeholders and interests in
goal setting and decision-making on actual resource use and
management in accordance with relevant spatial scales.
Ecological governance and time
As an ethic principle for intergenerational equity, sustainability
pits present demands on natural resources against the perceivable
demands of future generations. Against the economic concept of
‘sustained development’ based on expectancy of short- to
medium-term growth it puts the ecological concept of ‘sustainable
development’ concerned with the longer-term viability of the
natural resource base. It brings ecological lifecycles, varying from
millennial geological changes to seasonal and even shorter time
periods, to bear on political time horizons, be they election
periods or long-term ‘plans’. 
How then could political and societal clock time be made
compatible with the life cycles of the natural environment? The
most often recommended political solution is collective self-
binding now to provide autonomy for future generations. They
are held to have the same rights to the earth’s resources as earlier
and present ones. This implies the need to design institutions that
guarantee a transmission of the world’s resources in usable shape
to future generations (see Achterberg 1993:96 f.). However,
quests for sustainability built on the premise of inter-generational
equity must reconcile issues of socio-economic justice today. The
stronger existing human and civil rights are protected, the more
can present actors use natural resources without regard to their
long-term viability. Questions about sustainable resource use are
Where the grass is greener 9
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indeed also questions about rights to the resources. They also
concern whether, and, if so, by whom, present resource users
should be compensated if they are deprived of their user rights in
the interest of future generations. Stretton’s classic rhetorical
question is still valid: Is it worth having a self-binding system of
ecological governance for sustainability ‘if it merely shifts hard-
ships from rich to poor?’ (see Stretton 1976:4f.).
An ecological governance in line with the ‘precautionary prin-
ciple’ must thus get a ‘normative constraining of permissible
policy options’ democratically acceptable and accepted (Barry
1999:133). Natural resource and land-use planning is a well-
known form of normative constraint on future resource use. In
the context of ecological governance, planning refers to
‘conscious, collective determination and co-ordination of social
activities’ to maintain a sustainable society-environment relation-
ship (see Barry 1999:131). In terms of sustainability, however,
present planning is often found wanting (Jänicke and Jörgens
1998:47 f.; see Meadowcroft 1997a:431 ff.). Comprehensive
ecological planning for sustainable development is thus presented
as a permanent process of ‘institutional learning and design’ (see
Meadowcroft 1997b:179). 
However, the potential scale and pervasiveness of such plan-
ning may severely intrude on the autonomy of present resource
users. Therefore, its legitimisation must come from central demo-
cratic government. The preferable way to reconcile stringent
plans for sustainability with the value of user autonomy is
through generous provisions for participation and influence in the
planning process. Elected policy-makers can provide strategic
impulses and interventions, such as consensus talks with relevant
key interests and groups, and voluntary agreements for decen-
tralised implementation in co-operative management regimes (see
Jänicke and Jörgens 1998:30 f.; Meadowcroft 1997b: 182). But
also the outputs from such processes of resource and land-use
planning take the form of regulations binding future action, and
are backed by democratically legitimised state coercion. Certain
resource uses may be totally prohibited or restricted by conditions
spelled out in licences or quota. Some areas or resources may be
set aside for only specifically allowed activities, or spared from all
forms of exploitation (see Lundqvist 2001b:461 ff.).
Another way of approaching the temporal aspect of sustain-
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able resource use is to create closed cycles for materials and
resources flowing through society. Elaborate systems for reuse
and recycling of materials have been introduced in many nations
over the past 10 to 15 years. They involve consumers, producers,
local, regional and central governments, and market-based instru-
ments are often applied to make recycling and reuse work. In
some systems the responsibility for a product is put on the manu-
facturer, and covers the entire life cycle of the product or
material. It is left to the manufacturer to develop the technicali-
ties of this system of recycling and reuse (see Ligteringen 1999:
187 ff.). 
While this concept provides for individual autonomy, its rela-
tionship to sustainable development is precarious. As socially
constructed phenomena, the perceived closed cycles build on
steering the flows of materials and energy through infra-struc-
turally determined stages and locations. The closing is often made
possible only by heavy external inflows of fossil fuels. Second, the
durability of many materials and products continues beyond the
politically foreseeable future. Together with the dynamics of
markets that make companies come and go, producer liability
thus poses difficult temporal problems for the democratic gover-
nance of eco-cycles (see Lidskog 1996).
Flagging catchwords like Factor 10 and environmental certifi-
cation of industries, proponents of ecological modernisation see
increased efficiency of resource use as a way of ‘freeing’ or
preserving resources for future use. Eco-technological innovation
and development opens up for a new phase of industrialisation
where fewer resources are needed to produce the same or larger
amount of services (see Gouldson and Murphy 1997:74 f.). But
for this to come about, new eco-technological markets must be
opened up by state governments through stringent environmental
legislation and economic incentives (Dobers 1997:63 ff., 114 ff.).
To get acceptance for this double strategy, however, proponents
of ecological modernisation must convince industry and the
public that this is a ‘win-win’ solution dissolving the perceived
conflict between economic growth and environmental protection
(Cohen 1998:150). 
Using language that harmonises sustainability with orthodox
economic imperatives, politicians preach that ‘pollution preven-
tion pays’, bringing industry to find anticipatory development of
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green technology profitable (Hajer 1995:26 ff., 273; see Barry
1999:139). While ecological modernisation may provide for
considerable individual autonomy, its links to sustainable devel-
opment have been questioned. The ‘ecological modernisation’
school’s major assumption – resource problems can be solved
through consensual decisions with positive-sum outcomes – is
held to have no explicit, logical link to the specific ecological scale
at which solutions are to be reached (Langhelle 2000:303 ff.).
With regard to the temporal aspects of the society-environment
relationship, the following criteria for ecologically rational gover-
nance may be formulated:
• Governance is ecologically rational to the extent that compre-
hensive resource planning directed towards objectives of
sustainable development contains measures to secure popular
participation and influence over this collective process of self-
binding.
• Governance is ecologically rational to the extent that strategies
of ‘closed cycles’ or increased ‘eco-efficiency’ are constitutive
parts of the efforts to bring about sustainable development.
Ecological governance and knowledge
Quite clearly, restructured or new institutions to promote ecolog-
ically prudent spatial and temporal management of the resource
base imply constraints on individual autonomy. We are then
faced with the question of how such restrictions might be legit-
imised within society. One line of argument holds that
ecologically rational governance can be obtained if scientists and
professionals have the last word because of their exclusive knowl-
edge (Ophuls and Boyan 1992). However, claims for ‘domination
of elites embedded within bureaucratic decision-making bodies
distant from democratic control’ to achieve sustainability cannot
be democratically legitimised (Smith 1996:43 f.). Science cannot
claim a unified knowledge of what is actually sustainable (see
Wynne 1994). To forecast and remedy all possible natural and
social events and unintended consequences of human actions is
simply too tall an order for science or any professional expertise
(de Geus 1996:198). 
Decisions on how to achieve sustainability simply have too far-
12 Sweden and ecological governance
2579Ch1  12/8/03  11:46 AM  Page 12
reaching consequences for the life and welfare of all citizens to
allow for limitations on the autonomy of the demos. A more real-
istic view is that scientific monitoring and assessment of positive
or negative effects of certain resource uses should be subjected to
socio-economic and political debate. This is because scientific
conclusions and assessments imply ‘losers’ and ‘winners’ in the
continuous competition for resources. In a democratic system of
ecological governance, scientific recommendations for specific
resource decisions ‘necessary’ to achieve sustainability must be
weighed against other considerations, such as the provision of
socio-economic welfare for present citizens. 
Since resource use decisions are made under conditions of
uncertainty, however, the assistance of scientific knowledge is
highly needed to provide the best possible evaluation of different
alternatives, both ex ante and ex post. Scientific knowledge of
ecosystems and views on proper resource use should thus be an
integral part of broader social, economic and other considera-
tions, but not have the final word (see EndterWada et al. 1998).
Political decision-makers striving for ecologically rational
resource management should make sure that decisions are
founded on the best possible scientific opinion. But they must also
ensure that resource decisions are politically legitimate.
Therefore, ecologically rational governance must set up institu-
tional arrangements to ‘secure that the application of science is
within rather than beyond democratic regulation’ (Barry
1999:203). 
One way of achieving this is to build up a structure of semi-
autonomous institutions to gather, assess and disseminate
information on sustainable resource management to political
decision-making bodies and to the general public (Jänicke 1997,
Cohen 1998). A long-term strategy for securing scientific knowl-
edge on sustainable development might involve university
departments, independent research and monitoring institutes and
agencies that work much like the semi-autonomous institutions
presently found in the judicial and – to an increasing extent –
financial spheres. Norms of democracy and autonomy mean that
there should also be institutions where the scientific information
on resource use alternatives could be politically evaluated and
judged. Such institutions, be they judicial boards of appeal, public
hearings and other devices for citizen participation, must be easily
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accessible for all the actors and interests wanting to influence or
challenge resource-related decisions. 
The following criteria for ecologically rational governance may
be formulated:
• Governance is ecologically rational to the extent that the struc-
tures built up for developing, assessing and disseminating
science-based knowledge allow for free exchange of comple-
mentary and competing views. 
• Governance is ecologically rational when competing knowl-
edge is made accessible to public debate and scrutiny in the
policy process. 
• Governance is ecologically rational to the extent that scientific
knowledge is brought to bear on, and to interact with, politi-
cal judgement to arrive at democratically legitimate decisions
on how to use and manage natural resources in order to
achieve sustainable development. 
Ecological governance and integration
Policymaking for ecologically sustainable development is embed-
ded in the existing systems of governance with its fragmented
structures, and filtered through competing logics that reflect the
historic institutionalisation of different value structures (see Hanf
and Jansen 1998:4 ff.). Democratic governments have a built-in
respect for autonomy that makes for compromises over resource
management and allocation. Interests that presently make
demands on resources most often find themselves forced to act
according to the logics of the increasingly globalised competitive
market. National politicians are hard pressed to take the short-
term and medium-term economic prospects of their own
countries into account. These competitive, conflicting logics in
turn tend to result in muddled or contradictory resource manage-
ment objectives. Progress towards sustainability then becomes
difficult to achieve, let alone to determine (see Lafferty 1996:13). 
Thus a most crucial issue remains. How should a system of
governance, based on the logic of ecological rationality, be organ-
ised so that ecological concerns are effectively integrated in
policy-making and implementation? This problem of integration
grows as the previous view of environment as a specific policy
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field among others gives way to views of ecological sustainability
as a universal concern to, or constraint on, all human and socie-
tal activities. 
To establish criteria for what should be changed and where to
bring about such integrated ecological governance, one must
observe the intricate relationship between institutions and
organisations. Institutions are ‘symbolic systems, cognitive
constructions and normative rules through which actors cate-
gorise’ their activities and ‘infuse it with meaning and value’,
i.e., provide a logic of action (Hanf and Jansen 1998:4).
Organisations are concerned with action, i.e., with mobilisation
of resources to achieve certain goals and pursue specific values.
Institutionalised values create, influence and develop organisa-
tional practices. 
One is thus led to the conclusion that organisational changes in
themselves would not be sufficient to achieve integrated gover-
nance. Value changes that enhance an ecologically benign
interplay between structures and agents must somehow be
injected into the organisation of ecological governance to ‘influ-
ence the behaviour of agents by affecting the conditions under
which they make decisions’ (Barry 1999:104). Organisational
changes must thus provide mechanisms for instilling common
values of ecological rationality into its structures and agents.
Effective ecological governance for sustainability ‘can be realised
only if infrastructure policies become “ecologised” and there is a
build-up of “substantial environmental capacities in the non-envi-
ronmental policy areas”’ (Knoepfel 1995:214, 229). 
‘Ecologisation’ can be achieved by inserting guarantees for an
ecologically rational decision-making process. Examples are
mandatory inclusion of ecological objectives and competence
within all resource-related administrations, obligations to consult
with ecological administrations, or mandatory requirements to
develop environmental impact assessments for all resource use
and management-related projects of some scale (see Knoepfel
1995:221 ff.). Another way of improving the effectiveness in
ecological governance is to develop criteria for ‘good’ ecological
performance. Common measures ‘set in parameters that have
ecological and social references, and linked to agreed norms and
targets’ can be introduced (O’Riordan and Voisey 1997:10). One
way here is to create standardised sustainability indicators (see
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Thomas and Tennant 1998). Another is found in the efforts to
introduce measures of good green conduct, such as green bench-
marking and green certification, for both public governmental
bodies and private business. Closely related to benchmarking and
certification are the strategies of green labelling, green purchasing
and tender and green accounting. A crucial thing to observe and
judge is how and to what extent such measures are explicitly
adapted to institutionalised values of autonomy.
With regard to the integrative dimension, the following crite-
rion for ecologically rational governance may be formulated:
• Ecological governance is integrated in so far as ‘ecological’
values and norms, ecological capacities, and codes of ecologi-
cally good conduct are actually internalised in the political and
administrative decision-making process related to the use and
management of resources.
Ecological governance, democracy and individual autonomy 
This book builds on the normative argument that ecologically
rational governance must strive for sustainability within limits
drawn by democracy and the value of individual autonomy.
When laid out in ideal type fashion, such a system of governance
may seem attractive in terms of sustainability. Still, its practical
implementation will most certainly intensify conflicts over when,
how, why and by whom resources should be used. However
careful the balance is struck between sustainability and auton-
omy, there will thus be ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. The stronger the
value of autonomy is pursued at present, the more individual
actors today can utilise natural resources in ways not compatible
with the need for long-term, sustainable resource management.
On the other hand, the stronger the pursuit of long-term ecologi-
cal sustainability, the more threatened may be the value of
individual autonomy (see Lafferty and Meadowcroft 1996a:5).
Government is the main mechanism for solving such political
conflicts. But in democratic government, collectively binding
decisions on where this balance ought to be struck are dependent
on the configuration and distribution of power among actors and
interests, entrenched in institutions and organisations.
Ecologically rational governance thus seems bound to meet
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with political opposition and questioning of its legitimacy. How,
then, could individual autonomy and political influence be safe-
guarded in a system of governance geared towards ecological
sustainability? In the latter half of the 1990s, it was increasingly
argued that this question was wrongly put. Proponents of ecolog-
ical modernisation held that promotion of green growth would do
away with the presumed conflict between sustainability and indi-
vidual autonomy (see Jansen, Osland and Hanf 1998:291 ff.).
However, this view has been questioned on grounds of both
sustainability and autonomy. As for sustainability, ecological
modernisation ‘follows, in essence, past patterns of economic
development, particularly the equation of economic growth with
human social progress’ (Barry 1999:252 f.). A comparative study
of West European environmental governance found general
agreement that ‘none of the most active promoters of ecological
modernisation will achieve its goals in terms of the central cate-
gories and criteria of environmental policy’ (Jansen, Osland and
Hanf 1998:319). In terms of democracy and individual auton-
omy, ecological modernisation is criticised because its strong
emphasis on market-based instruments ‘addresses individuals and
groups in society as consumers’ rather than as ‘democratic citi-
zens under the law’ (Barry 1999:227). It encourages people to
think in terms of marginal behavioural change guided by the
criterion of individual economic gain. 
However, argue the critics, ecologically sustainable develop-
ment necessitates a massive change in cultural values. This can be
politically legitimised through free and informed deliberations on
what the institutionalised societal values should really be about.
This implies a concern with measures for participatory democracy
where autonomous citizens are ‘encouraged to consider the inter-
ests of all those potentially affected by the democratic process’
(Barry 1999:228 f.). When individuals are addressed as citizens,
their sphere of autonomy is widened. They are empowered to
participate in, and deliberate over which collectively binding deci-
sions should be made with respect to resource use and
management. Democratic governance, in which citizens have a
guaranteed sphere of influence also over collective matters, is
after all ‘a process in which we all come to internalise the inter-
ests of each other and indeed of the larger world around us’
(Goodin 1996:18).
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Several innovations in environmental policy provide for
more varied and intense public participation. Right-to-know
legislation, public hearings, impact assessment procedures, envi-
ronmental mediation, and regulatory negotiation are all examples
of designs which ideally bring people together under conditions of
free and open discourse to reach decisions through the strength of
the better argument (Dryzek 1995:302). It should be noted,
however, that ecologically rational governance in terms of space
and time both strengthens the need for democracy and autonomy
and complicates the realisation of these objectives. The picture of
ecological governance as a multi-level system of ‘nested enter-
prises’ indicates that its democratic legitimacy is dependent
on each level having spheres of autonomy that allow for
meaningful popular participation (Ostrom 1990:89 f.).
Decentralisation and delegation of authority and responsibility
are called for in this respect, as are specific programs directly
addressing local and ecosystem-based entities of governance with
recognised spheres of competence. The inter-generational
perspective of ecological governance calls for mechanisms to
enhance the interests of future generations. Arguments have
therefore been raised in favour of autonomy restrictions on the
individuals of today to provide autonomy of choice for future
generations. There are proposals to give rights not only to future
generations, and even to certain types of nature, in order to guar-
antee sustainability (see Wissenburg 1993).
With respect to the democracy and autonomy aspects of
ecological governance, the following criteria can be formulated:
• Governance is ecologically rational in terms of democracy
and individual autonomy to the extent that the management
of environment and natural resources is subjected to
political debate and decision-making in democratic processes
open to meaningful public participation at all levels of gover-
nance.
• Governance is ecologically rational in terms of individual
autonomy to the extent that the balance among different
policy instruments used in such governance is explicitly
tilted in favour of safeguarding individual rights across gener-
ations.
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Ecological governance and the authority of government
It was argued above that collective ecological management in
accordance with the logic of ecological rationality implies and
even requires a multi-level governance approach. Admittedly,
governance is an elusive concept. It refers to an inclusive and
comprehensive process of co-ordination and direction of public
and private actions and resources. Governance is concerned with
‘achieving collective action in the realm of public affairs’, where
it is not always fully possible ‘to rest on recourse to the authority
of the state’ (Stoker 2000:93). This implies that the nation state is
not the logical top rung on the ladder of governmental units
involved. 
But exactly what role does government play in governance?
The literature presents us with two opposing views of the ‘ecology
of governance’, i.e., the relations among actors in the structures
and processes of governing. At one end, central government is
seen as dwindling to a position as one among equals within a core
structure of governance consisting of inter-linked networks and
communities with both public and private sector participants,
mutually interdependent on each other for resources such as
money, expertise, and legitimacy. Indeed, since ‘integrated
networks resist government steering, develop their own policies
and mould their environments’, new governance comes close to
‘governing without government’ (Rhodes 1996:652, 658). 
At the other end, it is argued that hierarchical relations are still
very important. Governments do indeed ‘establish the basic
parameters within which markets, and even social groups, func-
tion’. The role of the state is ‘transforming from a role based in
constitutional powers towards a role based in co-ordination and
fusion of public and private interests’ (Pierre and Peters 2000:25,
39). In fact, ‘linkages upward towards transnational government
and downward towards sub-national government should be more
thought of as state strategies to reassert control and not as proof
of states surrendering to competing models of governance’ (Pierre
and Peters 2000:16; italics mine). While the role and power of the
state can vary between sectors, it retains control over such critical
resources in the process of governance as legislation and grants,
which gives it a decisive role in producing desired outcomes. The
state’s role may in fact be strengthened: ‘[I]t tends to gain control
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at the implementation stage by having in essence co-opted social
interests that might otherwise oppose its actions’ (Pierre and
Peters 2000:49). 
What, then, is the role and fate of the democratic state’s
authority in multi-level ecological governance? One way to
analyse this is to look at the historic record of state authority in
society and the economy. The pattern of state regulation and
control in Sweden is one where ‘the state has taken a higher
profile in society, pursuing agendas of provision and distribution’
(Pierre 2000:244). There is thus a historically developed institu-
tional interest in maintaining the authority of national
government. This means that there is institutional capacity (see
Jänicke 1997) for the state to function as the ‘needle’s eye’ in the
multi-level institutionalisation of the logic of ecological rational-
ity. Upward to the international and global levels, the state
sovereignly enters into agreements and assumes duties in the
common pursuit of global sustainability. Downward to regions
and municipalities, the state may delegate responsibilities for
implementing these internationally agreed upon measures.
Admittedly, there are several semi-autonomous as well as politi-
cally independent branches of government. However, the state is
vested with enough constitutionally legitimised resource-mobilis-
ing capacity and coercive competence to retain authority ‘in its
own right’ (Lundqvist 2001a). 
Another way is to start from the spatial character of sustain-
ability problems. The scale of such problems as climate change
necessitates a global approach; ‘ecologism in one country’ is
impossible. The individual nation state becomes – at least morally
– bound to implement agreed-upon international measures.
Regional organisations such as the EU call for equal conditions
with respect to production and consumption of goods and serv-
ices. These movements towards ‘nested enterprises’ undermine
the individual state’s authority to regulate economic activities
within its territory to promote ecological sustainability over and
above the levels prevailing for the Union as a whole. At the same
time, EU directives related to ecologically sustainable develop-
ment may force national governments to delegate power and
authority for the management of particular eco-systems – such as
water basins – to local or even sub-local units. 
How far and how intensely ecologically rational governance
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challenges the authority of the democratic state is thus open to
empirical analysis. Recent comparative research does not
conclude with certainty whether or not sustainable development
really is democratically obtainable. Some contend that democratic
governance – particularly if it involves corporativist streaks – and
traditional environmental policy are mutually enhancing (Jänicke
1997:12 f.; Crepaz 1995; Jahn 1998). Others argue that democ-
racies seem to have severe difficulties in adopting integrated and
effective policies of sustainable resource management (Eckerberg
and Lafferty 1997; O’Riordan and Voisey 1997). Liberal democ-
racy with its piecemeal style of policy-making may prove
insufficient for achieving sustainability (Hayward 1996:232). The
sheer comprehensiveness of public policies needed to steer natural
resource use towards sustainability in both production and
consumption might cause government overload. The efforts to
control individual behaviour might stumble on the constitutional
‘inaccessibility’ of citizens’ private, autonomous choices as
market actors (see Ligteringen 1999). On the other hand, some
aspects of the existing democratic state might be conducive to a
system of ecologically rational governance that values individual
autonomy. This is more likely if the capacity of the political
system as a whole for public participation and administrative
integration is well developed, as well as if there is a political
cultural context characterised by a co-operative policy style. 
Chapter 7 of this book will assess Sweden’s emerging system of
ecological governance in terms of their effects on the authority of
national government. The approach is somewhat different from
that of the other empirical chapters. Instead of establishing
specific assessment criteria, the themes and patterns of the earlier
chapters are brought to bear on the problem of authority. The
objective is to shed further light on the democratic state’s power
and authority to actually bring public and private efforts and
resources together to pursue a common objective of ecologically
sustainable development. Could the democratic state also become
the ecological state?
Sweden and ecological governance – a case in point?
Developing criteria for rational ecological governance is one
thing, choosing the most fruitful ways and cases for comparing
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actual developments and performance to these criteria another. A
basic assumption underlying this study is that environmental
policies have been undergoing thorough changes in the 1990s.
This is particularly the case following the 1987 Brundtland
Commission report and the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. The quest
for sustainable development has indeed placed new responsibili-
ties on the world community of states to integrate ecological
concerns into their structures and processes of governance.
An empirical answer as to how far we succeed in governing
ourselves to secure both democracy and sustainable development
could be sought through some form of comparison among a
randomly chosen number of nations. It could also be sought by
systematically comparing some class of nations that show simi-
larities in some characteristics crucial to the enhancement of
ecological concerns in governance. This latter strategy is
employed in a recent comparison of ‘high consumption societies’
and their strategies for implementing sustainable development.
Several arguments are put forward in favour of such a compara-
tive approach. One is normative. The internationally
acknowledged principle of ‘differentiated responsibility’ obliges
developed industrial nations to take special action, since their
high levels of production and consumption lead to ‘ecological
footprints’, i.e., pressure on environment and resources that tran-
scend far beyond their geographical territories. Another is based
on cumulativity. Several studies of environmental policy have
shown the importance for environmental policy of the countries´
productive, technological, financial and political/administrative
capacities (see Jänicke 1997). These two arguments lead to a
third; ‘the affluent societies of the North’ provide critical cases for
studying how far ecological concerns have penetrated the gover-
nance of those nations. That these countries are also democracies
only adds to this criticality (see Lafferty and Meadowcroft
2000a:3). 
Sweden is part of that comparative study. The final assessment
places the country in a group of nations whose governmental
response to sustainable development is classified as ‘enthusiastic’.
Sweden is said to have ‘an established reputation as an environ-
mental policy innovator and this has been carried forward over
the past decade into the policy realm of sustainable development’
(Lafferty and Meadowcroft 2000b:412 f.). Recent comparative
22 Sweden and ecological governance
2579Ch1  12/8/03  11:46 AM  Page 22
studies of the implementation of Local Agenda 21 have charac-
terised Sweden as ‘setting the pace’, showing ‘quick progress’, and
being ‘at the leading edge’ in the LA 21 process (see, e.g.,
Eckerberg, Coenen and Lafferty 1999:242 ff.; see also below,
pp. 168–71).
This means that critical case arguments for studying how high
consumption societies have gone about implementing sustainable
development within the democratic framework are even more
supportive for selecting Sweden as a case in point. If any country
has come anywhere near meeting the criteria for ecologically
rational government, a ‘forerunner’ like Sweden might be such a
country. This also means that concern for cumulativity speaks in
favour of making Sweden the case for analysis. While there is
much theoretical literature on how ecological governance or a
democratic ecological state should be designed and function,
much less has been done to find out how such governance is actu-
ally working. A comparison between an empirical ‘front’ case and
cumulatively established normative criteria for democratic and
ecologically rational governance could thus be a valuable addi-
tion to the current discourse. 
Such a comparison of empirical strategies and measures with
normatively established criteria should, to be of any cumulative
value, be based on a systematic selection and treatment of data.
What of the Swedish strategies, policies and measures could be
deemed relevant here? One criterion is the timing of Swedish
action. I have predominantly selected Swedish political action
related to sustainable development in the 1990s, i.e., a period
when the perspectives of the Brundtland Commission and the Rio
Earth Summit were making themselves felt and gradually
accepted nationally as well as internationally. In terms of the
content of strategies and policies chosen for analysis, I have
concentrated particularly on the ecological aspect of sustainabil-
ity. In so doing, I have tried as far as possible to cover actions that
seem pertinent to each of the dimensions of rational ecological
governance discussed above. 
The reader will find that I have deliberately chosen to concen-
trate on the national efforts to bring about ecologically rational
governance. This may of course fly in the face of those arguing –
rightly – that strategies for sustainable development cannot be
successfully implemented by individual nation states. However, I
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have applied this national perspective in order to be able to draw
some comparative lessons about what the individual nation can
and cannot achieve, thereby illuminating how and why national
strategies may succeed in, or fall short of successfully promoting
ecologically rational governance. It may also illuminate the
particular political, institutional and other circumstances that
seem to promote progress or provide obstacles to ecologically
rational governance. This would – so I hope – open up an
extended exchange and a closer connection between green politi-
cal and democratic theory on the one hand, and the comparative
study of politics for sustainable development on the other.
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2
‘Nested enterprises’? Spatial
dimensions of ecological governance
Do the twain ever meet? ‘Natural’ and ‘man-made’ systems and
the problem of scale
The nature–society interface: different scales, problems of fit,
and nestedness 
Space is of central concern to rational ecological governance.
Environmental problems and resource management issues cross
the man-made scales of local, regional or national governments.
The question thus becomes how ‘to negotiate a better fit’ in
responding to very complex ecological challenges (Pritchard Jr. et
al. 1998:30 f.). Elinor Ostrom’s answer in her now classic
Governing the Commons is twofold. The underlying principle in
her model of stable, ecosystem-based governance is one of
congruence between a natural ecosystem and the unit of gover-
nance for that system. Regimes for the use and management of
natural resources must thus have clearly defined boundaries, and
the users/managers of the resource should have their right to
organise recognised by external governmental authorities.
Pointing to the complexity posed by the crossing scales of natural
and man-made systems, and thus the problems of scale and co-
ordination in ecological governance, she recommends a spatial
web of ‘nested enterprises’. Smaller-scale resource regimes are
linked in multiple layers to form larger entities of resource gover-
nance (Ostrom 1990:90 ff., 101 f.). 
Admittedly, Ostrom’s classic study deals above all with single-
interest, single-purpose resource regimes. Ecosystems of some size
are, however, usually subjected to multiple, often conflicting
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claims and uses. This makes the problem of designing and co-
ordinating units for ecologically rational governance even more
complex. However, I argue that the idea of nested enterprises
does imply that multi-faceted interests and uses of shared natural
resources can be organised into a proper response to problems of
ecological governance. I therefore examine the ideas of ecosystem
management in order to formulate operational criteria for evalu-
ating Sweden’s performance in terms of spatially rational
ecological governance.
Ecosystem management – basic features 
The first issue of ecosystem management is to define the unit to
be managed. An ecosystem is a community of organisms that
functions as an integrated energy-nutrient processing system. As
such, it has physical structures, such as soil, plants and animals,
and exhibits functions of energy flows and nutrient cycling.
Ecosystems do have both space and time attributes. However, ‘no
boundary, border or classification system can adequately cate-
gorise and organise all of the information to support an ecological
approach’ (Sexton et al. 1998:168). Ecosystems grade into one
another and are nested within a matrix of interrelated ecosystems
of different sizes (Szaro et al. 1998:2). Still, we can define certain
types of ecosystems. Some are bounded naturally, like water
catchments, or topographically, like mountain ranges (see
Brussard et al. 1998:11 ff.). 
Ecosystems provide the basis for sustenance and reproduction
of human life. This human dimension means that to become
meaningful units for management, ecosystems must be delineated
in ways that have meaning and significance for people within and
outside that area as management units. They must thus be defined
in terms compatible with the problems of the actors benefiting
from or dependent on the natural resources and the ecological
services of the area (Lackey 1998:24). As management units, they
may build on, but not be constrained by existing political and
administrative jurisdictional boundaries. Governance units at
local and regional levels can be modified to match such areas as
water basins, air sheds, or mountain ranges. From a management
point of view, however, it is important to have a core definition
of the spatial area in order to enhance the effectiveness of the
administrative operational unit for that area (Slocombe 1998:34).
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What then should we mean by ecosystem management (ESM)?
It is evident that there has been an evolution in the views on what
constitutes the proper aims and content. In terms of our double
standard of sustainability and autonomy, the traditional view of
ESM showed little concern for autonomy. Many of the early defi-
nitions contended that ESM should be run by expert managers
who wilfully and skilfully use and integrate an established knowl-
edge base to achieve already decided objectives, usually framed in
terms of the viability of the ecosystem. The need for participation
by present users and the population of the area in decision-
making was not recognised (Freemuth 1996:413).
However, this view of the ESM as best left to professionals is
rapidly fading. Scientific information is important for effective
ecosystem management, but is only one element in a decision-
making process that is fundamentally one of public and private
choice (Lackey 1998:21 ff.). Nowadays, ESM is seen as a demo-
cratic process that requires public participation to create
consensus on the most proper use of resources. This is achieved
on the basis of an integrative use of knowledge – ecological,
economic, social and managerial – not only to maintain ecosys-
tem sustainability and biological diversity but also to support
human culture through sustainable economies and social civic
communities (Berry et al. 1998:56; Szaro et al. 1998:6). ESM is
thus now seen as involving relevant stakeholders in defining
ecologically sustainable alternatives for the interactions of people
and the environments in which they live. The implementation of
these alternatives is achieved through a full integration of social
and economic needs into management decisions (Pavlikakis and
Tsihrintzis 2000:265 ff). 
Ecosystem management and existing units of governance:
alternative ways to negotiate a ‘better fit’
The inclusion of different stakeholders and interests in ESM
means that conflicting economic and social demands enter the
process (see Jones et al. 1995:166). This, and the fact that stake-
holders’ actions have economic effects across areas of various
scales, means that the distribution (read ‘nesting’) of authority
and responsibility across natural and institutional scales becomes
a core issue for rational ecological governance (see Szaro et al.
1998:3 f.). 
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But where should the collectively binding decisions be made to
allow for a better fit to scale? The underlying premise in the more
recent discourse seems to be that the actors and interests living in
and/or socially and economically dependent on the ESM unit’s
resources should have considerable space for self-regulation, i.e.,
to make and apply binding resource decisions for the designated
area. Given the spatial delineation of present jurisdictions, this
may involve at least three designs, i.e., scaling down, scaling up,
or working sideways. Scaling down means transfer of authority
and responsibility to the ecosystem level, if that is smaller in size
than the political/administrative unit presently vested with juris-
diction over the ESM area in question. Working sideways or
scaling up denotes strategies for use when the delineated ESM
area covers space across boundaries of already existing jurisdic-
tions. These units will then have to relinquish powers horizontally
or vertically to the trans-boundary ESM unit. 
Used in this way, the ESM approach would mean an increase
in autonomy for the stakeholders directly affected by ESM deci-
sions. However, there could be problems in terms of nestedness.
The use of natural resources and the effects thereof may have
ecological, socio-economic and cultural repercussions way
beyond the designated ecosystem management area. To make this
alternative of self-governance at the ESM level acceptable, its
mandate must thus be compatible with democratically established
national and regional sustainability objectives, and bounded by
authority and power at the higher jurisdictional levels, e.g., the
region or the state. This means a need to create co-operative
mechanisms among agencies and actors through changes in the
existing institutional and organisational pattern. At a minimum,
meaningful co-operation will require resolving conflicting
mandates and integrating management goals among different
jurisdictions and agents (Cortner et al. 1998:162; Brussard et al.
1998:14). 
The state has the power to establish overarching objectives and
the scale of natural resource use in society. It is the central
government’s responsibility to determine the ‘law of the land’,
e.g., to provide for a decentralisation of certain decision-making
authority, as well as responsibility for implementing sustainabil-
ity measures that are functional in an ecological and resource
management sense. Such authoritative linking of levels of gover-
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nance, be it scaling down to regional or local governments,
scaling up to the central level, or cross-level co-operative schemes,
are strategies continuously used for restructuring governance to
adapt to new circumstances. For such re-organisational efforts to
be seen as ecologically rational, however, there must at least be
allusions, and preferably direct adaptations to ecologically rele-
vant scales. 
Criteria for spatially rational ecological governance
We can now formulate some operational criteria for spatially
rational ecological governance. First, at its core are place bound
units with clearly defined boundaries. The delineation is based on
ecologically relevant characteristics, such as natural or topo-
graphical features. Second, spatially rational ecological
governance means that the circle of relevant principal stakehold-
ers and participants is defined on the grounds of the area’s natural
or topographical characteristics. Finally, spatially rational ecolog-
ical governance through ecosystem-based management units
works within a larger web of ‘nested enterprises’, i.e., interlinked
decision-making units and processes of scaling down, working
sideways and scaling up in adherence to relevant ecological scales.
• Ecological governance is spatially rational when air sheds,
water catchments, or specific landscape types are constitutive
elements in the collective management of environment and
natural resources to achieve sustainability. 
• Ecological governance is spatially rational to the extent that it
defines the circles of stakeholders and interests in goal setting
and decision-making on actual resource use and management
in accordance with relevant spatial scales.
‘Scaling down’ – decentralisation to local government
Administrative decentralisation of environmental affairs in the
1980s
Despite ‘misfits’ with ecosystem boundaries, local governments
are of crucial importance to ecologically rational governance. In
Sweden, there is a long history of local governance; municipalities
have a constitutional responsibility to attend to the common
interests and collective welfare of their inhabitants, and are vested
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with strong tax powers for this purpose. Scaling down along
traditional lines of public authority means decentralisation from
central to regional and local levels of government. Over the last
decades the Swedish state has transferred an increasingly heavy
burden of responsibilities for implementing national policies.
What has been the pattern of such ‘traditional’ decentralisation
in environmental affairs over the last decades? The authority
to issue permits for polluting activities under the 1969
Environmental Protection Act was originally very centralised. A
reform in 1981 delegated all permit issues – except those of
national significance – to the Regional Administrations. The 1981
reform opened up for municipalities to take over – by agreement
– some or all of the County Administration’s supervision of
polluting activities within the municipality. However, only few of
the 286 municipalities sought such widened responsibilities
during the 1980s (SOU 1987:32, p. 200). 
The 1988/89 environmental reform redefined activities covered
by the Environment Protection Act according to duration, scope,
and effects on man and the environment. Half of the large plants
and facilities covered by the National Licensing Board procedures
were deferred to the Regional Administrations. Authority to issue
environmental permits to about 6,000 medium-sized and small
plants and facilities was decentralised from the regional level to
the municipal Environment and Health Protection Committees
(EHPCs). These Committees already handled more than 4,000
smaller facilities and activities requiring prior ‘notification’.
Decentralisation of supervisory responsibilities meant that the
municipal EHPCs would from then on supervise all permit or
notification activities within the local government’s jurisdiction
(SOU 1987:32, p. 309 f.). 
While such changes may bring some gains in local autonomy,
their contribution to spatially rational ecological governance is
less certain. The drive for resource efficiency might encourage
inter-municipal co-operation on environmental issues. Data from
a 1991 survey to Swedish local Chief Environmental Inspectors
show that more than half of the municipalities were engaged in
formally organised co-operation on water and air quality moni-
toring and surveillance. Nearly 60 per cent of the registered
co-operative contacts concerned neighbouring municipalities.
Furthermore, almost nine out of ten reported co-operative
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activities with municipalities within the same region. In terms of
authority, only one out of six CEIs said that the co-operative
organisations had authority to make decisions on resources or
actions binding on the participating municipalities (CEIS 1991). 
Thus, while decentralisation along traditional administrative
boundaries provides municipalities with more autonomy within
their territory, it contains inter-municipal co-operation within
and along traditional administrative lines. This has consequences
for spatially rational ecological governance. Municipalities co-
operate more with non-neighbours inside the same region than
with neighbours across the county border, even if close co-opera-
tion with the latter would be more rational in terms of ecosystem
management (see below, pp. 36–9).
Freedom to organise; the 1991 reform of municipal government 
The 1991 survey revealed the existence of a lively network among
professionals at the local and regional levels of government.
When asked about their contact network, the CEIs reported very
frequent contacts with environmental administrators in other
municipalities. These contacts were even more frequent than
those with their local politicians or with local action groups, local
media, and local associations. CEI contacts with environmental
officers at the county level are almost as lively as the contacts with
municipal politicians. There is thus a very specific professional
network on environmental and resource management at the local
and regional levels (CEIS 1991). 
The impact of such professional networks on the effectiveness
of ecological governance (see further ch. 6) very much depends on
the position of ecological competence within local government.
The new Municipal Act of 1991 gave Swedish municipalities
wide-ranging autonomy on how to organise local government.
Except for a Municipal Board of Directors (elected from the polit-
ical majority on the Municipal Council) and an Election
Committee, earlier mandatory boards and committees can be
substituted by an organisation tailored to the needs and political
will of the individual municipality. 
Within a year after this reform, 57 Swedish municipalities (or
20 per cent) had abandoned their EHPCs in favour of other
organisational solutions (SOU 1993:19, p. 41 f.). The amalgama-
tion of traditional, mandatory environment and health protection
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tasks with other local government activities continued during the
1990s. One line is legal-administrative; as many as 105 out of
Sweden’s 288 municipalities had merged all decision-making on
activities needing permits in Environmental and Building Permit
Committees after the 1998 local elections. Another is environ-
mentalist; traditional EHPCs existed in 83 municipalities, and 35
local governments had Environment Committees. A resource
management perspective can also be discerned; 19 local govern-
ments had integrated Environmental and Planning Committees.
Finally, there is a risk management view; 16 municipalities had
joint Environmental and Rescue Committees. It is further notable
that nearly 10 per cent of Sweden’s local governments did not
have a politically appointed Committee with the word ‘environ-
ment’ in its name in 1998 (Hagevi 1999). 
There seems to be no necessary link between a politically
appointed Committee dealing with environmental issues and an
independent Environmental Administration. Soon after the 1991
reform, 25 per cent of all local governments had integrated
environmental protection officers within other municipal admin-
istrations, like the Real Estate and/or Building or the Technical
and Infrastructure. This trend towards integration of environ-
mental issues into other parts of the local governmental
organisation was particularly visible in smaller municipalities
(SOU 1993:19, p. 43). All in all, the organisational changes in
local government during the 1990s seem to have weakened the
possibilities for ecological governance both politically and admin-
istratively.
Agenda 21 and local measures for sustainable development
As an outflow of the Rio Conference on Agenda 21, the Swedish
Cabinet in early 1994 proposed that all Swedish municipalities
should formulate their own Agenda 21, based on local problems
and alternatives for local solutions. The process should encourage
local groups and interests to engage in a discourse to find alter-
native, less resource-demanding and less environmentally
disturbing ways to conduct their daily activities, and integrate
sustainability concerns into every branch of the local government
itself. The municipal Local Agenda 21 documents were expected
to contain a comprehensive sustainable development programme
for the municipality (Cabinet Bill 1993/94:111, pp 63 ff.). The
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Cabinet’s Environmental Advisory Board (situated in the
Environment Ministry) distributed a handbook to guide the
municipalities in their LA 21 process with an emphasis on ecolog-
ically sustainable development (see SOU 1994:128). Money from
employment support programmes was allocated to local govern-
ments for hiring Agenda 21 co-ordinators. Most municipalities
came to make use of this support. 
Literally interpreted, the 1994 bill implied wide-ranging auton-
omy for municipal governments. Local action programmes for
sustainable development should be drawn up without interference
from higher governmental levels. A lively activity unfolded at the
local level. By the end of 1996, more than half of Sweden’s local
governments had appointed LA 21 co-ordinators. Municipalities
arranged seminars and courses, and gave practical advice on how
to proceed to different target groups as well as to the general
public. The Swedish report to the UN follow-up conference on
Agenda 21 in 1997 stated that ‘all’ Swedish municipalities had
started work on Local Agenda 21 (SOU 1997:105). 
By spring 1998, 56 per cent of Swedish local governments had
adopted an LA 21 action plan. The political centrality is revealed
by the fact that (a) over three quarters of the municipalities set
aside a special LA 21 budget, and (b) over 90 per cent of the plans
were adopted by the highest political bodies, i.e., the Municipal
Council or the Council’s Board of Directors. Around 70 per cent
of the adopted action plans were furthermore co-ordinated and
implemented by either the Board of Directors or a specially
appointed LA 21 Committee or Delegation. Only 12 per cent
were under the ægis of the Environmental and Health Protection
Committees. This implies that most municipalities viewed
sustainable development as involving a broader resource manage-
ment perspective than that of traditional environmental policy
(Brundin and Eckerberg 1999).
The municipal LA 21 activities scored high in terms of auton-
omy and democracy. Most local governments took active steps to
involve their citizens in the process, and three quarters launched
multi-faceted campaigns, including public meetings, educational
activities, study circles, and direct information to the households.
As many as 40 per cent reported that the local civil society initi-
ated, or played an important role, in the LA 21 process. General
interest was reported as increasing, or at least not changing, in
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about 75 per cent of the municipalities in spring 1998 (Brundin
and Eckerberg 1999).
At issue, then, is how Sweden’s LA 21 activity scores in terms
of effects on sustainable development. Are the LA 21 action plans
actually integrated into the daily activities of local government,
and if so, to what extent? Except for traditional environmental
tasks, integration is slow. The 1996 changes in planning and
building legislation directed local governments to strengthen
citizen involvement in detailed planning and to integrate the LA
21 and regular planning processes (Cabinet Bill 1994/95:230).
However, just over 50 per cent of the municipalities had formally
decided to join these two processes at the turn of the century, and
half of the LA co-ordinators reported that there had been little or
no practical integration by 1998. Municipal finance, budget and
accounting processes are, by far, the municipal sectors least inte-
grated in the LA 21 activities (Brundin and Eckerberg 1999). 
There are doubts about the prospects of LA 21 as a vehicle for
ecologically rational local governance. The Cabinet’s 1998 deci-
sion to provide SEK 50,000 to each of the 70 smallest
municipalities (see Parliament Housing Committee 1998/99,
p. 18) may not suffice to help economically hard-pressed local
governments. As one close observer puts it: ‘It is clear that that
the gap between pioneer and laggard municipalities is increasing.’
This implies that ‘those municipalities that have few staff and
little resources to manage comprehensive LA 21 programmes’ will
not live up to the original 1994 expectations of comprehensive
sustainable development plans (Eckerberg 2001:35).
Between resource mobilisation and sustainable resource
governance: a continuing local dilemma
Local governments are encountering three different logics in rela-
tion to resource management, all affecting the possibilities of
establishing an ecologically rational system of governance. To
mobilise resources, i.e., to increase the tax base and induce local
growth, they see merit in going alone. To use available resources
efficiently, there are strong incentives in favour of co-operation to
gain economics of scale in, e.g., large infrastructure investments.
To achieve resource sustainability, dependence on other local
governments may be quite obvious – like the case of communities
downstream from polluting industries – or less distinguishable,
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like acidification caused by long range transports of air pollutants
(Lundqvist 1998:95 f.). 
The main feature of the decentralisation measures just
described is that they have vested more legal and administrative
competence in local governments for decisions that bind actors
within the spatial unit of the municipality. The changes in plan-
ning and environmental legislation up to the Environmental Code
of 1999 have this spatial implication. In particular, the powers
inherent in the local governments’ planning monopoly are crucial.
The Master Plans (översiktsplaner) are a rolling, more or less
continuous exercise in which municipalities lay out visions and
plans for the use of land, eco-services, and the built environment.
Such exercises clearly invite local governments to work within the
logic of resource mobilisation, i.e., to adopt an exclusively intra-
municipal perspective to maximise the developmental potential
and thus, hopefully, the attractiveness of the municipality. In fact,
very few inter-municipal co-operative arrangements are found in
planning (Lundqvist 1998:100).
It is indeed somewhat of a spatial irony that the Local Agenda
21 process has been organised along these traditional jurisdic-
tional lines, despite the central government’s emphasis on
ecological sustainability as the core of that process. The local
government initiates the process within the borders of the munic-
ipality. Co-operation among municipalities to make action plans
for common pool resources is at best an added bonus, not some-
thing set out as a precondition for the process. 
Informal co-operation among environmental and planning
professionals across municipal borders may be a way of address-
ing the spatial problem of ecosystem management in a
decentralised system of government. But the extent to which
ecological rationality prevails in local decision-making is then
dependent on the political and administrative strength of the
proponents of the precautionary principle. The reorganisation of
local government taking place in the wake of the 1991 reform
implies that both the political and the professional strength in
municipal government may have become weaker with the diffu-
sion of the environmental functions into several other, and
structurally stronger, local administrations.
The developments in local government during the 1990s as a
result of decentralisation and municipal reorganisation, and even
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more as a result of the financial squeeze prevailing for most of
the decade, seem to point in the direction of a continuous
dilemma for ecological governance. Admittedly, the Regional
Administrations have some possibilities to block ecologically
questionable local actions and to initiate regional co-ordination
of resource management. However, the dominant strategy of
vesting authority in the hands of local governments provides few
incentives and possibilities of a spatially rational system of
ecological governance where decision-making capacity transcends
administrative borders to follow ecosystem boundaries. 
‘Working sideways’: local and regional governmental
co-operation
Water catchments – from mutual monitoring to actual
management?
If Sweden were to be divided politically and administratively on
the basis of main water catchments, there would be 119 units of
governance. The history of co-operation in water catchments
dates back to the 1950s, when Swedish municipalities initiated
and organised joint water quality management associations and
boards. By 1993, there were over 50 catchment-wide associations
in operation, varying in size from water management associations
of the big lakes Vänern, Vättern, Mälaren, and the large rivers,
e.g., Dalälven, and Göta älv, to water management committees in
the small catchments in the Skåne region. Membership consists of
municipal governments, local business, farming and forestry
organisations, and others. The average size of membership was
25, varying from 52 in the water associations to 12 in the water
committees. The catchment organisations do indeed transcend
municipal and regional boundaries. When controlling for multi-
ple drainage basin memberships, a 1988 study found that as many
as 178 of the then 284 Swedish municipalities participated in
organised co-operation on water quality management. At least
one dozen were members of three such organisations. About half
of the basin-wide organisations involved municipalities in at least
two counties (Enell et al. 1988).
However, their authority and responsibilities do not corre-
spond fully with the criteria for ecosystem management
formulated earlier. The core activity is monitoring; the so-called
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‘recipient control program’ involves the municipalities and stake-
holder members in continuous, joint monitoring of water quality.
The associations have only to a limited extent been involved in
local resource planning. This holds both for setting up specific
water planning documents and for active participation in the
process of developing municipal master plans (översiktsplaner). It
is worth noting that the 1977 Act regulating Water Associations
(vattenförbund) explicitly aims at enabling joint municipal and
stakeholder management of common water resources (Edenman
1990). Still, these water associations did not report any more
extensive activity on water planning and resource management
than other types of associations. They were only consulted, and
did not play an active role in the municipal master planning
process around 1990 (Gustafsson 1995). This pattern is further
evidenced in an inventory made by the Swedish Environmental
Protection Agency in late 1996. Half of the catchments are
subject to no further joint activity than monitoring water quality.
In terms of our previous criteria for ecosystem management, only
three (3) per cent of the catchments reported having active cross-
boundary municipal water planning including stakeholder
participation (Norman 1997). 
Why this pattern? Apart from the obvious lack of money and
manpower, representatives of water catchment organisations
point to the problem of credible commitment from local politi-
cians, as well as to legislative and administrative hindrances
(Gustafsson 1995). In fact, none of the municipal powers in land
use and resource planning provided to local governments under
the Planning and Building Act have been transferred from local
governments to the catchment associations. They have thus not
been nested firmly enough in the regular planning and manage-
ment administration to play a significant role. Still, the principal
view held by municipalities and regional administrations is that
voluntary catchment co-operation would easily develop if local
and regional levels were provided with more resources and better
policy instruments (SOU 1997:99, p. 18).
Around the turn of the century, there was mounting domestic
and international pressure to adopt a catchment perspective on
water management. The 1997 proposals for a EU Water Directive
explicitly built on this. Anticipating this Directive, the Swedish
Government had already appointed a special commission on
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water management. Its October 1997 report recommended that
Sweden be divided into ten ‘Catchment Districts’. A special
Catchment Authority would comprise two or three regional
administrations and all local governments within the district area.
Within the Catchment District, this Authority should (a) decide
on collectively binding management plans to reach ambient water
quality norms for catchments, (b) be solely responsible for envi-
ronmental permit decisions under the Environmental Code, and
(c) be responsible for monitoring and for liming of acidified
waters. Within the District’s major catchments, local govern-
ments should consolidate permit decisions into one permit
decision-making unit per catchment (SOU 1997:99, pp. 49 ff.,
69 ff.).
While these recommendations were geared towards sustainable
management, the commission also addressed the issue of auton-
omy. It thus suggested that binding plans and norms should be
worked out in close co-operation among regional administra-
tions, local governments, existing water catchment associations,
and all relevant stakeholders. Farmers and local governments
should be allowed to ‘swap’ management actions in order to
establish the most cost-effective ways to reach the water quality
norms for their sub-catchment. Subsidies, polluter fees and other
means could be used to encourage this form of ecosystem
management co-operation (SOU 1997:99, pp. 75 ff.). However,
collectively binding decision-making capacity could be delegated
from the Catchment Authority to such ‘local environmental
management co-operatives’ only if they fulfil certain criteria for
joint associations laid down in the Swedish Constitution (SOU
1997:155, p. 81 ff.). 
Anticipating the entering into force of the EU Water Directive,
the Swedish Government in early 2001 mandated the
Environmental Code Committee to work out suggestions of how
to adapt the Swedish Code to the Directive’s clauses on water
action plans. The Cabinet also indicated that a special commis-
sioner would be appointed to work out recommendations for the
administration of the water catchment districts required under
the EU Directive (Dir. 2001:25). Meanwhile, there has been
substantive work done on water management scenarios within
the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency. These scenarios
range from very centralised action in particularly ‘troubled’
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waters, over a ‘strong district’ model with popularly elected water
district parliaments deciding on action plans, to a model of ‘local
participation’, with an emphasis on new forms of co-operation,
diffusion of information, and local stakeholder participation. The
latter would include delegation of authority to existing water
catchment associations (SEPA 2000a). 
There are as yet (spring 2003) no concrete proposals to be
finally acted upon by the Swedish Government. From the view-
point of ecosystem management adopted here, a few comments
are in order. First of all, most discussion seeks to incorporate a
spatial ecosystem view – the water catchment – into the tradi-
tional administrative system. But regional boundaries rather than
catchments determine the width of the Catchment Districts. There
is a firm view on nestedness; ecologically determined organisa-
tions such as existing catchment associations and the proposed
‘environmental co-operative groups’ are to be bound by centrally
and regionally determined water quality norms. Autonomy, i.e.,
‘freedom to organise’ and to distribute costs and benefits among
relevant stakeholders is so grudgingly recognised that it might
detract from stakeholders’ already low willingness to participate
in management activities that cost money (SOU 1997:155, p. 54). 
Coastal zones – from water quality monitoring to ecosystem
management?
If anything, the coastal zone outside the land area of a state is a
common property resource. It is possible to detract individual
resource units from that zone, but no one could claim total
control of the stock. Water is running, and schools of fish and
other species are moving. To achieve rational ecological gover-
nance, it would thus seem logical to develop a spatially integrated
coastal zone management. 
However, Swedish coastal zone management in the mid-1990s
was more like a patchwork (see Engen 1996). The environmental
decentralisation in the late 1980s among other things involved the
so-called ‘recipient control programmes’. It was thus the bound-
aries of the municipalities that determined the surveillance and
monitoring of water quality in coastal and marine areas. The
1987 planning legislation furthermore made local governments
responsible for physical planning out to 12 nautical miles from
the territorial base line. This process of decentralisation meant
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that the commons of the Swedish coastline and marine environ-
ment was administratively divided into 15 regional and 85
municipal administrative enclosures of planning and resource
management. At the same time, there was an ecological division
into 55 ‘coastal water areas’, linked to the 119 major water catch-
ments in Sweden (SOU 1997:99, p. 50). 
In terms of spatially rational ecological governance, munici-
palities were given an order they could neither refuse nor deliver.
No local government can fully control marine waters within their
boundaries. What evolved of coastal zone management after
1990 reflected the narrow pattern of monitoring and measure-
ment that prevailed in inland catchment areas. By 1993, the entire
western coastline from the Norwegian border to the Strait
between Sweden and Denmark, the coastal waters around Skåne
and along the Baltic Sea coastline up through the Blekinge and
Kalmar counties, was subject to inter-municipal co-operation in
coastal water associations (see Gustafsson 1995). The most strik-
ing discrepancy from the spatially rational model of ecological
governance outlined earlier is that the coastal water associations
emerging in the 1990s were confined to running commonly
financed monitoring stations along the coastline. Nowhere did
there develop any co-ordinated coastal management crossing
existing regional boundaries. 
Why this spatial pattern? First of all, the initiative to set up co-
operative coastal monitoring schemes was top-down, from the
Environmental Units of the Regional Administrations. As arms of
the state, these Administrations and Units have the authority to
survey and co-ordinate actions on environmental and resource
issues crossing municipal borders. However, municipal planners
and officials were sceptical of ‘planning in water’. Co-operation
across municipal borders seldom went beyond the mandatory
consultation procedures prescribed by law; no municipal author-
ity to decide on land use and resource planning was transferred to
coastal water associations (Engen 1996). Thus, only one fjord
area on the West Coast had co-ordinated planning and environ-
mental control policies involving all the littoral municipalities in
the mid-1990s, and this was furthermore the result of state
economic support directed to that particularly ‘threatened’
marine environment. 
The remedy to this situation may be coming from central
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government. Following reports and recommendations of its
Environmental Advisory Board (EAB), the Cabinet in December
1997 directed seven Regional Administrations to develop
action programs for ‘Sustainable Development in Sweden’s
Archipelagos’. The areas concerned are the Stockholm archipel-
ago (with three Regional Administrations involved), the coastal
areas of southern Östergötland and northern Kalmar regions, the
archipelago of the Blekinge region, and the coastal areas of the
new Västra Götaland region. The action programmes are to be
worked out in co-operation among the Cabinet’s Environmental
Advisory Board, the municipalities and interested stakeholders
with the Regional Administrations as the central co-ordinating
actors (Environmental Advisory Board 1998:5 f.). 
The action programmes for the four coastal regions are to
cover both environmental management and economic and social
development. They are to rest on four pillars, namely (a) Sweden’s
national environmental objectives (see below, pp. 64–9), (b)
‘vital’ environmental and resource interests as defined by
earlier processes of national physical planning, (c) the Strategies
for the Regional Environment (STRAMs) worked out by the
Regional Administrations, and (d) the Local Agenda 21 docu-
ments worked out by the municipalities concerned. The objective
is to establish coherent management programmes for the four
coastal regions that are ‘environmentally satisfactory and
compatible with the need for [sustainable] socio-economic devel-
opment’ (Environmental Advisory Board 1998:6).
An EAB evaluation of the regional environment and resource
management programmes worked out for the above-mentioned
four archipelago areas came in 2000. The Board recommended
that the municipalities in these areas should produce in-depth
master plans for their coastal zones and marine waters by 2005.
The Regional Administrations in these areas should very actively
follow up municipal implementation and report to central
government in both 2003 and 2005. For the remainder of
Sweden’s coastal areas, concerned Regional Administrations and
local governments should produce such master plans by 2009.
Regional Administrations and relevant central authorities are to
have special responsibilities for providing local governments with
the necessary knowledge base. Furthermore, they are to suggest
what resources and measures should be given priority in local
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planning for sustainable coastal zone development (SOU
2000:67, pp. 37 ff.).
The Archipelago Management Programmes are still (spring
2003) at the planning stage. There are, however, aspects of
sustainability that imply a development towards spatially rational
ecological governance. The archipelagos are delineated as ecolog-
ically relevant planning areas. Several Regional Administrations
are mandatorily linked in the formation and implementation
process. They are to provide a firm basis of ecologically relevant
knowledge to local planners. There are also recommendations
for integration with the EU International Coastal Zone
Management initiatives. With such a strong emphasis of co-
ordination from above, what then about local and stakeholder
autonomy? First of all, the explicit linking of environmental
protection to sustainable resource use and socio-economic devel-
opment of the regions points towards the kind of involvement
from local stakeholders typical of ecosystem management.
Second, the active interaction with the local population during
the formation process is strongly emphasised as a necessary ingre-
dient for successful implementation of coastal zone management
(SOU 2000:67, p. 45).
Air quality co-operation – the land is the limit, not the sky 
Air quality is both influenced diffusely over large areas, and
locally affected by agglomerations of population, buildings,
industries, and transportation. While the former implies a
commons of vast dimensions, the latter indicates a more limited
spatial perspective, such as metropolitan areas or main traffic
arteries. And how should the relevant spatial unit be defined if the
local problem is caused by mobile sources? Furthermore, global
climate change problems imply that air quality management is not
easily defined in terms of ‘natural’ spatial boundaries.
Actors may thus be tempted to define air quality problems
along established boundaries. Indeed, Swedish co-operative
efforts in air quality management are predominantly organised
within the borders of the Regional Administrations. Just before
the turn of the century, there were air quality associations in all
except the northernmost of the 24 counties. Most of those
associations were founded just before 1990, after initiatives
from the Regional Administrations’ Environmental Units. The
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statutes, organisation and activities of the associations are almost
identical. They (1) initiate measurements and monitoring of air
quality within the county borders; (2) provide support and assis-
tance to investigations of the environmental and health effects of
air pollution; (3) inform members and other interested parties
about monitoring results and air quality developments within the
county, and (4) pledge to ‘work for’ co-ordinated action to abate
air pollution (see e.g., Kalmar, Kronoberg, and Östergötland
Counties, 1997–99). 
There are three membership categories, i.e., all the municipali-
ties within the county, the main industrial polluters, and regional
non-industrial organisations. Members pay an annual ‘service’ or
‘monitoring fee’ to finance measurement activities. Some of the
administrative functions are carried out by the Regional
Administrations’ Environmental Units. The actual measurements
are contracted out to the Swedish Environmental Research
Institute, (IVL, see www.ivl.se). There are a few cases of inter-
regional co-operation on the basis of some air shed models. The
six southernmost counties run co-ordinated air quality monitor-
ing throughout that part of Sweden (Kronoberg County 1996).
Most inter-regional co-operation occurs in metropolitan areas
with substantial air pollution problems. The Stockholm project
on air quality measurement involved six Stockholm area munici-
palities. The Municipal Association of the Gothenburg Region
comprises Gothenburg City and ten surrounding municipalities in
three counties.
The Swedish air quality associations are examples of how an
external actor moves in to bring about spatial co-operation on
a problem that the concerned actors – municipalities and
polluters – may not even recognise they have in common. The
main activity of the associations is limited to monitoring.
Individual municipalities may hesitate to commit resources to
joint air quality management since the possible gains may liter-
ally be gone with the wind. In areas dominated by mobile
sources and differing meteorological conditions for individual
local governments, it is furthermore quite difficult to define the
common interest. We are thus justified in concluding that in the
field of air quality and management, the land rather than the
sky is the limit. 
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From monitoring to management; a small step for central
government or a giant leap for local actors?
The planning powers enjoyed by Swedish local governments
provide them with a spatial monopoly that becomes a formidable
factor in hedging the focus and interests of local governments
within the borders of the municipality. The description of inter-
municipal environmental and natural resource-related activities in
Sweden confirms this view. While local governments do acknowl-
edge the necessity to co-operate on managing environmental and
natural resources held in common, they do not seem overly enthu-
siastic to transfer some of their authority. There are few, if any,
examples of inter-municipal, ecosystem-based management units
having the power to plan for, and much less to decide and distrib-
ute the use of natural resources and eco-services common to two
or more municipalities. The monitoring activities of water, air or
coastal zone associations are thus not firmly nested within the
traditional political and administrative structure. To provide for
a spatially rational perspective would thus involve a giant leap for
local governments in terms of restructuring power relations and
organisational patterns.
At the same time, we have seen that central government, some-
times with pushing from the European Union, is taking some
steps in this direction. The on-going design of co-ordinated
coastal zone management institutions for the main archipelagos,
and the proposed Water Districts and Authorities, are prime
examples. The former seems directed towards ecosystem manage-
ment in that it is to deal also with the social and economic claims
and use of resources and eco-services. The latter are so far more
exclusively geared toward the ecological sustainability of water
resources, albeit on a catchment scale. Common to both is that
the central government is trying to design, from above, manage-
ment units that are spatially rational in an ecological sense, as
well as nested within the traditional political and administrative
chain of command. What remains to be seen is whether and to
what extent these movements will lead to a spatial redistribution
of power that reflects the natural scales of relevant ecosystems
and if so, to what extent they will be combined with features that
secure values of local autonomy. 
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‘Scaling up’ – centralisation to and within the national
government
Implementation from above: local investments for an
‘ecologically sustainable society’
Accepting the leadership of the Swedish Social Democratic Party
in March 1996, the then Minister of Finance Göran Persson
proclaimed the achievement of an ‘ecologically sustainable
society’ as a new, ‘noble mission’ for his party. Presenting the
Cabinet Policy Platform as the new Prime Minister two weeks
later, he envisioned Sweden as ‘an internationally driving force
and a forerunner in the endeavours to create an ecologically
sustainable development’ (Parliamentary Record, March 22,
1996). 
Several programmes and measures were launched to implement
this vision. At the core, however, was massive central government
support to investment programmes for local sustainable develop-
ment (Environment Minister Anna Lindh 1997; DESD 1997:2;
Prime Minister Göran Persson 1997; SAP 1997). In January 1997,
a Delegation for Ecologically Sustainable Development (DESD)
was formed within the Cabinet, consisting of the Ministers of
Environment, Agriculture, Taxation, Basic Education, and the
Junior Minister of Labour. The Delegation’s first assignment was
to ‘develop a platform for the Cabinet’s comprehensive policy for
an ecologically sustainable society’ (Prime Minister Göran
Persson, Parliamentary Record January 22, 1997). 
The DESD proposal for A Sustainable Sweden came in March
1997. The proposed Sustainability Investment Programme
included (1) one billion SEK to eco-cycle adjustment of built envi-
ronments and infrastructure, (2) nine billion SEK to eco-cycle
transformation of the Swedish energy system, and (3) six billion
SEK to local sustainability investments by municipal governments
(DESD 1997). In its April 1997 Economic Bill to the Parliament,
the Cabinet proposed 12,6 billion SEK for the period 1998–2000
to local investment programmes (LIPs), and infrastructure and
energy conversion projects. The bill was subsequently passed by
the Parliament (Cabinet Bill 1996/97:150, pp. 87 ff.). In spring
1998 the Parliament decided to spend a further two billion SEK
for the year 2001 (Cabinet Bill 1997/98:150, Spending Area 18,
item E1).
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The drive for centralised implementation was in clear evidence.
The Cabinet – not any central agency – should set criteria for and
make decisions on applications from local governments (DESD
1997). The DESD even specified the demands that the Cabinet
should make on LIPs receiving support. It was not until amidst
the decision-making process that the government issued the
statute regulating the LIP application and grant process. The
statute described in great detail what municipal applications
should contain, but there were no explicit rules or criteria for how
the Cabinet should go about determining which municipal LIPs
would be worthy of state support (SFS 1998:23).
In fact, the granting process for the first programme year had
begun already in the autumn of 1997. All except two of Sweden’s
288 municipalities sent in notifications of interest by mid-
October. Within the Environment Ministry, a Preparatory
Working Group consisting of 12 members together with the
ministers in DESD selected 40 of these as particular municipali-
ties for a dialogue on how to proceed with applications. 115
municipalities sent in full applications for state LIP grants. Very
few of the applications were sent for consultation to expert
central agencies. The Riksdag’s Housing Committee evaluation
states that the process with its ‘unclear structures of decision-
making within the Cabinet’s Office and the unclear
administrative practice within the Environment Ministry’s
Preparatory Working Group . . . raised doubts about the continu-
ity, predictability and equal treatment of applicants’ (Parliament
Housing Committee 1998/99:20 ff.). 
During spring 1998, 42 municipalities were given a total of 2.3
billion SEK in state grants for their LIPs, with an average state
subsidy rate of 30 per cent. The government’s view of the politi-
cal centrality of the LIP grant programme is shown by the fact
that whenever a grant decision was taken, one of the five
Ministers in the Delegation for Ecologically Sustainable
Development went to the municipality in question. There, they
announced the granting decision at well-organised press confer-
ences, particularly pointing to the number of jobs resulting from
the local ‘green’ investment programme (see Environment
Ministry Press Releases spring 1998). 
What then about the implications for sustainability of the
supported programmes? First of all, it is clear that the programme
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did not adopt a spatially rational perspective; municipal bound-
aries were the criteria of ‘sustainable’ investments. The Swedish
Nature Conservancy Association (SNF) stated that the supported
LIPs were not directed towards more than three out of the 14
serious environmental threats identified by the Swedish
Environmental Protection Agency (Kågesson and Lidmark 1998,
ch. 9). The Auditors of Parliament concluded that meaningful
evaluations of environmental effects could only be made relative
to such quantified objectives that existed before the establishment
of Sweden’s National Environmental Objectives and subsequent
targets and sub-goals. For the seven comparisons thus possible,
the measures taken through LIPs granted in the first programme
year were estimated to contribute between 0.029 and 3.6 per cent
to the actual achievement of national objectives (Auditors of
Parliament 1998/99:94).
In terms of autonomy, municipal work on preparing the noti-
fication of interest and the final application was hard pressed by
the narrow time limits set by central government. Many munici-
palities thus could not find time to incorporate new ideas that
came up during the LIPs’ write up phase. Neither were the LIPs
fully anchored within the different branches of local government.
In particular, the local financing part, averaging 70 per cent,
seems to have caused internal political problems for some local
governments (Parliament Housing Committee 1998/99:30 ff.). 
As shown earlier, the Swedish government in effect launched
two programmes for sustainable development in the mid 1990s.
The Agenda 21 process spanned all levels of government, but the
local governments and the grassroots were given a most crucial
role (Cabinet Bill 1993/94:111, p. 63). The programme for ‘A
Sustainable Sweden’ was a central governmental initiative,
launched amidst the build-up of the Local Agenda 21 processes,
and in fact run by a specially designated Working Group within
the Environmental Ministry that could bypass most of the tradi-
tional lines of Swedish public decision-making (see Lundqvist
2001a). The three different investment programmes forming the
economic core of the programme would each in its own way have
important consequences for the Swedish municipalities. Official
statements contended that the LIPs would be ‘directly linked to
the Local Agenda 21 process. This also means an established
linkage from the local level to the central decision-making within
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the Cabinet and the Parliament’ (SOU 1997:105, p. 11). 
If the autonomy criterion for ecologically rational governance
is met, this should mean that local investment plans supported by
central government money are congruent with or compatible to
the Local Agenda 21 action plans. However, evidence shows that
citizen involvement in LIP preparation processes was lower and
local business involvement much higher than their respective
involvement rates in the Local Agenda 21 processes in general in
the first LIP year (Brundin and Eckerberg 1999). One report
concludes that the sheer size of the LIP grant programme and the
economic pressure on poorer municipalities may together create
preconditions that will change ‘the direction of their Local
Agenda 21’ (Brundin and Eckerberg 1999).
The forms of the LIP process have changed somewhat since the
first programme year. Still, it seems fair to say that when finished
in 2004, this state-supported programme is a prime example of
disguising centralised ‘implementation from above’ as a demo-
cratically anchored process of ecologically oriented governance
(see Lundqvist 2001a).
Beyond the fence: international conventions for trans-boundary
ecosystem management 
Sweden is a contracting party to conventions aiming at joint
management of trans-boundary common pool resources. Two of
the most important ones cover the marine environments of sea
areas adjacent to Sweden. The 1992 Convention on the
Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area is a
revised and updated version of an earlier 1974 convention.
Administered by the Baltic Marine Environment Protection
Commission in Helsinki (HELCOM), the 1992 convention covers
the Baltic Sea and the entrance to the Baltic Sea up through the
Kattegat to the parallel of the Skaw in the Skagerrak
(http://helcom.fi/). It thus overlaps somewhat with the 1992
Convention for the Protection of the North East Atlantic Marine
Environment (OSPAR). The OSPAR convention combines the
earlier 1972 Oslo Convention for the prevention of marine pollu-
tion by dumping from ships and aircraft and the 1974 Paris
Convention for the prevention of marine pollution from land-
based sources, and covers the North East Atlantic including
Skagerrak and Kattegat (www.ospar.org/). 
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These two international conventions oblige each of the signa-
tory states to implement the provisions for prevention of marine
pollution from land-based sources and sea vessels within their
territorial sea all the way to the base line. The Baltic convention
also applies to a country’s internal waters, i.e., the landward side
from the baseline to the coastal line as defined by each littoral
state. In substantial management terms, it is the states that are
responsible for implementing common decisions. The contracting
states pledge to adopt the precautionary principle to avoid the
introduction into the marine environment of substances and
energy that may bring about hazards to human health, harm
living resources and marine ecosystems. They agree that costs
of pollution prevention, control and reduction measures are
to be borne by the polluter. The countries set out to apply best
available techniques and best environmental practice including,
where appropriate, clean technology (www.ospar.org/). The
Baltic Sea convention spells out that the states should use Best
Environmental Practice for all sources and Best Available
Technology for point sources. Both conventions oblige the
member states to take relevant measures also on land without
prejudice to their sovereignty to prevent marine pollution
(http://helcom.fi/). 
Special Commissions supervise the implementation of the
Conventions and review the condition of the maritime areas and
the effectiveness of the measures being adopted. They may also
engage in developing further programmes and measures for the
prevention of pollution and for the control of activities that may
adversely affect the maritime area, including economic instru-
ments. Each of the littoral states has one vote in the Commissions
of the respective convention, and the Commissions’ decisions
should be taken unanimously. A decision, but not a recommen-
dation, becomes binding on member states that voted for it after
200 days, provided that three quarters of the member states have
shown that they accept the decision (www.ospar.org/).
These two conventions provide examples of how spatial
arrangements can be made to manage vast ecosystems. In a
formal sense, Sweden and other contracting states oblige them-
selves to take jointly decided measures to protect the common
marine resources of the Baltic and North Seas. At the same time,
however, decision-making rules place final power in the hands of
‘Nested enterprises’? 49
2579Ch2  12/8/03  11:47 AM  Page 49
sovereign member states. In the OSPAR case, a contracting state
may vote against a decision in the Commission, and thus not be
legally bound by it. On the other hand, participation in these
marine environment conventions also carries political implica-
tions. By engaging in such conventions, states actually commit
themselves to participate constructively in the governing of the
commons of the high seas. As it turns out, the work in these
conventions has been paralleled by ministerial and prime ministe-
rial conferences, where obligations have been made to undertake
measures more far-reaching than those stipulated in the conven-
tions (see, e.g., SOU 1996:153, pp. 47 ff.). 
‘Nested enterprises’ and compatible scales? 
Ecological governance and the problem of fit; seventeenth-
century fences are still crossing the commons
This chapter has dealt with the problem of spatially rational
ecological governance, i.e., how to solve the problem of fit
between naturally bounded eco-systems and man-made systems
of government. The premise is that the solution could be provided
through a system of interlinked jurisdictions proceeding from
naturally distinguishable, but socio-economically and culturally
meaningful ecosystems as the basic units. For such a system to
become functional, three criteria should be fulfilled: (1) the
resource regime must have clearly defined boundaries; (2) the
resource users/dependants must have a recognised right to organ-
ise and participate at the relevant spatial scale, and (3) the
complexity of society-environment relationships should be
addressed through nested enterprises. The basic units of gover-
nance are successively linked with local, regional and national
jurisdictions in order to solve problems of scale and achieve
sustainable environmental and resource use and management. 
Admittedly, there are problems with and conflicts among these
principles. First of all, there are problems of defining ecologically
proper boundaries. These are most pronounced for air quality
management, but more easily dealt with for the management of
water catchment areas. Coastal zones and marine environments
are somewhere in between, open-ended but still possible to define
in an ecologically and even socio-economically meaningful way.
Second, there is potential conflict between autonomy, i.e., the
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right to organise for the resource appropriators and dependants,
and sustainability, i.e., the need for effective co-ordination of
overall and long-term resource planning and use through inter-
linked local, regional and national jurisdictions. Existing scales
and units of government may prove a strong fence against trans-
ferring autonomy to new scales and units of governance.
The empirical evidence provided here corroborates this propo-
sition. Although there are many examples of new strategies to
solve the problem of fit between natural and societal scales, they
do not yet fully live up to the three conditions of boundaries,
recognition and nestedness. First of all, we have found that the
strategy of scaling down is fundamentally one of decentralising to
the traditional local unit of government, i.e., to the municipalities.
There are few, if any, examples of power being delegated further
down to users and dependants on ecosystem resources on a
smaller scale. (It should, however, be noted that some limited
experiments with local water management co-operation among
farmers on a sub-catchment level have been carried out; see SOU
1997:155). With regard to the Local Agenda 21 process, it seems
as if the original design of municipal autonomy and bottom-up
linking of plans was disturbed, and even overrun, by the centrally
initiated and managed programmes for local investments in
sustainable development.
Secondly, the strategy of working sideways to establish inter-
municipal co-operation around common ecosystems like water
catchments has so far not involved any delegation of autonomy
and authority to catchment associations to allow them to actually
manage the resource. These associations are not yet firmly nested
within the system of political and administrative governance.
They have very little if any influence over the planning process
that determines much of the land and resource use at the local
level. Whether and to what extent the implementation of the EU
Water Directive will involve a stronger role for these ecosystem-
based associations is still (spring 2003) an open question. Air
quality associations reveal a similar non-nested pattern. Since
they have been initiated within and downwards from the
Regional Administrations, their scale of operation does not seem
adapted to geographically more relevant scales of air pollution.
Third, scaling up to achieve a co-ordinated response to the
challenge of sustainable development has in one case meant
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super-centralisation. The national government’s 1998–2004
grants to local investment programmes for sustainable develop-
ment placed decisive powers at the Cabinet level. This is contrary
to the traditional Swedish system of managing such programmes
through central agencies that are constitutionally independent of
the Ministries when deciding on individual cases of implementa-
tion. The autonomously developed Local Agendas did not become
firmly integrated in the process. By making the municipalities the
prime targets for support, the central government furthermore
directed this huge effort to achieve ‘A Sustainable Sweden’ to
traditional administrative rather than ecologically relevant
natural scales. The international conventions in which Sweden
participates to achieve sustainable development of adjacent
marine environments are built on the states’ sovereignty to adopt
or reject common management measures.
Traditional political and administrative scales and units thus
make their presence felt throughout the land. Common pool
resources and coherent ecosystems have yet to become accepted
as legitimate spatial units of governance. Indeed, the boundaries
of local governments and regional administrations existing at the
threshold of the twenty-first century enclose and fence off the
commons in much the same way as they did in the seventeenth,
when the present borders of the Regional Administrations, now
crucial actors in the Water District, Archipelago Management
and Air Quality Monitoring schemes, were once drawn. 
Straddling the fence; moves toward spatially rational ecological
governance
‘É por ce muove!’ Galilei is (falsely) said to have exclaimed when
receiving his verdict from the inquisition. So is Sweden; there are
moves to get over old fences to make man-made jurisdictional
scales more compatible with ecologically rational governance for
sustainable development. The most evident signs are the recent
proposals for new systems of governance for water catchments
and the environments of Sweden’s larger archipelagos. Water
catchments are recognised as proper units for organising activities
to achieve sustainable development. Given traditional identities in
the archipelago areas, the delineations are most probably cultur-
ally and socio-economically meaningful enough to appeal to
affected actors and interests. 
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Admittedly, there is still a lot of ground to cover to reach
spatially rational ecological governance. The issue of autonomy is
still clouded. There are yet (spring 2003) no concrete proposals to
delegate authority and responsibility to ecosystem-linked actors
for decision-making and management of resources within the
ecosystem boundaries, but across political borders. Discussing in
more vague terms of information, participation and consensus
building, recent proposals seem intent on striking a balance
between nestedness and co-ordination on the one hand, and user
influence over management on the other. The archipelago
proposal places the programme development and goal setting in
the hands of Regional Administrations, while the central
Environmental Advisory Board is to lay out how different local
and regional actors and interests should be involved in the
implementation of those action programmes (see SOU 2000:67).
Different alternatives for stakeholder involvement in developing
and implementing Water Catchment Action Plans have been
suggested in scenarios worked out by the Swedish Environmental
Protection Agency (see SEPA 2000a). 
On balance, then, Sweden finds itself straddling old fences in
efforts to negotiate a better spatial fit between natural and socie-
tal scales, i.e., to reach a spatially rational system of ecological
governance. 
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3
Up or down with the ecology cycle?
Strategies for temporally rational
ecological governance
Political terms and ecological cycles
Next budget and next election; dominant time spans in politics
From the early nineteenth century onwards, the dominant politi-
cal view of time was one of continuous ‘progress’ with the state
at the centre of change (Ekengren 1998:30). This linear concep-
tion of time is, however, just one possible view. Political time can
also be seen as (series of) distinct events or as connected points
that have special meaning or importance. One can furthermore
view political time as cyclical, with events recurring in a
predictable fashion. The budgetary process is a prime example.
Governments set strict timetables that bind the procedure step by
step, and the organisation level by level, in a predetermined,
annually repeated cycle (see Brunsson 1995:12 ff., 182 f.). 
Elections are crucial political events reoccurring at predeter-
mined intervals. They determine the views and uses of time
among political representatives. Elected representatives then have
two to five years before they face the verdict of the electorate at
the next election. A major motivation for their actions and stand-
points thus is how these influence the chances to become
re-elected. Consequently, the immediate questions of here and
now tend to take precedence over longer-term issues. The timing
of a political initiative is often a strategic consideration by politi-
cians bent on political gains (Edelman 1988). In combination
with the constant pressure from the media, such strategic consid-
erations may lead to extremely short term political horizons. 
There are, however, also other conceptions of political time.
2579Ch3  12/8/03  11:47 AM  Page 54
Efforts are made to break the one-year cycle of the budgetary
process by introducing three- to four-year budget cycles for
certain policy fields. Perspectives of up to 15 years have been used
in infrastructure planning and development. Defence policy
works with 30- to 40-year perspectives when deciding on major
air or naval systems of warfare. Politicians thus face a multi-
temporal situation, where they take part in an increasing number
of interactions with different social and political time scales
(Ekengren 1998:26).
Still, time perceptions in politics are predominantly geared
towards the ‘next budget’ and the ‘next election’. These cycles
and predetermined points in time converge to instil into political
and administrative life a bias in favour of the immediate sched-
uled tasks, and the wishes and reactions of the present electorate.
The dramatic growth of information and communication tech-
nology enhances further this predominance for the ‘here’ and
‘now’ at the expense of the historic and well as future ‘then’.
Rapid and dramatic moves in global financial markets can – so is
the lesson driven home by the 1992 economic turmoil in Sweden
– put pressure on politicians to provide decisions literally ‘within
the hour’ to avert a major national crisis.
Doing time on earth; politics as ultimately fenced by natural
ecocycles
This institutionalised political shortsightedness is increasingly
challenged. The long-term trends of population growth, water
and air pollution, and possibly irrevocable climate change, have
created doubts about the sustainability and productivity of the
planet’s ecosystems. The picture of ‘Spaceship Earth’ as a finite
entity with finite resources has driven home the lesson, sometimes
forgotten in the era of linear ‘progress’, that man – also political
man – is ultimately fenced within nature and the productivity of
its ecosystems. Nobody can escape from doing his or her time
here. Furthermore, this recognition draws attention to the gener-
ational cycles of reproduction. If we are fenced in now, so will be
our descendants, one generation after the other. 
The emphasis on lifecycles and their importance for long-term
productivity show that natural time can be seen as a circular
phenomenon. Water circulates between the ground and the
atmosphere. Plants and species come to life, mature, reproduce
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and die. A smooth and balanced functioning of the seasonal and
other short-term patterns is the necessary basis for the systems’
longer-term health and productivity. Just like politics, the natural
environment thus exhibits a plurality of times, reaching from
millennial geological changes to seasonal and even shorter cycles
(see Adam 1994).
There is, however, an important difference between political
cycles and ecological lifecycles. Short-term tactics and strategic
timing may lead to a smoother functioning of the political
processes of the day, but may detract from the longer-term viabil-
ity and productivity of the political system as a whole by
diminishing popular support and democratic legitimacy. While it
may take only one line in a budget or bill to save a government
coalition, that single line may devastate an ecosystem to the
extent that it will take decades to restore it. 
In the broadest sense then, political time is ultimately bound by
the life cycles of ecosystems that produce and reproduce resources
necessary for human life. Political actors can not escape from this
basic relationship when they mobilise resources for collective
endeavours by way of their democratically legitimated use of
power in society. They are forced to find ways to achieve tempo-
rally rational ecological governance. Above all, they have to
adopt an inter-generational time horizon. Present actions should
be judged in the light of long-term ecological sustainability as well
as autonomy for future generations.
From here to sustainability; ways of reconciling political and
ecological time scales
There are several alternative ways of reconciling political and
ecological time cycles. The most long-term binding perspectives
have historically been found in physical planning, i.e., the process
of directing, restricting, or even forbidding certain uses of land
and resources. Planning regulations and processes infringe on
present resource use to an extent that makes it perhaps the most
authoritative way of reconciling political and ecological time
perspectives. To pass the autonomy test, systems of comprehen-
sive planning in ecological governance should thus exhibit
participatory mechanisms that allow present stakeholders and the
general public a meaningful say in the process before binding
decisions are taken.
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Another alternative is to adapt more fully to the circular
processes in nature by closing as much as possible the flows of
goods, materials, energy and resources through society. Such eco-
cycle adaptation is fully achieved when ‘the handling of the flows
of material and other resources, like land, is such that natural
ecocycles can absorb rest products and renew the resources for
future generations, and does so with preserved biodiversity’
(Ecocycle Commission 1997:16 f.). While leaving much room for
autonomous choice to present generations, eco-cycle adaptation
may create a temporal illusion if it does not fully achieve this
ideal. Leaks and loopholes in the cycle, huge inputs of energy
needed to redirect flows of goods and materials through society,
as well as new uses for the energy and materials saved, all detract
from sustainability (see Jänicke et al. 1999:128). 
The strategy of increased resource use efficiency is actually
directed towards ‘beating time’ by decreasing the input of
resources to provide the same or a larger output of goods and
services. This would make possible the transfer to the next gener-
ation of a sustainable society with leeway for autonomous choice
without sacrificing present welfare. Linked to this strategy is a
specific view of the relationship between economic growth, social
welfare, and ecological sustainability, viz. ecological modernisa-
tion. At its core is the view that building a sustainable society
demands new, resource-saving and resource-efficient technolo-
gies, which provide a rapidly growing market and thus become an
engine for growth and jobs (see Gouldson and Murphy 1997:74
f.). Ecological modernisation is said to dissolve the perceived
conflict between economic growth and environmental protection
(Cohen 1998:150). Environmental protection and economic
growth are turned into a positive-sum game, where industry finds
anticipatory development of green technology profitable, and
politicians can preach ‘green’ growth (Hajer 1995:26 ff., 273). 
This shift in outlook is accompanied by changes in policy princi-
ples, instruments and organisation. The emphasis is on early
internalisation of ecological values and modes of thinking among
all relevant actors. Stable and foreseeable regulations, and
increased use of economic and monitoring instruments, are
expected to provide a good climate for innovative eco-technology.
This in turn increases resource and energy efficiency in the
processes of production, consumption and recycling, and may give
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forerunners comparative advantages in world markets (Stavins and
Whitehead 1997:112; see Dobers 1997:63 ff., 114 ff.). 
With the possible exception of planning, these strategies imply
enormous problems of co-ordination and overview. The timing of
actions and events becomes increasingly important, as does the
question of what stage in the process of political and ecological
reconciliation is actually reached. The ‘New Public Management’
focuses on goals and objectives as the most important aspect of
managing large systems, leaving those responsible for implemen-
tation to decide on the most effective mix of instruments to attain
these objectives. But might not this become an exercise in
symbolic politics? For management by objectives to actually take
on a self-binding character is crucially dependent on how the rela-
tionships between political orderers of action and administrative
and other performers of action are institutionalised and organ-
ised. Management by objectives consciously brings relevant
actors into the system of governance, in particular those
contributing to the non-sustainable patterns of environmental
and resource use. The translation of sustainability objectives to
targets and action plans takes place at lower levels and in co-oper-
ation with affected interests and stakeholders (Jänicke et al.
1999:111). Much effort is put into setting up specific timetables
for goal achievement. Comprehensive systems of monitoring in
the form of commonly accepted indicators and operationalised
measures are included. Together with specified target dates, this
is meant to enable actors in the system to get commonly under-
standable answers when ‘checking time’, i.e., assessing progress
(see Jänicke et al. 1999:68 ff.). 
Green and just in time; criteria for temporally rational
ecological governance
The precautionary principle urges decision-makers at all levels to
take into account the future environmental and resource conse-
quences of present action. But what is irreversible is uncertain,
and might not be distinguishable until way into the future. To
play it safe, decision-makers are thus pushed towards constrain-
ing present action beyond critical thresholds (see Barry 1999:225
f.). The institutional and procedural design is thus of utmost
importance to safeguard against both ecological irreversibility
and inter-generational injustice. 
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When analysing the Swedish strategies to achieve temporally
rational governance, we first look for specified target dates for
achieving objectives of sustainable development. Ecological
governance is temporally rational when these time schedules are
based on, or linked to, ecologically relevant characteristics, such
as ‘safe’ levels or concentration of substances, lifecycles relevant
to the health of ecosystems, as well as to the scope and pace of
resource and materials flows through society and the economy. 
However, targets and dates do not become binding on the
present if they are not accompanied by a well-developed system of
surveillance and monitoring, as well as statistical measures and
indicators. We thus look for premeditated ways of monitoring
and evaluating goal achievement. Temporally rational ecological
governance distributes specific responsibility for achieving certain
targets to specific units, thus binding their future activities to the
overarching objective of sustainable development. These instru-
ments do not only show the state of progress. They also show
which processes and activities in society put pressure on environ-
ment and resources, and the results of measures taken to counter
such pressures. 
Such an environmental and resource information system
provides not only experts and administrators with opportunities
to make autonomous judgements over time about the progress
towards sustainability. A transparent process of decision-making,
implementation and feedback also makes this possible for the
ordinary citizen. Temporally rational ecological governance is
thus democratic. The participants in the process to reach deci-
sions on objectives, binding target dates, and methods of goal
achievement are defined on the grounds of their contribution to,
as well as dependence on eco-cycles, energy and material flows.
Specific mechanisms are built in to safeguard the value of auton-
omy for future generations. 
The ‘telescopic state’ – binding the present for the future
Land use planning and restrictions on future resource use 
The conditions for land use and resource utilisation can be
manipulated through the structuring of physical space (Eckhoff
1983:29). Ever since the dawn of the twentieth century, ‘alloca-
tion of special functions to areas’ (Glasbergen 1992:197) has been
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used in Sweden to set aside geographical areas as national parks,
nature reserves, and nature conservation areas. By 1998, such
areas reserved for future generations comprised over 38,000
square kilometres, equivalent to over eight (8) per cent of
Sweden’s total area (Statistics Sweden 2000:227 ff.). The 1968
Sarek Agreement, later ratified by Parliament, declared four
major rivers in northern Sweden off limits for hydroelectric power
exploitation. This binding decision was further confirmed in
1993, when the four rivers were labelled ‘national rivers’ (Cabinet
Bill 1997/98:45, Part 1, p. 241).
The Planning and Building Act of 1947 made Sweden’s local
governments and their Building Committees responsible for all
local planning. Geared towards housing and urban infrastructure,
municipal master plans and detail plans provided general and
specific guidelines for expected municipal expansion. Plans were
made legally binding through ratification by Regional
Administration Boards or, for larger and more important plans,
by the national government (Lundqvist 1972, passim). The plan-
ning process did little to link local development to the scale and
quality of natural resources. Increasingly frequent clashes among
competitive demands for land and natural resources could not be
resolved, and resource issues spanning many municipalities and
whole regions were not properly addressed. 
This led the national government to develop more comprehen-
sive national physical planning. Surveys were made in the late
1960s of foreseeable demands for natural resources over the next
30 years for industrial production, urban development, outdoor
recreation, and environmental quality. To this was linked an
inventory of the location and amount of available resources.
Areas where future clashes of interest might occur were then
pointed out. Following simulations of alternative land use
patterns, principles were established for an adequate location of
different resource demanding activities. The system of National
Physical Planning decided by Parliament in 1972 contained four
elements:
• Guidelines for the planning of activities involving competing
claims on land and natural resources.
• Guidelines for the planning of geographical areas with partic-
ularly intensive competition for land and natural resources.
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• Processes for implementing these guidelines into a national
physical plan covering all of Sweden.
• Binding provisions for cases of severe conflicts over resource
use implying comprehensive cross-sectoral impacts. 
Decisions on the location of nine types of industrial and other
activities with heavy demands and impacts on Sweden’s natural
resources and energy supply now had to be made by the Cabinet.
The Cabinet’s decision would then bind subsequent planning and
environmental assessments. Environmental permit authorities
could not prohibit an activity allowed by the Cabinet and vice
versa. A municipal veto meant that the Cabinet could grant a
location permit to a large-scale, resource-demanding activity only
if the Municipal Board of Councillors in question had approved
of such a location (Lundqvist 1979:248 f.).
Only a decade later, a Governmental Commission reported
that Sweden’s land use and resource planning was not sufficiently
geared towards long-term sustainable development. Planning for
use and protection of natural resources should be guided by such
concepts as the carrying capacity of ecosystems and biochemical
cycles. In particular, the use of non-renewable resources should
be put under much more stringent control (SOU 1983:56).
However, to make sustainability the core criterion in land use and
resource planning was an idea whose time had yet to come. A
1984 Cabinet memorandum pronounced it more ‘reasonable’ to
proceed from the present National Physical Planning programme.
The 1985/86 Cabinet proposal for a new Natural Resources Act
explicitly stated that the resource management concept should
have a relatively narrow content, linked to the use of man’s phys-
ical environment (see SOU 1993:27, p. 280 f.). 
However, some steps to incorporate emerging ideas on longer-
term sustainable development were taken in the 1987 Natural
Resources Act (NRA). This Act was an umbrella, covering and
‘guiding’ eight other acts relevant to natural resource use, among
others the Planning and Building Act, also codified in 1987
(Cabinet Bill 1990/91:90, pp. 165 ff.; Michanek 1991:22 ff.). The
NRA made Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) mandatory
for all potentially harmful activities requiring a permit under any
of these acts. The EIS requirement included location of large proj-
ects and facilities, environmental permit procedures, large-scale
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use of water and forest resources, as well as infrastructure devel-
opments (see Cabinet Bill 1990/91:90, pp. 169 ff.). 
The Natural Resources Act and the acts covered by it are now
incorporated under the comprehensive Environmental Code rati-
fied in 1998. The inclusion of the NRA in the Environmental
Code was seen as an instrument for comprehensive judgements in
the planning process to secure ‘an ecologically, socially, culturally
and socio-economically sound resource management’. The Code
enumerates those areas and natural resources in Sweden that are
of ‘national interest’. Such areas may be subject to industrial or
other polluting activities only under very special circumstances.
Further areas of ‘national interest’ can be designated through
a process involving national agencies and Regional
Administrations. However, these areas become fully accepted as
of ‘national interest’, and thus binding on future activities, only
after an explicit decision under any of the relevant acts within the
NRA/EC umbrella (Cabinet Bill 1997/98:45, Part 1, pp. 242 ff.). 
Under present (2003) planning legislation, municipalities
establish an overview plan for their territory, describing future
land and water use, and defining areas for infrastructure,
commercial and housing developments. Overview plans are not
binding; only the detail plans for particular areas are.
Municipalities may issue area regulations for areas outside detail
plans. Before the Municipal Board adopts an overview plan, the
Regional Administration must issue a report asserting whether or
not the plan is compatible with the NRA/EC definition of areas of
‘national interests’ (Michanek 1991:28 ff.; Cabinet Bill
1994/94:230).
Indeed, the 289 municipalities are issued a tall order to save
areas for the future. By the turn of the century, the more than
2,200 areas declared of ‘national interest’ covered nearly 25 per
cent of Sweden’s total area (Statistics Sweden 2000:229). About
one-quarter of these areas are physically protected as nature
reserves, which means that industrial activities cannot be located
there. The other 75 per cent may be secured for the future
through municipal prohibitions, environmental permit decisions,
or Regional Administrations’ conditions for exploitation
(Sveriges Nationalatlas 1991:164 ff.).
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Planning for the present, the future, or . . . ?
What then, does this planning process offer in terms of sustain-
ability and autonomy? First of all, it is reiterative; local
governments are expected to renew the overview plans by five-
year intervals. In reality, however, the time perspective is often
shorter. Plans are ‘rolling’, and quite often subject to negotiations
between local governments and parties with relatively short-term
interests in resource exploitation and commercial development.
The National Audit Office contended in 1996 that the Swedish
process of environmental impact assessment (EIA) exhibited
several flaws. Environmental expert authorities had no regulated
standing in the process. Long-term environmental effects went
unattended, due to lack of necessary competence for the review of
EIA documents. Usually, the alternative preferred by the
exploiters was the only one being assessed in the process. All in
all, Swedish EIA process was said to lack formal rules, standards
of content, and allocation of rights and duties among actors
(National Audit Office 1996: passim; see Kjellerup 1997). 
Criticism also concerned the democratic aspect of planning.
Formally, municipalities are required to arrange procedures of
consultation and hearings with the citizens, firms, organisations
and others concerned when they prepare detail plans. Changes in
1994 actually aimed at strengthening citizen participation
(Michanek 1991:28 ff.; Cabinet Bill 1994/94:230). However, the
National Audit Office concluded in 1996 that public involvement
comes in too late, if at all (National Audit Office 1996: passim;
see Kjellerup 1997).
The 1997/98 Cabinet Bill on National Environmental
Objectives put much emphasis on the idea of A Sustainable
Sweden. A broad conception of sustainable development is used.
The Cabinet stated that the 15 long-term NEOs (see further
below, pp. 65–7) should guide all physical planning. ‘Through co-
operation across sectoral lines, national and municipal authorities
shall promote an ecologically sustainable development with a
good living environment for all’ (Cabinet Bill 1997/98:145, p.
321 ff.). New instruments were conceived. Regional environmen-
tal and resource management (ERM) programmes are to be
developed for areas with such severe environmental and resource
management problems that environmental quality norms may be
imposed. These programmes are to be based on the NEOs, on the
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‘national interests’ determined on the basis of NRA/EC regula-
tions, as well as on the regional environmental strategies
(STRAMs) worked out by the Regional Administrations (see
Arwidsson 1999:8 f.). 
Planning is expected to integrate the precautionary principle
through the EIA process. The government claims that Swedish
EIAs reflect the integration of environmental concerns in a proac-
tive planning process. However, there is an ‘integration
confusion’ between a consensual planning process and an adver-
sarial examination at one stage in that process. There is no
screening of alternatives, no scoping of effects of interrelated deci-
sions, no early public consultation, no requirements for
non-technical summaries, and no formal EIA decision. Long-term
binding effects of contextual decisions may thus still go unat-
tended (Emmelin 1998:189, 205). The building of the railroad
tunnel through Hallandsås (to allow for a 12 minute gain in travel
time between Gothenburg and Copenhagen) caused an ecological
scandal affecting the sustainability of the region. It thus provides
a glaring example of deficiencies in the planning process that
detract from temporally rational ecological governance (SOU
1998:137, esp. pp. 91 ff., 123 f.). 
A silent revolution: self-binding for the future through
‘management by objectives’
An important distinction in the thinking on governance is
between ‘policy’ and ‘management’. As mentioned, ‘New Public
Management’ points to management by objectives (MBO) as a
flexible way of moving towards commonly formulated and shared
views of a future state of affairs. As a temporal strategy of gover-
nance, MBO exhibits the following characteristics:
• Co-operative and consensual processes to formulate objectives,
including (measurable) target levels and dates, and dominated
by political decision-makers.
• Deliberate ways of internalising common problem views
among implementers and target groups.
• Decentralised competence to use program resources for imple-
menting common objectives, involving negotiation and
agreements among programme administrators and (organised)
target groups.
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• Continuous monitoring and assessment of progress in relation
to target levels and dates, with a strong role for political deci-
sion-makers. 
The MBO strategy thus leaves much discretion and responsi-
bility to administrators in the process of instrumentation and
implementation. However, continuous political evaluation and
goal (re)formulation together with conscious methods for inter-
nalisation of objectives and problem views are thought to lead
to expected future outcomes (see Jänicke et al. 1999:68 ff.).
Evidently, the possibility that the MBO strategy will take on a
self-binding character is very much dependent on how the rela-
tionships between the political principals (the orderers of action)
and the agents (the performers of action) are institutionalised and
organised into a coherent system of governance. Clear objectives
with explicit time limits, linked to specific responsibilities and
resources provided to specified actors, would certainly add to its
‘binding’ nature.
The Swedish process of reorienting traditional environmental
policy towards one of sustainable development began in the mid
1990s. In the spring 1997 Budget Bill, the Cabinet proposed a
broad strategy for sustainable development, to be based on three
overarching objectives; protection of environmental quality, effi-
cient use of resources, and sustainable ecosystem productivity
(Cabinet Bill 1996/97:150). An earlier report of the National
Agenda 21 Committee had pointed to the incoherence among the
numerous ‘goal like’ expressions in official policy statements. In
September 1997, the Environmental Protection Agency proposed
that those more than 170 ‘goals’ be condensed into 18 environ-
mental quality objectives (SEPA 1997).
In May 1998 the Cabinet presented a bill proposing 15
‘national environmental objectives’ (NEOs) to be achieved
‘within one generation’, i.e., by 2020–25: 
• Reduced Climate Impact
• Clean Air
• Natural Acidification Only
• A Non-Toxic Environment
• A Protective Ozone Layer
• A Safe Radiation Environment
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• Zero Eutrophication
• Flourishing Lakes and Streams
• Good-quality Groundwater




• A Varied Agricultural Landscape
• A Magnificent Mountain Landscape
• A Good Built Environment
This was the starting point for ‘a system of government by
objectives and results’ that – in the eyes of the Cabinet – presented
the ‘most effective way of governing a broadly conceived
programme for sustainable development with participation from
all sectors of society’. The NEOs would be broken down into
further, more precise sectoral (and geographical) targets, to be
decided upon by the Cabinet. Involved public agencies and
municipalities would enjoy wide discretion in selecting instru-
ments to achieve the goals, and voluntary action by firms and
enterprises was welcomed (Cabinet Bill 1997/98:145, p. 38 f.,
esp. p. 41). The further content of the bill indicated that this new
structure would not become another exercise in symbolic politics.
It outlined a process for developing targets and action plans for
different sectors, and distributed clear responsibilities for this
process among agencies and authorities. Furthermore, the
proposal envisaged a system of indicators and mechanisms for
monitoring and surveying progress of the work towards the 15
objectives (Cabinet Bill 1997/98:145, pp. 169 ff.). 
The MBO process for sustainable development started even
before Parliament had voted on the NEO Bill. Already in June
1998, the Cabinet instructed 17 sectoral agencies and all the
Regional Administrations to develop proposals for targets,
sectoral goals and action plans necessary for reaching the NEOs
within their area of competence and authority. The Swedish EPA
was to provide co-ordination and support to sectoral agencies in
their work on targets and action plans, and make sure all agencies
reported back to the Cabinet by October 1999. The Cabinet
furthermore appointed a Parliamentary Commission to review
the agency reports and particularly evaluate the environmental,
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socio-economic, fiscal, and specific sectoral consequences of
targets and action programmes. The Commission presented its
final report to the Government in June 2000 (SOU 2000:52), and
a Cabinet Bill was sent to Parliament in April 2001 (Cabinet Bill
2000/01:130). 
The temporal perspective is evident and, to say the least, brave.
The objective is ‘to hand over to the next generation a society in
which the major environmental problems have been solved’
(italics added). The structure of this MBO system of ecological
governance is as follows (Cabinet Bill 2000/01:130, pp. 11 ff.): 
• The 15 NEOs define the state of environmental quality to be
achieved by 2025; one main definition of each ‘generational’
objective is further developed into sometimes as many as ten
specific features of the environmental quality to be achieved.
• Interim targets state the direction and time scale for ongoing,
concrete measures; most interim targets relate to what should
be achieved by 2010 in terms of emission level reductions or
specified levels of environmental quality.
• Action strategies to co-ordinate measures to achieve several
NEOs at the same time, as well as other policy objectives: 
1. A strategy for more efficient energy use and transport 
2. A strategy for non-toxic and resource-efficient cyclical
systems, including an integrated product policy 
3. A strategy for management of land, water and the built envi-
ronment.
For each of these strategies, an orchestrated set of policy
instruments is envisaged. The ‘energy and transport’ strategy
builds, among other things, on a ‘green’ tax shift in the range of
SEK 30 billion (€3.3 billion) up to 2010. The ‘eco cycle’ strategy
envisages more ‘green’ tender and procurement in addition to an
integrated product policy. Finally, the ‘resource management’
strategy rests on regulatory measures and procedural safeguards
to strengthen protection of valuable nature and water resources,
and a revision of the physical planning process (Cabinet Bill
2000/01:130, pp. 196 ff.).
Three modes of implementation are pointed out as crucial to
the success of these strategies. One is the integration of responsi-
bility for an ecologically sustainable development into the
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mandates of public agencies and the activities of enterprises and
other organisations in various social sectors. As for the 24 public
agencies specifically pointed out, this mandate includes identify-
ing their ‘ecological’ roles, formulating action programmes with
specified sectoral objectives and measures, assessing the effects of
these measures on the public economy, and making sure that
sectoral action programmes are implemented by making them
part of all their decision–making. To ease this ecological admin-
istrative reform, public agencies are to make Environmental
Management Systems (EMS) an integrated part of their processes.
Another mode of implementation is to complement legal and
economic instruments with voluntary agreements with industry
and business. These agreements can be based on existing regula-
tion, or form the basis for action instead of regulations. The
argument for such agreements is that they may lead to more cost-
efficient methods of achieving sustainable development (Cabinet
Bill 2000/01:130, pp. 17 ff.).
The third mode is a comprehensive system of monitoring and
evaluation, based on a system of statistics that comprises the state
of the environment, reflects the development of factors affecting
environmental quality, and points to measures needed to counter
negative trends. This will include data from the National
Environmental Surveillance Network, as well as statistics on the
use, accumulation, recirculation and productivity of materials
and energy in society. A system of indicators of sustainable devel-
opment (gröna nyckeltal) is to be developed to furnish
decision-makers and the general public with information on
Sweden’s progress towards sustainable development. An
Environmental Objectives Board (EOB) was established under the
SEPA in 2002 to co-ordinate the efforts of the national and
regional authorities with specific sectoral responsibilities for
sustainable development. The Council will report directly to the
Cabinet to provide the basis for the Cabinet’s annual report on
progress towards achievement of NEOs. A more in-depth report
on the progress towards ‘Sustainable Sweden’ is to be delivered to
Parliament every four years (Cabinet Bill 2000/01:130, pp. 223
ff.).
If this MBO process continues according to plan, Sweden will
in a few years have a coherent plan of national, sectoral, and
regional action, complete with time-tables for achievement of
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sustainable development. Sweden will also have a system for
continuous review and measurement of trends and developments
indicating whether and to what extent achievement of the
national environmental goals and interim targets is actually forth-
coming. This gives an impression of Swedish environmental and
resource management as an example of democratic self-binding.
The formal procedure of ratifying objectives through parliamen-
tary vote fulfils the democratic criterion. There is an easily
understood temporal goal; an environmentally sound society is to
be achieved ‘within one generation’. The elaboration of interim
targets and operationalisation of sectoral goals means that agen-
cies become bound to programmes and time-tables they have
helped design and have come to internalise as ‘feasible’ to them-
selves as well as to affected sectoral actors and interests along the
way. The democratic self-binding is further strengthened by the
elaborate system of monitoring and evaluation. Built as it is on
extensive statistics and understandable indicators, it enables the
general public to make autonomous judgements about progress
towards sustainability, and thus to hold political and administra-
tive decision-makers accountable for the success or failure of the
MBO strategy.
Towards the ‘ecocycle society’? Closing the loops of goods and
materials 
Ecocycle adaptation; policy action from the 1992 Recycling Bill
to the present
The Bourgeois Government labelled its Ecocycle Bill of 1993 as a
first step towards ‘a society based on the principle of ecocycles’
(Ministry of the Environment 1993:3). The bill introduced
specific demands and targets to reduce solid waste and adapt
products for reuse and recycling. Demands were defined as
specific percentages to be reached by 1997 for reuse or recycling
of packaging materials that were already then recycled to a large
extent (SFS 1994:1235). Targets concerned packaging materials
that were only recycled by small factions of the total volume
(Cabinet Bill 1992/93:180, p. 78 f.). The Government introduced
the principle of producer liability, comprising the whole life cycle
of the package or material, and including responsibility to take
care of the waste in an ‘environmentally acceptable’ way (Cabinet
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Bill 1992/93:180, pp. 53 ff.). A special Ecocycle Commission was
appointed in 1993 to ‘develop a strategy for eco-cycle adaptation
of the commodities sector and propose successive extensions of
the producer liability’ (Ecocycle Commission 1997:3).
Apart from some general remarks on the necessity for adequate
separation and collection systems, and of the need to inform
consumers, the 1993 Cabinet Bill left the manufacturers to decide
on the ‘how’ of this eco-cycle adaptation. The largest manufac-
turers in branches affected by the liability regulations swiftly
formed a self-regulatory organisation. Special ‘materials compa-
nies’ were established for cardboard, corrugated paper, plastics
and metals, as well as a special recycling company for glass. These
companies are run as ‘not-for-profit companies’, contracting out
the actual collection and recycling. The materials companies
control the reuse and recycling activities of their member produc-
ers, while producers outside the companies account for their
reuse and recycling to the SEPA (Statistics Sweden 2000:114).
Combined, they form the service organisation that disseminates
information on collection and recycling, and how and where to
deposit packaging (www.repa.se).
What have been the Government’s activities after the 1993
Bill? A 1996 bill passed by Parliament mandated the Cabinet to
prohibit the dumping of burnable and organic waste by 2002 and
2005, respectively (Cabinet Bill 1996/97:172). The 1997 strategy
report from the Ecocycle Commission suggested quite ambitious
objectives for infrastructural change, adaptation of new goods
and commodities, and waste products (Ecocycle Commission
1997:28). The 1998 Bill on National Environmental Objectives
extended the list of goods and commodities subject to producer
liability, and linked this to target levels and dates. Up to 80 per
cent of worn out tyres were to be recycled or taken care of in an
environmentally friendly way by manufacturers and dealers after
1998. Car manufacturers must take care of cars registered 1997
and later left for scrapping after 1998, and to make 85 per cent
of each individual post-1997 model car recyclable or reusable by
2002. This share is to reach 95 per cent by 2015. For electric and
electronic products, regulatory changes concerning the producer
liability were put on the books (Cabinet Bill 1997/98:145,
pp. 201 ff.)
The 1998 bill also addressed the eco-cycle adaptation of large-
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scale systems in the society’s infrastructure, such as waste
dumping and water and sewage. The prohibitions against
dumping burnable and organic waste by 2002 and 2005, the
pending permit regulations for waste transportation, and the
pending proposal to introduce a tax on all dumped waste would,
in the Cabinet’s view, increase the assortment of waste at the
source and its use for recycling or energy production. The objec-
tive was to reduce, by 2005, the total volume of dumped waste
by 50 to 70 per cent in relation to 1995 volumes (Cabinet Bill
1997/98:145, p. 146, 205 f.). As for the closing of nutrient cycles
between urban and rural areas, the 2005 prohibition against
dumping of organic waste would also concern sludge from
sewage treatment plants (Cabinet Bill 1997/98:145, p. 207 f.). 
A Cabinet Communication to Parliament in May 2000
reported on a strategy for a sustainable products policy. Working
closely with the EU, and adopting a life-cycle perspective, the
Swedish Government and its agencies will continue to work
towards decreasing the negative impact on human health and the
environment of commercial products. Measures comprise infor-
mation, EMAS, green tender and procurement, green labelling
and standardisation, as well as widened producer liability
(Cabinet Communication 1999/2000:114, passim). Elaborating
on the strategy for non-toxic and resource-efficient cyclical
systems in its NEO bill of 2001, the Cabinet pointed to several
new initiatives that are to be taken on issues such as an environ-
mentally adapted products policy, international co-ordination, a
programme for the production, use and retrieval of chemicals,
reduction of the dumping of waste, and others (Cabinet Bill
2000/01:130, pp. 209 ff.). A special Commission was set up to
report during 2001 on further concrete measures to extend
producer liability to other product areas (Dir. 2000:28).
Ecocycle adaptation in practice; leaks, loopholes, and full circles
How far, then, have Sweden’s efforts towards eco-cycle adapta-
tion progressed in practice? Five years after the producer liability
regulations came into force, annual recycling had increased by
130,000 tons for packaging materials, by 10,000 tons for paper,
and by 10,000 tons for tyres. Of the 20,000 companies and firms
affected by producer liability for packaging materials, producers
accountable for 90 per cent of all packaging materials in Sweden
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had joined the materials company in question (http://environ.se as
of June 15, 1999). 
As shown in Table 3.1., there are several examples of relative
‘success’ in the Swedish process. The most obvious closing of life
cycles concerns products that actively involve consumers. Glass
and PET bottles, and aluminium cans, are reused and recycled to
the extent that targets are already reached. So is the case for recy-
cling of paper from newspapers and journals. A contributing
factor to this achievement is most probably that price conscious
consumers make use of the system of repayment for old bottles
and cans in force at grocery stores throughout the country.
Furthermore, local governments have arranged recycling stations
in most neighbourhoods, where individuals and households can
deliver paper, cardboard, bottles and cans, as well as batteries
and old clothes. It is also notable that several of the targets for
more ‘industrial’ recycling and reuse are close to being reached.
However, these examples of relative success in closing cycles of
goods and materials comprise only those areas subjected to
producer liability. A system for collection, transport and reuse by
manufacturers can be built up by reversing the flows from
consumers to producers. A spring 1998 survey of nine industrial
branches showed that car manufacturers, producers of electric
and electronic products, tyre companies and the packaging indus-
try all use several ecocycle adaptation criteria throughout the
production phase. However, only a few areas report on prolonged
product life cycles. Even fewer engage in making their products
upgradeable (Ecocycle Commission 1998: 165 ff.). Far greater
challenges to eco-cycle adaptation are raised by the large-scale
systems in the society’s infrastructure. With lifecycles of up to 150
years, most were built up long before the (re)discovery of the
problems of the commons. The effect is a locking in of flows of
nutrients, energy, materials, and waste in technologies and struc-
tures (Ecocycle Commission 1997, ch. 7). 
In terms of sustainability, the strategy of eco-cycle adaptation
thus still has a long way to go. The ‘direct material input’ (DMI)
into the Swedish economy was close to 25 tons per capita in
1998. Input of fossil fuels seems to have stabilised during the
1990s, while that from other non-renewable materials oscillates.
There is, however, a steady increase in the input of renewable
resources. About 10 per cent of the DMI becomes waste, and half
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Table 3.1 Demanded and estimated actual levels of recycling and reuse
for different goods and commodities subjected to producer liability in
Sweden. 
Good or Demanded level of recycling or reuse, Actually
commodity and year of attainment attained levels
1999 in %
Packages Up to June 2001 After June 2001
Glass containers 70% recycling or 70% recycling 84
reuse of material
Corrugated 65% recycling or 65% recycling 84
cardboard reuse of material
Cardboard, 30% recycling or 70% (40% reuse 40
cartons reuse of material of material) 
Steel sheets 50% recycling or 70% recycling 62
reuse of material
Aluminium, 50% recycling or 70% (40% reuse 33
(except beverage reuse of material of material)
containers)
Aluminium, 90% recycling 90% reuse of 84
beverage containers material
Plastics (not 30% recycling or 70% (30% reuse 34
PET bottles) reuse of material of material)
Wooden packages 70% (15% reuse
of material)
Packages, other 30% (15% reuse
material of material)
PET bottles 90% recycling or 90% reuse of 91 (refill), 73
reuse of material material (reuse of
material)
Returnable glass 95% recycling 98
bottles
Other Products
Cars 85% reuse of
material (from
2002)
Tyres 80% reuse of material (from 1999) 92
Newspapers and 75% (from 2000) 79
recyclable paper
Source: www.environ.se/index.php3?main=/dokument/teknik/avfall/avfall1.htm
(as of September 2001)
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of this waste is recycled into the economy. It should also be noted
that about 20 per cent of the annual DMI is hazardous to human
health and the environment (Statistics Sweden 2000:108). 
The eco-cycle adaptation strategy shows some interesting
features in terms of autonomy. The Social Democratic govern-
ment has stated that a ‘Sustainable Sweden’ should be achieved
‘without disturbing effects on market competition’, and as far as
possible through voluntary action and negotiated solutions, also
involving consumers (Cabinet Bill 1997/98:145, pp. 196 ff.).
While providing consumers and citizens with incentives for ‘good
environmental conduct’, the markets for recycling and reuse
established in sectors subjected to producer liability, and the
continuous information campaigns leave the choice of conduct to
the individual. The implementation of the producer liability
concept through branch agreements is seen as a model for the
future widening of that concept. 
Changing gears – policies for resource efficiency 
Factor Ten and the quest for efficiency in energy and transport
In its September 1997 report to the Parliament on ‘Ecological
Sustainability’, the Social-Democratic Cabinet pointed to the need
to make energy and material flows compatible with sustainable
development. It would be necessary to achieve ‘a manifold
decrease in the demand for energy and materials’. The Cabinet
explicitly pointed to the ‘Factor Ten’ concept, i.e., a tenfold effec-
tivisation of resource use over the next two generations as ‘a
signal of the necessary level of effectivisation . . . [and] . . . a
compass to stimulate new ideas’ (Cabinet Communication
1997/98:13, p. 9). The Cabinet thus seemed to have accepted the
thinking of its Ecocycle Commission: ‘factor ten can be used as a
benchmark for the need to dematerialise’ production and
consumption in a highly industrialised country like Sweden
(Ecocycle Commission 1997:60).
Seven months earlier, in February 1997, the Social-Democratic
Cabinet had reached an agreement with the Left Party and the
Greens on a programme for ‘sustainable’ energy provision. In the
March 1997 Energy Bill, the Cabinet stated that the exodus from
the nuclear energy society agreed upon by the three parties
opened up for a cost-effective energy provision with an emphasis
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on renewable energy sources, and with low future impacts on
health, environment, and climate. Electric energy should be
provided through a system of domestic, renewable and sustain-
able energy sources, and combined with efficient energy use and
low use of fossil fuels. Not only would this ease the transforma-
tion into an ecologically sustainable society, but it would also
stimulate Sweden’s economic and social development. As much as
SEK 8 billion would be allocated to support investments in
already functioning energy-efficient technology and in renewable
energy sources and to stimulate the development and use of
competitive, efficient, environment-friendly energy technologies
based on renewable sources (Cabinet Bill 1996/97:84, p. 28 f.). 
The efficiency drive in the Energy Bill was clearly anchored
within the Cabinet’s by then emerging strategy of ‘ecological
modernisation’ (see below, pp. 77–81). At the core of the argu-
ments of the Minister of Industry and Trade was the traditional
Social-Democratic view that increased production and economic
growth is decisive for employment and thus welfare. A basic
favourable element in this respect, argued the Minister, is the
secure provision of inexpensive electric energy to industrial
production. The new ‘non-nuclear’ energy policy built on the
premise that industrial use of electric energy should be allowed to
increase – but must also become more efficient – over the next
decade (Cabinet Bill 1996/97:84, p. 7).
In the 2001 Cabinet Bill on National Environmental
Objectives, the strategy for more efficient energy use and trans-
portation is particularly tied in with the following NEOs: Clean
Air, Reduced Climate Impact, Natural Acidification Only, No
Eutrophication, and A Good Built Environment. The quite ambi-
tious 2010 interim targets for these NEOs would seem to require
very tough measures, impinging on individual autonomy. The Bill
foresees an increased use of economic instruments to make the
environmental costs explicit and to stimulate energy effectivisa-
tion and further development of performance standards for
vehicles, machines and other moving equipment. Green tax
reforms in the vicinity of SEK 30 billion were indicated for the
period up to 2010, including increased CO2 and energy taxes.
There will also be a programme for infrastructural changes to
achieve a sustainable transportation system (Cabinet Bill
2000/01:130, pp. 198 ff.). 
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What then are the implications for sustainability from recent
patterns of efficiency and productivity in energy and transporta-
tion? Final energy use decreased in industry and the built
environment in the latter half of the 1990s. Energy use per SEK of
product value sank by one-third from 1980 to the end of the
century. Energy productivity rose steadily by about 11/2 per cent
annually (SOU 2001:2, pp. 141 ff.). The pattern is not that posi-
tive for the transport sector. Final energy use rose steadily in the
1990s. The amount of gasoline per vehicle kilometre decreased by
12 per cent in the 1980s, but has since levelled out. The shift in
demand towards heavier vehicles, and the lower number of
passengers per vehicle together contribute to higher use of gaso-
line per passenger kilometre in 1998 than in 1970 (SOU 2001:2,
pp. 147 ff.). 
Sweden and the middle way: seeking consensual ecological
modernisation 
When the then Minister of Finance Göran Persson assumed lead-
ership of the Swedish Social Democratic Party in March 1996, he
surprised many observers by proclaiming the achievement of an
‘ecologically sustainable society’ as a new, ‘noble mission’ for his
party. Presenting his Cabinet Policy Platform two weeks later,
Prime Minister Persson stated that Sweden should be ‘an interna-
tionally driving force and a forerunner in the endeavours to create
an ecologically sustainable development’ (Parliamentary Record,
March 22, 1996). The temporal aspect was of central concern.
The present pattern of continued economic growth would – so
argued the Ministers and the party elite – overtax natural
resources and leave future generations disinherited (Prime
Minister Göran Persson 1997; Environmental Minister Anna
Lindh 1997; DESD 1997:1; SAP 1997). 
However, the transformation of the country into ‘A
Sustainable Sweden’ should not mean draconian measures
towards present generations. The ruling Swedish Social
Democrats put a strong emphasis on the social and economic
aspects of sustainable development. Allusions were made to the
glorious past, when the party ruled over the transformation of
Sweden into a modern welfare state, folkhemmet (the ‘People’s
Home’; see Tilton 1990:125 ff.): ‘Now, we have a similar mission.
We will realise the vision of a green welfare state, and bring about
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a thorough ecological modernisation of Sweden’ (SAP 1997;
italics added). In its Finance Plan for 1997, the Social Democratic
Cabinet stated that the transformation of Sweden into a ‘green
people’s home’
means an increased demand for investments and development of
modern technology. Energy is a case in point. If Sweden is a fore-
runner in developing new technology, new markets are created for
Swedish business and many new firms will be established in the
energy sector. (Cabinet Bill 1996/97:150, p. 22)
Said the Prime Minister: ‘[W]e will all gain from . . . the marriage
of ecology, economy and employment’. (Cabinet Policy Platform,
September 17, 1996; Environmental Minister Anna Lindh 1997;
DESD 1997:2; Prime Minister Göran Persson 1997; SAP 1997;
see Edman 1998)
This policy shift indicated a wholesale acceptance of the strat-
egy of ecological modernisation (see Jänicke 1985, Hajer 1995,
Gouldson and Murphy 1997, Lundqvist 2000). This strategy is
founded on a combination of regulatory and economic policy
instruments to propel the growth of new, green technologies and
production/consumption processes in society (see Murphy
2000:3). This way of promoting economic growth is in fact a
long-term hallmark of Sweden’s Social Democrats; it seemed only
‘natural’ to extend it to promote ‘green’ growth in consensus with
broad socio-economic interests. Ministers pointed to the fact that
Swedish public sector annually purchases goods and services for
nearly 300 billion SEK (about €33 billion). The government could
thus ‘directly create a market’ for green goods and services
through an active ‘green procurement’ policy for public agencies
at all levels. The tax system should be subjected to successive
changes to promote both eco-sustainability and the competitive-
ness of Swedish firms and enterprises. Massive government
support of eco-investment programmes would also be forthcom-
ing to stimulate the ecological modernisation – read greening – of
the ‘People’s Home’ (Environmental Minister Anna Lindh 1997;
Prime Minister Göran Persson 1997; SAP 1997). 
The Delegation for Ecologically Sustainable Development
(DESD) formed in January 1997 within the Cabinet became the
vehicle for this strategy. The Delegation’s first, explicitly short-
term assignment was to ‘develop a platform for the Cabinet’s
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comprehensive policy for an ecologically sustainable society.’
(Parliamentary Record January 22, 1997, Prime Minister Göran
Persson). The Delegation’s March 1997 report on A Sustainable
Sweden called for a Sustainability Investment Programme to run
from 1998 to 2004. It included 
• one billion SEK to eco-cycle adjustment of built environments
and infrastructure;
• nine billion SEK to eco-cycle transformation of the Swedish
energy system, and;
• six billion SEK to local investment programs (LIPs) for sustain-
ability by municipal governments (DESD 1997). 
Not only was such a programme important for the possibilities
of future generations to lead a good life, argued the Delegation.
The ‘most thrilling aspect’ of the work towards sustainable devel-
opment was to ‘be able to utilise the markets to open up for
environmentally adapted products and services’, thus stimulating
growth and competitiveness, and creating new jobs. The
Cabinet’s spring 1997 Economic Bill allocated 12,6 billion SEK
for the period 1998–2000 to the Sustainable Sweden programme
as a whole. Of this, 5,4 billion SEK was specifically destined to
support the Local Investment Programmes (LIPs) (Cabinet Bill
1996/97:150, pp. 87 ff.). 
‘Beating time’? The record of future-oriented ecological
modernisation 
The policy statements of leading Social Democrats indicated that
they wanted to achieve the ecological modernisation of the
‘People’s Home’ through consensus. The view of the economy-
ecology relationship as a positive-sum game was clearly meant to
imply that the road to sustainability is one where present genera-
tions would gain as much as those of the future. What, then, is the
record so far of the LIPs in terms of autonomy and sustainability? 
The political centrality attributed by the Cabinet to the
Sustainability Investment Programme is clearly shown in the
implementation process. Contrary to usual procedures of distrib-
uting grants through formally independent agencies, the Cabinet
formed a Special Unit within the Environment Ministry for this
purpose. The statute regulating the process and establishing the
criteria for grants affords wide leeway and discretion to this Unit
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(SFS 1998:23). Local governments send ‘notifications of interest’,
outlining investment ideas. From these, the Special Unit selects a
number of local governments for ‘dialogue’, during which the
investment ideas are further developed. After receiving the final
applications, the Special Unit scrutinises them, and may then seek
counsel from relevant national agencies and the Regional
Administrations. Early assessments of the process pointed to
several problems. The criteria for decisions on grants were not
clear and transparent. Agency experts were not consulted to an
extent that would guarantee the cost-effectiveness of supported
investments in relation to environmental objectives (Standing
Committee on Housing 1998/99, pp. 25 ff; see Auditors of
Parliament 1998/99:97). A survey to the municipal Local Agenda
co-ordinators at the end of 1998 revealed that LIPs were seldom
anchored within the Local Agenda 21 processes and the sustain-
ability ideas developed in discussions among citizen groups and
local politicians and administrators. The indication was rather
that administrative and business elites within the municipalities
dusted off old pet projects (Brundin and Eckerberg 1999). 
The ‘consensus’ was thus very much one promoted by the
activities and views of the Environment Ministry’s special unit.
This in turn implies that the autonomy of present local citizens –
expressed, e.g., in Local Agenda 21 plans – was somewhat
compromised. But was not this in their long-term interest, as the
programme promoted sustainability and thus autonomy for
future generations? Under the statute, municipalities applying for
LIP grants were required to describe how the proposed measures
might stimulate the development of new technology (italics mine).
The statute ‘demands’ that grants to ‘sustainability’ investments
by industry or business must promote such development (SFS
1998:23). However, the technology-driving grants were never
more than a tiny part of the whole programme (see Auditors of
Parliament 1998/99:87). Even with a very generous interpretation
of ‘new’ technology, only about one (1) per cent of the 2.3 billion
SEK granted in the first year were of this kind (Kågesson and
Lidmark 1998). 
Against this background, it only seems logical that the Swedish
government notified the EU of changes in the 1998 statute to the
effect that the technology-development conditions for grants to
competitive industries and firms is withdrawn from autumn
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1999. Furthermore, Internet information to applicants empha-
sises that LIP grants are different from other state grants. There is
‘no technology driving conditionality, i.e., the Cabinet does not
point out which technological solutions should be supported.
Instead, the ecological and employment effects are in focus’. The
Ecocycle Billion, explicitly designed to stimulate development of
technologies for ecologically sustainable development, was taken
out of the state budget in April 1999. Only one-fifth was ever
used for project grants, and only a few of the supported projects
were technology-driving (National Audit Office 1999a:passim.
See www.hallbarasverige.gov.se as of June 1999). With the basic
element of the ecological modernisation strategy withdrawn, the
Prime Minister’s vision of the LIP programme as a promoter of
green technology and new ‘niches’ of sustainable growth for
Swedish industry thus in effect came to nought.
But could not the programme have employment and environ-
mental effects that would in the longer term justify the
Social-Democratic strategy of ecological modernisation?
According to the latest available official figures, 141 municipali-
ties (just under half of Sweden’s 289 local governments) were
granted a total of SEK 5.6 billion to LIPs up to the autumn of
2001. Out of the total investments of SEK 21,5 billion, directly
environment-related investments totalled SEK 17 billion. The
employment impact estimated by the municipalities comes to
about 15,600 ‘green jobs’ up to 2002. There are, however, only
about 1,800 permanent new jobs created through LIPs
(Government Communication 2000/01:38, p. 24; see
http://miljo.regeringen.se/M-dep_fragor/hallbar utveckling/LIP).
As for environmental effects of the LIPs, the only base for judge-
ment comes from the estimates made in the municipal application
for grants. The funds invested up to 2001 ‘are expected’ to
produce the following results:
• Energy consumption down by 2.1 TWh per year.
• Fossil fuels equivalent to 2.3 TWh per year replaced by renew-
able energy sources.
• Carbon dioxide emissions down by 1.57 million tonnes or 2.8
per cent of all Sweden’s emissions. 
• Nutrient and phosphorous discharges down by 2 and 4 per
cent respectively of the current discharges into water. 
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• The amount of waste going to landfill down by 500,000
tonnes, which is the equivalent of 10 per cent of present
volumes (Cabinet Communication 2000/01:38, p. 58 f.).
In their assessment of the first two programme years, the
Auditors of Parliament stated that meaningful judgements on
environmental effects could only be made relative to such quanti-
fied objectives that existed before the establishment of National
Environmental Objectives and subsequent interim targets (see
above, pp. 65–8). For the seven comparisons thus possible, the
measures resulting from LIPs granted state support in 1998
contributed only infinitesimally to the actual achievement of these
quantified objectives. The Auditors could not judge the LIPs’ cost
effectiveness, since the Environment Ministry’s database did not
classify the grants according to estimated environmental effects.
Seen from the sustainability perspective, the Auditors’ conclusion
on the LIPs’ contribution to ‘A Sustainable Sweden’ is worth
quoting. The Auditors found it
questionable whether the Cabinet – by using other policy instru-
ments – can stimulate activities that make sure the other 95 per
cent of the effects necessary for goal achievement will actually
materialise. (Auditors of Parliament 1998/99:97)
Ecological self-binding in Sweden: up or down with the
ecocycle?
‘Saving’ time: are physical planning and ecocycle adaptation
closing in on the future? 
Temporally rational ecological governance means that societal
and economic processes are made compatible with underlying,
and ultimately binding, ecological and natural resource cycles.
The precautionary principle demands that decision-makers at all
levels avoid actions that may have irreversible effects on these
cycles. But what is irreversible is surrounded by great uncertainty,
and may not be discovered until way into the future. The precau-
tionary principle thus forces decision-makers to play it safe by
constraining present action through ‘self-binding’ measures. For
such binding to count as temporally rational ecological gover-
nance, we defined three constitutive elements: (1) defined target
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dates when specific sustainability objectives are to be achieved,
(2) clearly outlined processes of monitoring and evaluation of
actual goal achievement, and (3) democratic procedures for deci-
sion-making and implementation, regardless of the self-binding
strategies used. 
Four major Swedish strategies of constraining present action in
favour of future sustainability and autonomy have been studied,
i.e., physical planning and management by objectives, eco-cycle
adaptation, and resource efficiency.
Physical planning exhibits a peculiar relationship to tempo-
rally rational ecological governance. The time frames of present
physical planning provide a temporal context for environmental
and resource management, but do not in and of themselves
define targets or dates of their achievement. Defined from polit-
ical and economic rather than natural cycles, the temporal
frames of planning differ among sectors. The problems
with physical planning as a means of binding us now for
future sustainable development also come out clearly in the
quite limited and indecisive role of Environmental Impact
Assessments. Physical planning processes have proven unable to
block certain large-scale developments with possibly irreversible
environmental and resource consequences, with the Hallandsås
railroad tunnel as a case in point (see below, pp. 109–11). In
terms of autonomy, present planning procedures exhibit a gap
between formal and real opportunities for public participation
and influence. To what extent resource and environmental
considerations emanating from public involvement actually find
their way into local master plans is presently unknown. 
Having said this, one should however not forget that Sweden’s
national physical planning has been instrumental in ‘preserving’
time by defining and defending areas and specific resources of
‘national interest’. Almost one quarter of Sweden’s area is under
such constraints that activities detrimental to sustainable devel-
opment and environmental quality cannot take place there. The
regional Strategic Environmental Guidelines (STRAMs) are a
major source of identification and prevention of such areas.
Finally, the future linking of all sectoral planning to the 15
National Environmental Objectives and their interim targets,
indicates a longer time perspective and a more co-ordinated
process. This linkage holds the promise of making the planning
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process more binding on resource-related decision, and thus more
instrumental to sustainability. 
The eco-cycle adaptation strategy is essentially one of ‘saving’
time and resources for the future. An increased recycling and
reuse of materials and products now leads to lower pressure on
the resource base and environmental quality in the future. A clear
streak of autonomy is visible. The most remarkable progress has
been made in fields where individuals – as consumers and as citi-
zens – have access to markets as well as infrastructural
arrangements aimed at easing individual choice of this strategy.
Packaging materials, newspapers, as well as glass, aluminium and
PET beverage containers are examples of recycling and reuse
where achievements are even ahead of projected targets. In terms
of sustainability, the fully eco-cycle adapted society is a long way
off. Comprehensive infrastructural socio-economic processes –
such as those of sewage and transportation – will not be adapted
for some time to come, because of the ‘lock in’ effects of present
technologies. 
What is important to note, however, is that eco-cycle adapta-
tion has become a constituent part of Sweden’s environmental
and resource policy. Decisions are taken, and moves are made to
push further with this strategy. Regulations of material cycles in
key industrial and other branches, and explicit timetables for the
recyclability/reusability/upgradeability of several products and
materials are projected to take effect over the first decade of this
millennium.
‘Beating time’: does ecological modernisation have a future?
In essence, ecological modernisation holds the promise of
‘beating’ time. By making energy and resource use more and
more efficient, the intergenerational conflict can be avoided (for
a glowing Swedish ‘homage’, see Edman 1998). Efficiency hikes
in line with ‘Factor 10’ will allow present generations to uphold
their living standard but still leave future generations with
enough resources to allow for autonomous choices of ways of
life. Much of this strategy’s credibility thus hinges on the actual
effectiveness of programmes launched to stimulate the growth of
‘green’ and ‘lean’ technology. While it is too early for final
judgements on programmes with a temporal scope of genera-
tions, the results of presently available evaluations may give
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indications of where these programmes are heading.
When announcing the ecological modernisation strategy in
1996, the Social Democrats said it would build a future, ‘green’
People’s Home, saving environment and resources for future
generations. After a flying start there are, however, strong indica-
tions that the programme is turning away from this central idea.
The technology-driving element, so central to the strategy, has
become subdued in the LIPs. The ‘Ecocycle Billion’ grants to
stimulating new resource- and energy-efficient technologies were
even abandoned. 
The discretionary decision-making process, with lack of strict
criteria, little if any analysis of longer-term strategic effects, seem-
ingly no cost-effectiveness analyses, and an almost programmatic
non-involvement of expert authorities, seems to have compro-
mised both the sustainability and autonomy elements of
temporally rational ecological governance. The programme of
subsidies for long-term conversion of Sweden’s energy provision
and distribution systems is split between authorities and sub-
programmes, and thus is difficult to assess in terms of its
contribution to sustainable energy provision. All in all, however,
the effects on environmental quality and energy conversion from
the ‘eco-efficiency’ strategy seem quite marginal. The Auditors of
Parliament even called for a reconsideration of national environ-
mental quality and resource management objectives should this
strategy continue. 
The ‘efficiency’ strategy has had a special impact on autonomy
and democracy. The LIP grant programme is characterised by a
very high degree of centralised decision-making. Traditional ways
of implementing decisions through independent expert authorities
have been bypassed (see Lundqvist 2001a). Most of the grants to
local investment programmes for sustainable development were
decided by just a dozen officers within the Ministry of
Environment’s special LIP unit. Ideas emanating from municipal
Local Agenda 21 processes, and anchored within discussions
among local citizens, have not found their way into LIP grant
applications to an extent compatible with the criterion of auton-
omy (see Kågesson and Lidmark 1998; Brundin and Eckerberg
1999).
This leads us to an intricate question: Will ecological moderni-
sation – and the ‘efficient use’ strategies based on it – really ‘beat’
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time by bridging us over to affluence for future generations
without detriment to the present? Given the record so far, one is
forced to answer in the negative. For the ecological modernisa-
tion’s ‘positive-sum-game’ to materialise, more resource-efficient
and environment-friendly technologies must develop, and provide
new opportunities of socio-economic development also for the
present generation. When that element is compromised, as seems
to be the case for Sweden, the auspices for autonomy and sustain-
ability held out by ecological modernisers certainly seem clouded.
An idea just in time? The prospects of ecological management
by objectives
Still, temporal aspects are integrated parts of Sweden’s environ-
mental and resource policies. Planning regulations, programmes
for ecocycle adaptation, and even efficient use strategies do
address the longer-term aspects of sustainable development, and
are binding – with different strengths – on future decisions. But if
there is not enough of ‘saving’ and ‘reserving’ time, and if the
prospects of ‘beating’ time are not all that clear, is there really a
future for temporally rational ecological governance? 
Perhaps the most interesting answer to this question is
provided by an idea whose time has just come, i.e., ecological
management by objectives (MBO). The three overarching objec-
tives of protection of environmental quality, efficient use of
resources, and sustainable ecosystem productivity formulated in
1997, explicitly lifted the perspective to one generation from now
to around 2020–25. With the 15 National Environmental
Objectives and the specification of interim targets, ratified by
Parliament in 1999 and 2001 respectively, all societal sectors will
have explicit goals and target dates for sustainable resource use
and environmental management by the middle of the first decade
of the third millennium.
The reader may argue that this is just some rattling at the
fences, and not a binding pledge to attack problems of sustainable
development. Admittedly, management by objectives is a loosely
structured process in classic political and administrative terms.
But the interim targets are there, binding agencies and actors
involved in the process of developing sub-goals and targets
further down the line. They will most probably come to feel
formally, but above all mentally, bound to these objectives and
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targets. Another crucial aspect of the MBO strategy is that the
choice of methods of goal achievement is left with the responsible
agents and their client groups. The agencies and the politically
responsible elites must bring responsible sectoral actors into
consensus around the objectives and constructive decisions as to
proper measures for goal achievement, something that implies a
considerable degree of autonomy in the process. 
However, temporally rational ecological governance is not just
about how to arrange political institutions to take account of
different life cycles and time scales important to the balance of
ecosystems. To the aspect of becoming ‘green in time’ is thus
added the aspect of being politically accountable and ‘just in
time’. A most interesting aspect of the MBO strategy is its
entrenchment in central bureaucracy. In effect, present bureau-
crats function as ‘ombudsmen’ for future generations. If the
subgoals and targets come to reflect judgements of administrative
feasibility as much as considerations of levels necessary for
sustainable development, this may affect the autonomy of future
generations. It should, however, be noted that an elaborate struc-
ture of political, and thus open, review of progress towards goals
and targets is envisaged with annual reports to Parliament, and a
broad State of the Environment report every mandate period.
Together with the explicit linking of the MBO strategy to a
supportive context of monitoring, evaluation, and new statistical
accounts, this means that the development towards goals and
targets can be closely scrutinised and the adequacy of goals and
targets challenged by the interested citizen.
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4
The commons of governing: the
knowledge base of ecological
governance
Science, politics and sustainable resource management
Between knowledge and power; scientific research and
ecological politics
Yesterday’s environmental problems were rather tangible in
spatial and temporal terms. Often easily detectable causes and
effects made them relatively simple to manage. The up-stream
polluter could be forced to compensate the down-stream victim.
However, the causes and effects of modern environmental prob-
lems are increasingly difficult to delimit in time and space.
Catchment eutrophication, long-range transport of air pollution,
thinning of the ozone layer, and global warming are examples of
this growing diffuseness of environmental problems. Resource use
decisions are increasingly made under conditions of uncertainty.
There is thus a growing need to ground rational ecological gover-
nance in scientific knowledge of ecosystems and of the effects of
resource use (see Berkes and Folke 2000). 
This means that scientific expertise comes to hold a key posi-
tion in governance for sustainable development. Scientists are
called upon to assess the spatial and temporal scale of environ-
mental problems, as well as to define the range of technically,
economically and socially possible solutions. We approach a
‘scientisation’ of ecological politics. Participants in the debates
over ecological governance are keen to use scientific arguments to
justify their positions. The turns of the debate over global
warming provide a clear example of how experts and counter-
experts are brought in to support differing standpoints. Scientists
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who want their findings accepted as the proper basis for policy
measures engage in a lot of lobbying-like footwork in the corri-
dors of political power. All this also means a ‘politicisation’ of
science. The importance of finding a ‘valid’ scientific base for
action propels political actors to seek ways of ‘steering’ scientific
research towards valued political ends (see, e.g., Jasanoff 1990;
Lee 1993). As a consequence, the boundaries between scientifi-
cally validated facts and politically accepted opinions are blurred.
Research on the role of scientists and of knowledge in envi-
ronmental and resource management has produced two lines of
argument. Institutionalists view policy-makers as rational actors
involved in political bargaining to further their interests and
objectives. Knowledge is just one among other inputs into the
bargain, providing supportive arguments to political actors with
rather stable interests. Institutional factors that promote or block
the choice of knowledge to support certain alternative courses of
action are particularly important. Others argue that consensual
knowledge is what actually shapes the environmental and
resource management ‘regime’ and its patterns of action by
moulding the interests of the actors (Haas 1993:183 ff.).
Epistemic communities, i.e., networks of researchers and experts
are able to wield political power by cognitive authority based on
commonly accepted knowledge. These communities become vehi-
cles for institutional learning that, in turn, influences the content
of ecological governance (Haas 1997:200, 205 f.).
Speaking truth to power; access, validation and acceptance of
scientific arguments
These two views of the relationship between science and politics
point out several aspects influencing the possibilities of ecologi-
cally rational governance to achieve both sustainability and
autonomy. Scientifically validated knowledge about what
promotes sustainability is increasingly crucial to such governance.
But the growing complexity of environmental problems means
that the process of obtaining knowledge, and of processing and
validating it, creates a need to organise knowledge production,
assessment and diffusion. 
First, by whom should this knowledge be generated and vali-
dated, i.e., accepted as common ground for ecological politics?
Most often, developed industrial nations see this as a matter for
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scientists and experts, working in research institutions, and not a
task for lay people relying on practical experience (see however,
Olsson and Folke 2001). The underlying idea is that specialisa-
tion and professional skill will lead to a reliable and valid base for
policy measures. Second, how should knowledge be produced and
evaluated? Ideally, the research process should not be directed by
politics or special interests. Researchers should be unhindered to
seek results in scientifically accepted ways. Otherwise, science
might not be speaking truth reliably to power. 
But even if science speaks the truth, what knowledge should be
produced and validated? At one stage in the process, the answer
may be that we need validated knowledge on the actual relation-
ships between causes and effects of specific environmental
problems. This presumes that there is some consensus as to which
environmental problems are the most critical ones. At a later
stage, priority may have to be given to specific courses of action,
i.e., practicable solutions to environmental problems. Ideally, this
prioritisation should have access to scientific evidence about the
scope and seriousness of specific environmental problems and
their effects, in order to widen political judgement and make it
more probable that political action is directed towards the most
relevant targets. Obviously, different kinds of knowledge are
required to solve problems of sustainable development. The
argument that research on sustainability should be less curiosity-
driven and more problem-driven leads to a re-evaluation of
scientific standards with respect to ‘tolerable’ uncertainties (see,
e.g., Board for Sustainable Development of the National Research
Council 1999).
Ideals are one thing, however, and reality another. On all these
three aspects, the lines between science and politics do get
blurred, with quite distinctive consequences for the possibilities of
achieving both sustainability and autonomy. Scientists fight
publicly over method; the how of knowledge production and
assessment is judged by criteria that differ among disciplines or
schools. They proceed from differing assumptions and perspec-
tives, which makes the prioritisation about what and by whom
even more complicated for political decision-makers (see Holling
et al. 2000:344 ff.). Since scientific arguments are not always
transparent to policy-makers, this increases the possibility of
influence from science over decisions about research priorities.
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Problems of scale also come in here. Sustainable development
largely focuses on global issues and global problems whereas
political decision-making structures and the systems of knowl-
edge generation are nationally organised.
Ecocracy vs. democracy; the normative dimension 
We thus end up with starkly normative questions about the
proper role of science in the policy process. Too much science
tends to withdraw policy-making from popular control, thus
blurring the lines of accountability. Too much politics in science
may threaten the validity of research results, as the research
process becomes impregnated with assumptions not derivable
from theoretically defendable premises. Thus, while the need to
achieve sustainable development makes it necessary to base polit-
ical decisions on the best possible scientific knowledge,
democratic norms force us to find ways of balancing politics and
science. How should a system of ecological governance be
designed to make sure that ecologically relevant scientific knowl-
edge is brought to bear on issues related to sustainability, and still
allow for democratic accountability of public decision-makers?
Some are clearly in favour of tipping the balance towards the
scientific end of the scale. Eco-authoritarians contend that the
pace of ecological degradation is rapidly threatening the ecologi-
cal survival of society. This leads them to argue that democracy
may be counterproductive to securing that objective. Invoking the
authority of science, they claim this to be an ‘objective’ definition
of the sustainability problem. Science can provide the appropriate
technical solutions. The resolution to the overriding problem of
scarcity is an oligarchic system ‘. . . with only those possessing the
ecological and other competencies necessary to make prudent
decisions allowed full participation in the political process.’
(Ophuls 1977:163). 
However, decisions on the best way to reach an ecologically
rational relation between society and the natural environment
‘will affect more lives (private and collective, present and future),
and to a greater extent than, arguably, any other policy area’,
with the exception of war (Barry 1999:199). Those tipping the
scale towards the democratic side argue that scientific knowledge
is necessary and useful. However, the scale and possible conse-
quences of ecological governance are so comprehensive as to
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demand that the demos as a whole, or its representatives, must
have the last word. Democratic politics should determine what
are the problems involved in sustainability, and decide on the
appropriate solutions: ‘Once these major issues have been demo-
cratically decided, then technical considerations may be
appropriate. Experts ought to be “on tap, not on top” . . .’ (Barry
1999:199 ff.).
Criteria for knowledge-based and democratic ecological
governance
But how should that tap be construed to ascertain that ‘the appli-
cation of science is within rather than beyond democratic
regulation’ (Barry 1999:203)? How are we to make sure that
the answers to what, how and by whom are based on the best
possible knowledge available and, as far as possible, on comple-
mentary and competing views on problems and solutions? First of
all, it seems important that the question of what should be
subjected to scientific research and production of knowledge is
answered through an intricate balancing of scientific, political
and social aspects. Scientific discoveries and findings concerning
the society-environment metabolism can be used to address issues
of the scope, intensity and direction of ‘problems’ related to
sustainability. An institutionalised dialogue between science and
politics can then guide political decisions on how to allocate
public funding for future research. This is particularly important
for a small country like Sweden with limited resources in terms of
both money and manpower. 
However, both second-generation environmental and – in
particular – sustainability issues involve uncertainties and risks of
an unprecedented order. Citizens and actors in civil society can
never fully avoid being exposed to these uncertainties and risks.
On grounds of autonomy, the evaluation of risks and uncertain-
ties should not be left to policy-makers and scientists alone. This
‘post-normal’ situation has been used to argue for a more
conscious involvement of citizens and a different role for civil
society in the production of problem-oriented knowledge
(Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993). 
Thus, the issues of how and by whom what knowledge should
be generated and assessed ought to be addressed by securing a
structure of autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions that
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gather, assess and then disseminate knowledge on sustainable
resource management to political decision-making bodies and to
the general public. This may involve university departments, inde-
pendent research and monitoring institutes. It may also involve
agencies that work much like the semi-autonomous institutions
presently found in the judicial and – to an increasing extent –
financial spheres. For such a pluralistic structure of scientific
activity to provide complementary and competing knowledge, it
is of course necessary that the answers to the question of what are
such that competition is enhanced by the system of funding.
Norms of democracy and autonomy mean that there should also
be institutions where scientific knowledge on the state of the envi-
ronment, and on resource use alternatives and their effects, can be
politically evaluated and judged. Such institutions, be they parlia-
mentary commissions, judicial boards of appeal, public hearings
or other devices for participation, must be easily accessible for the
actors and interests wanting to influence or challenge resource-
related decisions. 
With regard to the knowledge aspect, the following criteria for
ecologically rational governance may thus be formulated:
• Governance is ecologically rational to the extent that the struc-
tures built up to develop, assess and disseminate science-based
knowledge allow for free exchange of complementary and
competing views. 
• Governance is ecologically rational when competing knowl-
edge is made accessible to public debate and scrutiny in the
policy process. 
• Governance is ecologically rational to the extent that scientific
knowledge is brought to bear on, and to interact with, politi-
cal judgement to arrive at democratically legitimate decisions
on how to use and manage natural resources to achieve
sustainable development. 
Organising knowledge for sustainable resource governance
Science for governmental policy: agency-sponsored research for
policy implementation
From the outset, the what, how and by whom of Swedish envi-
ronmental research was intimately linked to the implementation
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of governmental policy. An Environmental Research Board
within the Swedish Environmental Policy Administration decided
on the allocation of research grants. The SEPA Director General
also chaired that Board. A number of specialised Research
Committees examined applications for grants. These committees
consisted of active researchers as well as representatives of
sectoral agencies, municipalities, and sometimes industry, with
officers from the SEPA Research Department working as secre-
taries to the committees. Now and then, specific environmental
problems were singled out as ‘Programme Areas’. A Programme
Area Officer from SEPA’s Research Department co-ordinated
research within a designated area, and was ultimately responsible
to report the results to the Research Board. 
The environmental research budget was decided upon together
with all other state-supported research in the Cabinet’s Omnibus
Research Bill sent to Parliament every third year (see Cabinet Bill
1990/91:90, p. 459 f.). The allocations grew from about SEK 20
million in the early 1970s to around SEK 150 million in the mid
1990s, constituting about one-tenth of total state expenditures on
environmental policy. Besides the objective of building compe-
tence in Swedish environmental science, SEPA and its Research
Board emphasised direct practical applicability of research results
when awarding grants. Information and reports about Board-
sponsored research results were made easily available through
several series of SEPA research reports. The objectives of SEPA
Action Plans during the 1980s and 1990s were to a large extent
based on the results from agency-sponsored research (Lundqvist
1996:285 ff.).
This linkage between policy and science corresponded to the
then dominant view of the society-environment relationship.
Environmental problems were seen as linked to media (air, water,
soil), and/or to their sectors ‘of origin’ (agriculture, transport,
large resource-based industry, etc.). They were mainly discussed
in natural science and technical terms, and could be ‘solved’ one
by one with the right facts and the right techniques. A broader
view, including perspectives on the society-environment relation-
ship prevalent in social science and the humanities, was mainly
missing. Not until the late 1980s was a specific Research
Committee on Society and the Environment set up within the
SEPA research structure. Its share of the environment research
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budget remained infinitesimal, however, and the committee was
early on restructured to reflect the views of different organised
interests. 
The problems inherent in this organisation of the science-
policy relationship became increasingly apparent by the 1990s, as
the broader views of sustainable development and the more
diffuse character of second-generation problems got to the top of
the environmental agenda. A special environmental research
commission recommended a broader, more problem-oriented
perspective and more co-ordination among different users of
research than the prevailing ‘environmental’ and ‘cause-effect’
research structure dominated by the SEPA (SOU 1992:68, pp.
108 ff.; Cabinet Bill 1992/93:170, p. 513). 
Science for markets; solution-oriented research to develop green
technology
By then, environmental research was drawn into political turmoil.
Upon winning the 1991 elections, one of new Bourgeois
Government’s first, and certainly most well advertised priorities
was to dissolve the so-called Wage Earners’ Funds (Cabinet Bill
1991/92:92). Somewhat reluctantly, the Social-Democratic
Government established these funds within a year after regaining
power in 1982, after years of intensive ideological debate. Part of
the profit generated by Swedish business was to be placed in these
employee-controlled funds. Over the years, the share of employee
ownership and control over Swedish business would thus gradu-
ally increase. In its 1993 Cabinet Bill on ‘frontline research’ the
Centre-Right Coalition proposed that part of the funds should be
used for long-term knowledge expansion though basic research
and recruitment of scholars in areas of crucial importance to
Sweden’s future competitiveness in a global economy. This
included, among other things, strategic environmental research.
The strategic component meant that there should be more
research on new solutions, such as resource-lean technologies
(Cabinet Bill 1992/93:171, passim).
The 1992/93 Research Bill developed these ideas further. The
Bourgeois Government then in power proposed that the SEK 20
billion to be released for research through the dissolution of Wage
Earners’ Funds should be given to a few large ‘research founda-
tions’. Working for a period of about 15 years, these foundations
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should provide the best possible conditions for strong research
milieus by concentrating their funding to broad but well-defined
programmes. The drive for research to provide new solutions is
evident. Said the Minister: ‘It is of national importance to ensure
that Swedish industry has access to an infrastructure of basic and
applied research that enables it to conquer new markets.’
(Cabinet Bill 1992/93:170, p. 35).
One of the new foundations would address strategic environ-
mental research. This foundation, called MISTRA, was charged
with using the interest on SEK 2.5 billion to support research that
‘can be swiftly developed into practices of importance to the envi-
ronment’. The MISTRA Board should be ‘clearly anchored’ in
both the scientific community and Swedish industry (Cabinet Bill
1992/93:170, p. 38). Evidently, the Cabinet had in mind to break
new paths for Swedish environmental research. What this meant
to the traditional, discipline-bound cause-effect research is
discussed below (see pp. 97–9). 
MISTRA’s historic record and present activities reveal a delib-
erate and continuous effort to bridge the gap between the
scientific community and a broad spectrum of potential users of
research results. To receive MISTRA funding, environmental
research programmes must be driven not only by the scientific
community’s urge to be ‘at the cutting edge of knowledge’. They
must address the need to solve real world environmental prob-
lems. Such solutions should include environmentally sound
products, services and processes that can make it in a market, as
well as new judicial, administrative and other political measures.
Fundable MISTRA programs should 
• provide users in enterprises, authorities and organisations, as
well as international negotiators, decision-makers on different
levels and interest groups, with the latest scientific findings,
irrespective of sectoral boundaries;
• provide the research community with problems as they have
been formulated by the problem owners/users, irrespective of
its disciplinary boundaries. 
Also the enumeration of the different actors and interests that
might get funded through MISTRA evidences this drive to bring
scientific research and socio-economic practice together, in
order both to solve environmental problems and bring about new
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technological development. The foundation’s homepage states
that ‘MISTRA is for
• researchers who want to tackle problems, the solutions to
which can forward the development towards a sustainable
society;
• Swedish companies who want to be at the cutting edge when it
comes to developing environmentally sound products, services
or production processes. Scientific and commercial perspec-
tives must be combined;
• authorities and legislators who wish to tighten the require-
ments on activities that may harm the environment. Tougher
requirements must be based on solid scientific foundations;
• international negotiators charged with the task of drawing up
international agreements on more stringent environmental
requirements. A MISTRA programme must be able to meet
both the demands of the international research community for
quality and the need of negotiators for accurate information;
• non-governmental organisations and others striving for
sustainable development.’ (www.mistra-research.se/).
Programmes that fulfil these requirements, and pass the
needle’s eye of an extensive international peer review of scientific
quality, usually get funded for two consecutive three to four year
periods. Executive committees lead the programmes and are
mandated to keep the programme’s focus on problem solving and
the practical implementation of research. The MISTRA secre-
tariat is also quite active, checking each programme throughout
its duration, e.g., by meeting representatives of each programme
several times a year. About 20 programmes were running by the
end of 2001, and the sum available for annual funding from
MISTRA amounts to SEK 250 million (www.mistra-research.se/). 
Since the mid-1990s, MISTRA has provided grants to Swedish
environment- and resource-related research in the neighbourhood
of SEK 1.2 billion (about €130 million). What has this compara-
tively rich funding meant so far for the role of knowledge in
ecological governance? First of all, it has profoundly influenced
the how and by whom of Swedish environmental research. Due to
the thorough review of programme proposals, and the continuous
evaluation of programme performance, scientific quality is kept
at a high level. The MISTRA approach has also caused a dramatic
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increase in cross-disciplinary environment-related research;
natural sciences, technology, and the social sciences have been
forced to team up to get funded for research on different aspects
of a common problem. 
At issue, however, is the question of what is affected (and, one
might add, the question of for whom). The MISTRA Board of
Governors decides which programmes should be funded, often
after active scanning and development of ideas through the
MISTRA staff. The MISTRA and other strategic research foun-
dations are deliberately made constitutionally sovereign in
interpreting their statutes on how to spend their funds. The large
sums allocated to research might thus not necessarily be in
tandem with the priorities made in the Parliament’s research
policy decisions. The mandate to promote eco-technological
developments in Swedish industry may further accentuate this.
Another issue concerns who should own the research results.
Should it be MISTRA as a foundation under private law? Or
should it be those exploiting research results by developing new
technologies, or other groups involved in the practical solution of
environmental problems? The issue of government’s role in
ecological governance with respect to the knowledge dimension
soon came to occupy centre stage in the political debate. 
For government’s sake; the political fight to control strategic
environmental research
To the Social-Democratic government returning to power after
the 1994 elections, the strategic research foundations were an
aberration in research policy. The foundations’ voluminous
budgets, their independent status relative to the government, and
their strategies for research and development had drawn heavy
criticism. The Social Democrats were furthermore haunted by the
repercussions of the acute economic crisis of 1992, and the
continuously huge budget deficit. All this combined to promote
an orchestrated attack on the strategic foundations, where envi-
ronmental research in particular came to occupy centre stage.
In its drive to balance the state budget, the Social-Democratic
Government in September 1996 ordered the SEPA to cut its
budget by SEK 230 million in 1998–99. Searching for alterna-
tives, the SEPA leadership suggested taking away the agency’s
whole research budget. This alternative was put forward because
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the SEPA leadership seemingly nursed the view that MISTRA
would open its chest and fully compensate the SEPA for the cuts
in the research budget. However, it was not clear whether the
Social-Democratic Government and the Environment Minister
actually shared this view (Esselin and Arvidsson 1998:12 ff.). 
The SEPA Director General (who incidentally was at the same
time Chairman of the MISTRA Board of Directors) counted on
the Cabinet to gain a political majority for opening the strategic
research foundations to governmental influence and control. A
1996 bill proposed that the Cabinet should have the right to
change the statutes of the foundations from 1997. This would
circumvent earlier regulations demanding that such changes be
preceded by a formal request from the foundation board (Cabinet
Bill 1996/97:22, p. 4). Furthermore, the Cabinet’s research bill
proposed that the Cabinet should have the prerogative to appoint
and fire the members of the foundation boards. This would also
concern members representing the scientific community, who
should no longer be voted in by a special electoral collegium. The
Cabinet argued that this was motivated by the need to co-ordinate
scientific activities to research policy objectives, to free resources
for use elsewhere, and simply to cut the budget deficit (Cabinet
Bill 1996/97:5, p. 45 f.) Obviously, the Social-Democratic cabinet
saw these proposals as a way of getting the foundation boards to
allocate money not just to peer-reviewed research programmes
but also to state agencies and councils supporting environmental
research. 
The changes in the statutes and the processes of appointing
board members were accepted by the Parliament after intense
debate (Esselin and Arvidsson 1998:15 f.). The 1997 Budget Bill
cut the SEPA’s research budget for 1997 by one third, and allo-
cated no research money for 1998 and 1999. There was a clear
ambition to compensate SEPA with money from MISTRA, so that
SEPA could fulfil its responsibility for co-ordinating and evaluat-
ing Swedish environmental research (Cabinet Bills 1996/97:1/20,
pp. 5, 22; 1996/97:5, p. 303 f.). However, the Social-Democratic
victory turned out to be of no consequence. The MISTRA Board’s
Position Paper presented by mid-1997 made it strikingly clear
that the foundation would not grant money to the research tradi-
tionally supported by the SEPA. Indeed, MISTRA emphasised
that it would continue to concentrate on broad, interdisciplinary,
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and above all, solution-oriented programmes to enhance
Sweden’s possibilities to capture greater shares of the growing
eco-technology market (MISTRA 1997:16 ff.). 
The efforts to gain governmental control over appointments to
the boards of strategic research foundations were thus parliamen-
tarily successful. However, the formal changes did not translate
into changes in the directions of funding. The MISTRA board
rejected state involvement in decisions on what research should be
sponsored by MISTRA. Given the bleak prospects for future
funding of SEPA-sponsored research, it thus seemed as if the
SEPA had lost most of its former control of the research agenda
and access to research results. Furthermore, the question of what
environment-related research to support seemed to be tipping
towards an emphasis on ‘marketable’ technological solutions to
sustainability problems.
Balancing the scale: towards a multi-faceted relationship
between science, politics and market actors
Soon, however, proposals for comprehensive changes in the
system of research funding were put on the agenda. The ‘Research
2000’ Commission report released in October 1998 proposed to
co-ordinate and consolidate the funding of basic, applied and
sectoral research into four research councils. The final proposal
presented in the Social-Democratic Cabinet Bill on research in
March 2000 contained a mix of funding bodies and some inter-
esting arguments for such a mix. 
The purpose was to create a new funding organisation to
enable ‘concentrated efforts in important fields of scientific
research, promote co-operation between research and develop-
ment, and improve the diffusion of scientific knowledge’. This
organisation should make it possible for Cabinet and Parliament
to answer the question of what by directing research to ‘impor-
tant’ fields of both basic and applied research, and to stimulate
high quality research co-operation across disciplines. One large
national Science Council, established through a conglomeration
of the earlier, more specialised councils would now fund basic
research. With respect to applied research, two new research
councils would be set up, also on the basis of existing units. To
secure a proper answer to the question of how, the scientific
community would be provided with a legally guaranteed majority
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on the boards of the new funding councils. Furthermore, a special
funding agency would be established to help develop research
results into inventions and new technologies (Cabinet Bill 1999/
2000:81, p. 9).
What, then, about research for an ecologically sustainable
development? The Cabinet saw this as a highly prioritised field, in
need of a strong base for concentrated, long-term research efforts
involving not only research in natural science and technology, but
also on social, cultural and economic aspects. One of the
proposed new research councils should therefore fund research in
the fields of environment, agriculture and forestry, as well as
planning, building and housing. This meant taking over responsi-
bilities from four earlier Research Councils and most of the
traditional environmental research earlier funded by the SEPA. In
one stroke, the Cabinet thus put an enormously broad spectrum
of ecologically relevant research within one administrative frame-
work. It funds research spanning all the way from molecular
biology to comprehensive infra-structural planning. The
Cabinet’s major argument for this reorganisation was that since
‘the organisation of society and our lifestyles are the ultimate
causes of environmental problems, we must understand and
change the underlying economic, political and social mechanisms
in order to solve these problems’ (Cabinet Bill 1999/2000:81,
p. 28 f.). 
The new Research Council for Environment, Agricultural
Sciences and Spatial Planning – (FORMAS) – began its activities
in the second half of the year 2000. The Cabinet’s priorities as to
the what and how of research within FORMAS’s area of respon-
sibility reflect efforts to carefully balance all the multi-faceted
demands made on research for sustainable development. Charged
with initiating and co-ordinating research of importance to the
society’s transition to ‘Sustainable Sweden’, FORMAS is to give
priority to research on positive and negative relations among
ecologically, economically and socially sustainable development.
But it should also fund research that contributes to the achieve-
ment of sectoral development goals, and leads to increased
competitiveness in agriculture and forestry and industries within
those sectors, particularly the development of agricultural prod-
ucts not harmful to consumers.
The same concern for an appropriate balance of competing
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demands is evident with respect to how research should be carried
out. FORMAS should spur multi- and cross-disciplinary research
for sustainable development by supporting concentrated Swedish
activities in prioritised areas and by enhancing international
research co-operation. FORMAS is also expected to support crit-
ical and independent research providing scientifically valid
alternatives of action for Swedish agricultural and forestry poli-
cies. The new council is to co-operate with other research-funding
bodies to make sure crucial problems related to sustainable devel-
opment do not go unattended. Finally, FORMAS is charged with
actively assembling and disseminating research results and accu-
mulated knowledge to different groups and actors in society
(Cabinet Bill 2000/01:3, pp. 116 ff.). 
The division of labour determined by Parliament mandates
FORMAS to secure a ‘long-term build-up of knowledge’ in all the
areas within its responsibility, while the SEPA is responsible ‘for
research directly supporting its own activities.’ (Cabinet Bill
1999/2000:81, p.30). The SEPA has since embarked upon a strat-
egy of concentrating its research support to so-called ‘initiative’
areas. The themes are elaborated within the Agency, and then
opened up for competition among groups of researchers. The
final programme is worked out in co-operation between the
researchers, potential users interested in the research, and SEPA
officers, to secure quality, relevance and applicability of results
(see, e.g., SEPA 2000b). The FORMAS budget for 2002
amounted to SEK 435 million, of which SEK 180 million were
‘mortgaged’ to already granted research (FORMAS 2001). SEPA
returned as an actor with monetary capacities to provide grants
to environmental research in the year 2000. The sum allocated to
the SEPA is expected to increase from SEK 50 million in that year
to SEK 80 million in 2003 (Cabinet Bill 2000/01:1/20, p. 35). 
The reforms in the last decade of the twentieth century resulted
in a quite multi-faceted structure for funding research to sustain-
able development. At one end, MISTRA can use its annually
available SEK 250 million for grants to large-scale programmes
involving primarily applied research aimed at solving particular
environmental and sustainability problems, all in accordance with
priorities made by its Board of Governors and staff. There is little,
if any, government intervention with respect to the content of
supported programmes. At the other end, the SEPA uses its funds
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of up to SEK 80 million to support research serving the Agency’s
mandate to implement policy measures for sustainable develop-
ment. In the middle, we find the new FORMAS with its
scientist-dominated board. FORMAS is expected to use its SEK
400 to 500 million to support not only basic research over the
whole spectrum of sustainable development problems, but also
research that could support public policy measures as well as
strengthen the future competitiveness of sectors dependent on
renewable natural resources. 
There have been signs that the new research council FORMAS
has tried to co-ordinate answers the questions of what knowledge
should be sought, particularly in the field of climate change
(www.formas.se). At the same time, MISTRA’s strong financial
independence means that the MISTRA Board can determine much
of the answer simply by announcing new priorities for funding
(MISTRA did so by the end of 2002 in the field of climate change.
Research; see http://www.mistra-research.se). That came one year
after the SEPA was funding a large research programme on the
same topic (www.naturvardsverket.se). By the end of 2002,
Sweden thus had three research funding bodies all giving atten-
tion to and spending money on climate-related research, each
from their particular vantage point. This indicates that the two
first criteria set up for the knowledge dimension of ecologically
rational governance criterion – scientific competition and accessi-
bility of results for public debate and scrutiny – are now closer to
being met than they were before the big organisational shuffle of
the 1990s.
Monitoring – providing common knowledge for policy-making
and evaluation
A functioning system for continuous monitoring and evaluation is
obviously a necessary means to gather knowledge about the state
and trends of ecological systems. SEPA became responsible for the
programme on measurement and control of environmental
quality as early as 1978. Regional and local programmes were set
up for water recipient control, covering most of Sweden’s fresh-
water bodies and streams. Regional air quality measurement
programmes were established around the largest urban conglom-
erations (see Lundqvist 1994:1739 ff.). Problems of co-ordination,
dissemination and irretrievability soon developed. A 1994
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commission report found that more than a dozen public agencies
were engaged in data collection, with little exchange of informa-
tion. Field studies made data collection very costly. Measurement
stations were not co-ordinated with one another. No common
central environmental database existed. The report emphasised
that remote sensing methods should come into more intensive use,
and be closely co-ordinated and integrated with the net of data-
collecting ground-stations. It suggested a new, more co-ordinated
environmental data system to provide the basis for environmental
indices (SOU 1994:125, pp. 91 ff., 161 ff.).
Much of the data collected from national, regional, and to
some extent local monitoring activities functioned as a database
available to all and everyone interested in the environment. The
SEPA ran a series called Monitor reporting trends in different
environmental pollutants or different parts of the environment.
Statistics Sweden and SEPA published (and still do) The Natural
Environment in Figures, which gives an overview of global and
regional environmental problems, reports on factors influencing
the national environment, and contains a lengthy statistical
description of the state of the environment in Sweden. Statistics
Sweden also runs an information bulletin, presenting annual
trends of different pollutants, hazardous products etc.
Later developments reveal an increasing concern with the
connection between environmental monitoring and actual deci-
sion-making. A 1997 Commission report suggested that the
monitoring programme areas set up by the SEPA and its
Environment Monitoring Board, and the regional programmes,
should in the future be closely connected to the environmental
quality norms of the Environmental Code and the coming
National Environmental Objectives. Furthermore, future EU
directives might call for reconsidering ‘relevant’ spatial scales of
monitoring. The increased costs of expanding monitoring and
surveillance should be at least partly covered through payments
from sector agencies with explicit NEO responsibilities (SOU
1997:34, pp. 131 ff.). The NEO Commission suggested an elabo-
rate system of nearly 160 indices for the 15 NEOs. The eight
national agencies assigned with realising these objectives should
have explicitly defined monitoring responsibilities. The
Environmental Objectives Board (EOB) established within the
SEPA in 2002 is charged with co-ordinating monitoring and
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evaluation of NEO progress (SOU 2000:52, Part 2, pp. 723 ff.;
see below, part 5.3.2). As passed by Parliament, the 2001 Bill on
NEOs stated that the number of indices should be limited to
allow for overview. The importance of monitoring and evaluation
to provide commonly shared knowledge of the state of ten
environments can be seen in the 70 per cent increase in budget
allocations to monitoring and evaluation (Cabinet Bill 2000/
01:130, pp. 223 ff.). 
Knowledge at bay – the role of science in key processes of
ecological governance
Taking the heat; science, politics and the issue of climate change 
I said above that governance is ecologically rational when its
structures allow for scientific research results and expertise to
make complementary and competing knowledge accessible to
public debate and judgement in the policy process. The organisa-
tion of the science-policy relationship developing in Sweden at the
turn of the century covers some distance in satisfying this crite-
rion. Furthermore, I stated that for governance to be ecologically
rational, scientific and expert knowledge must be brought to bear
on and interact with actual decision-making related to the objec-
tive of sustainable development. To shed some light on this
aspect, let us look at the actual role of science and expertise in
processes of key importance to the achievement of ‘Sustainable
Sweden’. This will be done by looking at critical cases in three
stages of ecological governance; policy formation, policy imple-
mentation, and one case of large-scale infra-structural
development involving valuable natural resources. 
First is the formation of Sweden’s policy on climate change.
There is profound uncertainty about whether and, if so, when
crucial limits will be reached. There are no end-of-pipe solutions.
This together with the complex relation between climate change
and the energy and transportation systems on which modern soci-
eties depend means that climate change really highlights the
precarious dependency of politics on science. In 1993, the Centre-
Right Cabinet then in power appointed a special Climate Change
Commission (CCC) under the Ministry of Environment. The
CCC consisted of active climate researchers, representatives of
agencies and councils supporting climate-related research, as well
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as officers from central agencies and representatives from
Swedish industry. Its mandate was to co-ordinate Swedish
climate-related research, give advice to the Cabinet on how to
utilise research results in national policy-making and interna-
tional climate negotiations, co-ordinate Sweden’s activities within
IPCC, and provide co-ordinated and continuous reporting on
climate research (SOU 1994:138, foreword). 
The CCC early on presented overviews of Swedish climate
research and its funding. It set about organising national work-
shops on issues of climate change, and on how to come to grips
with the emissions of greenhouse gases. Its 1994 report contains
a comprehensive overview of the causes and present trends of
global and regional climate change, as well as on the counter-
strategies that might be deployed (SOU 1994:138, passim). The
1995 report developed these themes further, and more specifically
concentrated on the global level and the international climate
negotiations. The Swedish situation and options in the future
negotiations were outlined (SOU 1995:96, passim). 
It seems quite clear that the CCC during its first years enjoyed
a highly regarded position within Swedish policy-making on
climate change issues. This is to a large degree due to the fact that
the CCC chairman was at the same time chairman of the IPCC.
He could thus provide Swedish key policy-makers with compre-
hensive and valuable insights into the ongoing IPCC process, and
offer advice on how Sweden should formulate its strategies in the
continued negotiations. His international status both as a scholar
and as a central IPCC actor furthermore gave him credibility
within the Swedish climate research community. From this base,
he used the CCC to bring both believers and sceptics among
climate-related researchers into the Swedish debate. In the organ-
isational and inter-agency linkages emerging in Sweden ‘after the
Rio Conference and on the road to Kyoto’, the CCC came to be
seen as the most important science-related institution (Elzinga
and Nolin 1998:22, 53 f.). 
In early 1996, the CCC was reorganised and thereafter located
within the SEPA. The following year, the CCC chairman retired
from his post in the IPCC. The initiative in Swedish climate policy
now shifted from the CCC to the more policy-oriented ‘Kyoto
group’, consisting of climate-specialised representatives of
ministries, SEPA and the National Board for Industrial and
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Technological Development. Meeting twice a month, this group
became the focal point of Swedish policy-making on climate
change. Whenever there were conflicting views within the group,
the issue was moved directly to the Cabinet level for settlement.
Scientific and expert knowledge had several inroads to this highly
political group. In-house consultation was a way to get updates of
knowledge, used particularly by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
Use of outside expertise was made frequently by actively seeking
out Swedish experts who had done research on specific climate-
related issues. The former CCC chairman was consulted on issues
confronting Sweden’s negotiating team. Reviewers of the process
argue that the focus was all the time on Swedish research; inter-
national knowledge came in mainly via Swedish scientists
(Elzinga and Nolin 1998:62).
The inter-organisational structure of the Kyoto group was thus
quite different from the highly intra-ministerial one found in the
issue of allocating LIP funds (see above, pp. 77–81). The differ-
ence in relation to science and expertise is also striking.
Admittedly, the climate issue is comprehensive, and has broad
implications for Sweden’s efforts to achieve sustainable develop-
ment. But one could easily argue that this is the case also for the
LIP programme. And yet, we find that the climate issue seemed to
call for close interaction with the scientific community, whereas
the sustainability issues involved in the LIPs did not (see below,
pp. 107–9).
The CCC was dissolved in 1998. Work on Sweden’s future
policy towards climate change was then concentrated in the 1998
Climate Commission, a body of politicians and experts charged
with developing strategies for achieving the NEO of Limited
climate impact. This commission particularly emphasised the
need to increase public knowledge on the greenhouse effect and
the risks of global warming. However, the basis recommended for
better knowledge primarily consisted of improved monitoring
and evaluation of policy effects and general climate trends.
Nothing in the ‘basic action package’ explicitly refers to contin-
ued or intensified climate research to widen the knowledge base
(SOU 2000:23, pp. 272 ff., 597 ff.). 
Meanwhile, the funding of climate-related research turned
more action-oriented. As pointed out already (see above, part
4.2.4), the MISTRA foundation by the end of 2002 increased its
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activities in this field, actively seeking cross-disciplinary
programmes involving also the social sciences. With research
money again flowing in, the SEPA initiated a specific research
initiative on climate policy instrumentation in 2001.
Furthermore, the new FORMAS research council is developing
further climate-related research activities funded by its predeces-
sors. Finally, Swedish climate researchers have long been actively
engaged in co-operative programmes at the European level (see
Elzinga and Nolin 1998:27 ff.). 
Thus, the Swedish research community and funding agencies
seem to be taking the issue of global warming and its threat to
sustainability quite seriously. What remains to be seen, however,
is the extent to which Sweden’s future climate policy will rely on
such knowledge. Since the release of its report, the Climate
Commission has taken much heated criticism for its views on
what constitutes the proper basis for elevating citizen knowledge
and awareness, and on the role of citizens as passive receivers of
information.
Paying LIP service to knowledge; the limited role of expertise in
Local Investment Plans for sustainable development
Let us then turn to the implementation of what I above labelled a
flagship of Sweden’s efforts to achieve a ‘sustainable society’, i.e.,
the large 1998–2004 programme of subsidies to local investment
programmes for sustainable development (see above, pp. 78–81).
The Cabinet put much political prestige into the LIP programme
and thus set up a new, quite unorthodox structure and process for
handling the LIPs. The Ministry of Environment established a
Unit for Ecological Transformation and Development (here
called MENUET) to process LIP applications. The Unit consisted
of a dozen officials and was mandated to use ‘whatever sectoral
agency competence and expertise was needed’ (Cabinet Budget
Bill 1997/98:1, Spending Area 18, p. 46). 
Central and regional expert agencies implementing environ-
mental and natural resource policies were told by the
Environment Minister that they would have a prominent role in
the LIP process (Auditors of Parliament 1998/99:37). However,
the Cabinet’s designation of expert agencies to assist the
MENUET and the municipalities in evaluating the sustainability
aspects of locally suggested measures came only just before the
The commons of governing 107
2579Ch4  12/8/03  11:52 AM  Page 107
deadline for final applications. The Regional Administrations
(RA, länsstyrelserna) were linked to the process by a rule making
it mandatory for local governments to seek RA counsel when
applying for LIP grants (Auditors of Parliament 1998/99:38, 45). 
The actual decision-making process differed very much from
formal regulations. The application and evaluation process in the
first programme year stretched over a period of only six months.
During the first four months, 286 municipal notifications of inter-
est were processed, and about 40 municipalities were selected for
further dialogue with the MENUET. In the last two months, the
12 MENUET officials took decisions on 115 final applications
and selected 42 municipalities. The designated expert agencies
never really became part of the innermost network of actors. They
were asked only to comment on individual ‘measures’ in the
municipal notifications of interest according to a MENUET
checklist, and could thus never provide overall expert assessments
on the applications. Indeed, very few expert comments were
sought. The three most knowledgeable expert agencies
commented on no more than 26 of the 460 ‘measures’ in the 42
LIPs finally receiving grants (Standing Committee on Housing
1998/99:URD1, p. 23 ff.). 
The usual procedures for expert consultation thus did not
work in this process. Very few measures were ever remitted to the
expert agencies, and their comments were mostly not considered
by the MENUET. The very limited role for the SEPA further
reflects this demise of knowledge and expertise. Its so-called
‘favourable’ position only meant that a SEPA official could ‘sit in’
to provide support during the MENUET’s initial scanning of
municipal notifications selected for further dialogue (Auditors of
Parliament 1998/99:37 ff., 77). 
The expert role of Regional Administrations in the LIP process
became totally blurred. Because the LIP Ordinance was too
unclear, they could not provide answers to municipalities about
which measures might be eligible for grants. Furthermore, they
were unable to give adequate advice to the MENUET, because
they were not let into the crucial ‘dialogue’ between the
MENUET and selected municipalities. Neither could they assist
municipalities not receiving grants, since they had no insight into
the Unit’s criteria, priorities and arguments (Standing Committee
on Housing 1998/99:URD1, pp. 26 ff.). A majority of the 115
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local governments making final applications in the first
programme year said they met with changing or contradictory
demands and guidelines from the MENUET on the proper
content of the application. One third of the 115 MGs finally
applying for grants actually doubted whether MENUET had
enough competence or knowledge of the functioning of local
government to really understand their problems with LIP appli-
cations. 
The massive critique against this process did lead to some
changes in the second LIP round of 1998–99. The agencies now
had experts sitting in with the MENUET once or several times a
week. Furthermore, some agencies’ views were now sought both
before and after the final applications were in. However, there
remained a crucial question: Were the officials individually
knowledgeable experts or representatives of their agencies
(Auditors of Parliament 1998/99:40 f.)? Some agencies expressed
fears about what might happen to the authority of agencies and
RAs in ordinary planning and regulation, if or when municipal
governments found that the MENUET was playing political
games by ‘facilitating or accommodating’ municipal measures
deemed inappropriate by professional expert standards (Auditors
of Parliament 1998/99:42).
Expert knowledge was thus given secondary importance in the
LIP process. By defining sustainable development as a cross-
sectoral issue, the Cabinet downplayed the role of expert
knowledge and obfuscated the status of the agencies representing
such knowledge. The vagueness of the Ordinance’s criteria for
judgement on what measures in the LIPs were sustainability-
oriented enough to be eligible for grants added to the uncertainty
about the role of expert knowledge. As one evaluation puts it, the
Unit ‘did not satisfactorily assess the quality of the information
provided in the municipal applications’ (National Audit Office
1999b:41 f.). 
Tunnelled vision; the role of science and expertise in large-scale
infrastructure investments
During the ending decades of the twentieth century, the paradigm
of centralised large-scale social engineering came under fire in
Sweden. In particular, large-scale infra-structural projects such as
nuclear power plants, highways and other facilities to be located
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in local environments drew fire from ordinary citizens.
Increasingly, such development projects were seen as threats to
the local environment, local identity, and the continuity of
preferred ways of life. A case in point is the renewal of the rail-
road on the Swedish west coast. Originally a vision promoted by
the business elite in the European Round Table, the new double-
track railway would provide a high-speed link, all the way from
Oslo over Gothenburg and Malmö, and then via the new Öresund
Bridge to Denmark connecting this region with the European
continent. As much as SEK 8 billion would be invested. The
Swedish Parliament allocated money for the project in 1991, and
construction work began soon thereafter under the auspices of the
National Rail Administration (NRA). 
In ecological terms, the most crucial part concerned construc-
tion of two parallel 8.6 km railway tunnels through the
Hallandsås, a rock-sand-clay ridge running between the Halland
and Skåne regions. With several features judged of utmost
national environmental concern, the area was subjected to severe
constraints – protected areas, prohibited resource-related activi-
ties – under Swedish natural resource and environmental
legislation. This was to be weighted against the economic gain
from the tunnel; it would cut 10 to 15 minutes off the travel time
between Gothenburg and Malmö, and would cost only about SEK
one billion to complete. Most environmental concerns were,
however, given less consideration, although the Water Court set
some strict conditions concerning the allowable impact on
groundwater resources in the ridge (SOU 1998:60, passim). 
It soon turned out, however, that these conditions could not be
met. The water leakage in the tunnel widely exceeded all limits,
and groundwater levels on the ridge plummeted far below the
levels allowed. Evidently, the geological characteristics of the
ridge had not been given enough attention. In fact, the NRA flatly
neglected already available geo-technical knowledge offered by
geological expertise in an energy company that had built a fresh-
water provision tunnel through the ridge a decade earlier
(Falkemark 1998:16). Looking for methods of stemming this self-
inflicted tide, the NRA first wanted the contractors to widen the
tunnel to allow for lining. This would, however, lead to forbid-
ding cost increases. Another solution was now sought in the form
of some chemical sealant that could be injected into the tunnel to
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prevent leakage. The alternative chosen was Rhoca-Gil. After
some initial investigations and trial injections of this sealant in
early 1997, the NRA ordered 360 tons in late June. Injections
with Rhoca-Gil were then made until early October 1997,
totalling 1,400 tons for 550 metres. By then, several dramatic
instances had occurred. Construction workers became severely ill,
with symptoms of disturbances in their nervous system. Cattle
had to be slaughtered when they became paralysed after drinking
from water in the creeks into which excess tunnel water was being
pumped.
At this stage, the local government – backed by the National
Chemicals Inspectorate and the regional Labour Inspectorate –
stopped the tunnel work. The toxic effects of Rhoca-Gil – caused
by the ingredient acrylamide – were such that all activities must
be abandoned. The most interesting thing here is that there
existed both knowledge and information about this aspect of the
Rhoca-Gil sealant when it was first tried out in the tunnel.
Japanese experience indicated toxic effects on those handling the
product, and the toxicity was clearly pointed out in the first trials
and analyses by the contractor and then conveyed to the NRA.
However, this was then tuned down and later evidently more or
less neglected in the further handling (Falkemark 1998:36 ff.).
By early summer 2003 the construction of the tunnel was still
suspended. 
It is evident from the many evaluations made of the tunnel case
that the role of expert knowledge was consistently downplayed.
This was true for the legal environmental constraints on large-
scale construction in the ridge area. It was furthermore true for the
assessment of the geological characteristics of the ridge. And
finally, knowledge seems to have been consciously neglected or
downplayed when it came to the possible negative effects on envi-
ronment and health of the chemical sealant chosen to tighten the
tunnel. The explanation offered by the evaluators is simple, and
has far-reaching implications for the possibilities of establishing a
relation between knowledge and decision-making that is rational
in ecological terms. The vision among those responsible for the
construction was tunnelled; the economic gains from the high-
speed track and the tunnel obviously justified all the environmental
and health costs incurred during the construction phase
(Falkemark 1998:46 f.; see also Hydén and Baier 1998:36 f.). 
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Knowledge matters, but politics (and money) counts
Knowledge and sustainability – the volatile role of science in
ecological governance
The degree of uncertainty surrounding what is sustainable and
how to get onto a path towards sustainable development makes
scientifically validated knowledge a necessary part of rational
ecological governance. At the same time, the demand for effective
decision-making makes for an unclear or uneasy role of scientific
knowledge within ecological governance. The quest for reducing
uncertainty implies that research results validated by the scientific
community should provide the basis for decisions. But since scien-
tific debate often concerns problems of validation, this puts
scientific knowledge in somewhat of a veto position vis-á-vis
political decision-makers in need of clear cut and reliable recom-
mendations for action. On the other hand, the political demand
for effective decision-making may push scientists to come forward
with results and recommendations not yet fully meeting the crite-
ria for scientific validation. Policy-makers eager to take action
may neglect or downplay scholarly differences of opinion, or lend
their ears to certain ‘schools’ of science, who may then come to
dominate in ‘speaking truth to power’. In the end, policy-makers
then receive advice that is less instrumental for the effective imple-
mentation of rational ecological governance. 
At least two of the three criteria formulated at the outset of this
chapter address this precarious balance between validated scien-
tific knowledge and effective decision-making in ecological
governance for sustainability. We consider governance ecologi-
cally rational to the extent that the structures for developing,
assessing and disseminating science-based knowledge allow for
the build-up and exchange of complementary and competing
views and arguments, and different bodies of knowledge.
Furthermore, governance is ecologically rational when competing
knowledge is made accessible to public debate and scrutiny in the
policy process. 
To what extent does the Swedish science-policy relationship in
the realm of sustainable development live up to these criteria? The
relationship prevailing in Swedish environmental politics up to
the 1990s could be labeled monopsonistic. The Environment
Protection Agency was in essence the only funding body, and thus
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‘buyer’, of research related to environmental policy-making. A
large part of the SEPA research budget went to areas or themes
elaborated and decided upon within the agency itself.
Consequently, the major part of environmental research was
directed towards helping policy implementation in fields defined
by the agency as most in need of improved knowledge. 
While such an order of things could be seen as positive in rela-
tion to policy- and decision-making within the agency’s area of
responsibility, it is problematic in three interrelated aspects. First,
the concentration of funding to research on narrowly specified
environmental problems meant that broader interactive problems
went mostly unattended. Given their dependency on one source of
grants, the members of the comparatively small environmental
research community in Sweden became highly specialised on
specific issues. This in turn meant that science-based recommen-
dations for how to tackle the broader issues of sustainable
development were difficult to obtain from the research commu-
nity. The efforts made in the 1990s to bring about broad-based
’Research Programmes for A Better Environment’ show that this
problem was increasingly realised by SEPA and other research-
funding bodies (see, e.g., SEPA 1996). 
By then, however, the situation for environment-related
research had become even more volatile. A new and formidable
player was moving to centre stage. With its large funds and its
mandate to sponsor solution-oriented research and development,
MISTRA has the power to bring about cross-disciplinary
programmes that address issues crucial to the broader perspec-
tives of governance for sustainable development. Undoubtedly,
this has led to a widening of research perspectives and to a more
inter-disciplinary profile of Swedish environment-related
research. Furthermore, the exchange of differing views on prob-
lems, solutions and research priorities is provided with a new
arena. On the other hand, while the links between research and
governmental policy were quite obvious when SEPA dominated
the funding landscape, they now became more obscure. When
MISTRA – a private law foundation – makes its research priori-
ties, how do they relate to governmental strategies for sustainable
development? 
Given that the SEPA was bereft of its research funds while
MISTRA flourished, it seemed for a while as if Swedish environ-
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ment-related research was thrown from one monopsonist situa-
tion to another. However, the emergence of the new scientist-
dominated FORMAS research council, and the revival of SEPA as
a research-funding body clearly point towards a more pluralistic
situation. More funds are now available for research on issues
crucial to ecologically rational governance than ever before. As
shown earlier, these three bodies represent a broad spectrum in
terms of science/policy dominance. There are now funds available
from bodies with different mandates and objectives. The develop-
ment of large cross-disciplinary programmes means there will be
more competing and complementary knowledge, and thus more
open scientific exchange on alternatives for ecological gover-
nance. One should also take into account the increasing Swedish
participation in European research programmes. Circumstances
thus seem favourable for both competitive knowledge formation
and broader scientific exchange.
When the votes are all in; science, democracy and ecological
politics
But a most crucial issue remains. Are scientific knowledge and
expert advice actually used, and expert advice actually heeded to
the extent implied by our criteria for rationally ecological gover-
nance? We earlier defined governance as ecologically rational
when knowledge and expertise is brought to bear on, and to
interact with, political judgement to arrive at democratically legit-
imate decisions on how to use and manage natural resources to
achieve sustainable development. In these carefully balanced
words lies a consideration for political autonomy. The collective
of citizens in the democratic system should have the last word –
through their representatives – on how to proceed towards the
‘sustainable society’, not the scientists or experts. At the same
time, democratic representatives have a political responsibility to
seek out and make use of the best possible knowledge for deci-
sions on sustainable development. 
The way science and expertise have fared in recent, and for the
project of ‘Sustainable Sweden’ quite crucial, decision-making
processes, makes the prospects for meeting this criterion seem
rather mixed. When Social-Democrats wanted to make a show of
their commitment to sustainable development, they seemed to
look more to gaining politically from the first round of LIP
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programmes than to reducing uncertainty about the actual effec-
tiveness and effects of the measures of implementation. The
implementation of the first rounds of the LIP programme strongly
supports this conclusion. On the very uncertainty-ridden problem
of climate change, Swedish policy-makers and international nego-
tiators from the outset worked quite closely with leading Swedish
scientists and experts. Although this relationship may have weak-
ened somewhat after 1998, as evidenced by the treatment of
science in the Climate Commission’s report on Sweden’s future
climate strategy, efforts are now (spring 2003) underway to
strengthen Swedish climate research (see www.mistra-
research.se). Finally, the spectacular tunnel case implies that even
in areas strongly protected by environmental and resource legis-
lation, exploitation for large-scale high-technology projects may
proceed without due weight being given to knowledge about
effects on sustainability. 
One might argue that this picture is all too pessimistic. After
all, Sweden has a well-established system of governmental
commissions to investigate new policies and large-scale socio-
economic and technological programmes. These commissions
most often gather scientific and expert opinions on what to do
and how to do it, and take scientific opinion into account when
making recommendations in the SOU reports. Furthermore, one
could point to the policy of sectoral responsibility (see below, pp.
128–32), which mandates central authorities to investigate and
assess all their actions and programmes in relation to their effects
on the achievement of the 15 NEOs (see above, pp. 65–7). Since
these national environmental objectives are operationalised into
interim targets and sectoral objectives, citizens and their repre-
sentatives have a fair chance to judge scientific assessments and
disputes over programme effects and goal achievement. Even
where knowledge would really matter, money and prestige count.
This leads us to the so far less shown card in the science-policy
game. The intensified programme of environmental and resource
monitoring, and the envisaged system of ‘green indicators’ (see
below, pp. 132–4) may well turn out a trump, both in terms of
sustainability and autonomy. As for sustainability, the monitor-
ing programme provides for a continuous and systematic build-up
of ecological knowledge to be used in collective decision-making
on environment and resource management. Knowledge gained
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from this programme will be published in annual governmental
reports and used as the basis for quadrennial general debates in
Parliament on the state of the environment. It will provide for
continuous democratic discussion and debate, thus holding the
promise of becoming a catalyst for future, more firmly knowl-
edge-based and democratic ecological governance.
116 Sweden and ecological governance
2579Ch4  12/8/03  11:52 AM  Page 116
5
Governing in common – integration
and effectiveness in ecological
governance 
Specialisation or integration. Organising principles of ecological
governance for sustainability
From environment to sustainable development; the quest for
effectiveness and integration 
The first decades of environmental policy in Sweden were charac-
terised by an amalgamation of different governmental units
dealing with aspects of the environmental issue into a recognis-
able sectoral policy domain. This was how SEPA came to be a
specialised agency, whose mission was to prevent or mitigate the
effects on the environment of different socio-economic activities.
Top priorities were to clean up and prevent pollution, and help in
creating a system of constraints against undue exploitation of
valuable natural environments. The guiding normative principle
was one of ‘balancing interests’; the environment was seen as one
societal interest that should be weighted against others, and could
sometimes lose out in the process (see Lundqvist 1971). Within
this normative and administrative context, the strategy was for
some time remarkably successful (Lundqvist 1995). 
However, with growing evidence of the cross-sectoral and
cross-temporal character of ecological and socio-economic rela-
tionships, as manifested in the ‘diffuse source’ problems of
pollution, the need for more integrated modes of governance was
increasingly realised in the 1980s. An important contribution no
doubt came from the development of new ideas and thoughts at
the international level. The Brundtland Commission’s report
explicitly stated that the ‘standard agenda’ of environmental
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policy focusing on environmental effects would no longer do;
concentration must from now on be on the policies that cause
these effects. In the words of the Commission,
Sustainable development objectives should be incorporated in the
terms of reference of those cabinet and legislative committees
dealing with national economic policy and planning as well as
those dealing with key sectoral and international policies. As an
extension of this, the major central economic and sectoral agencies
of governments should now be made directly responsible and fully
accountable for ensuring that their policies, programmes, and
budgets support development that is ecologically as well as
economically sustainable. (WCED 1987:314)
The Commission’s words point towards two different but
interrelated problems of ecological governance. One problem
concerns effectiveness and efficiency. Ecologically rational gover-
nance for sustainable development is then seen as a conscious use
of strategies to achieve ambitious ecological objectives through
policy integration, striving for ‘a lasting, systematic and innova-
tive opening of the non-environmental policies towards ecological
policies in the comprehensive sense’ (Knoepfel 1995:198). The
problem here is how to instil ecological concerns into the work-
ings of traditionally non-environmental sectoral policies and
agencies to achieve not only effective goal achievement, but also
to do so in the most cost-effective way.
The other problem is related to the strength of ecological
concerns in such policy integration. Where the effectiveness/effi-
ciency problem concerns how to integrate and how to make that
integration work in a cost-effective way, the problem of strength
relates to how much weight environmental or ecological
concerns should carry in the decision-making process within and
across different policy fields. On the one hand, if objectives of
sustainability are put above other concerns in the hierarchy of
objectives of political governance, then liberal democratic
concerns for individual autonomy and equality of opportunity
may be jeopardised. On the other hand, if objectives of ecolog-
ical sustainability continue to be dealt with in the way
environmental concerns were historically ‘balanced’ in Sweden’s
environmental policy, the prospects for sustainable development
are dimmed. 
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Ecologically sustainable development as an integrative criterion
for rational governance
What was just said about effectiveness/efficiency and strength
indicates that policy integration has organisational as well as
normative aspects. The organisational aspect of environmental
policy integration could be taken to mean how environmental
concerns are ‘integrated into’ different sectoral policies. In this
respect integration includes, among other things, 
• access for ecological governance to policy instruments used in
sectoral policies; 
• build-up and/or strengthening of institutional structures to
bring attention to issues of sustainability and provide arenas
for solution of conflicts;
• conscious strategies and means of monitoring ecological
performance in terms of resources used and results achieved in
relation to the sector’s overarching objectives (see Knoepfel
1995). 
Integration then becomes, in effect, similar to problems of
coherence, co-ordination, conflict resolution, and effective
performance found within most policy areas. But when is a policy
fully integrated? It has been suggested that for this to be the case,
three criteria should be satisfied, i.e., comprehensiveness, consis-
tency and aggregation. The first refers to the inclusiveness in
terms of space, time, actors and issues. Aggregation means that
policies and policy measures are evaluated from some overarch-
ing criterion or principle, and consistency connotes that the
components of the policy are in agreement. An integrated policy
is thus one where ‘all significant consequences of policy decisions
are recognised as decision premises, where policy options are
evaluated on the basis of their effects on some aggregate measure
of utility, and where the different policy elements are in accord
with each other’ (Underdal, 1980:162). 
The most important aspect of Underdal’s definition is that of
aggregation. It directs attention to the issue of what relative
weights should be given to different objectives or standards exist-
ing alongside each other in policy-making both intra- and
inter-sectorally. Noting that earlier discussions on environmental
policy integration – (such as Collier 1994; Liberatore 1997) –
assume a ‘balance’ or a possible resolution of goal conflicts
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among sectoral objectives, Lafferty argues that the core aim of
such integration is, at the very least, to avoid situations where
environmental objectives become subsidiary. It also means – in
the broader purview of sustainable development – to ensure that
they become principal or overarching societal objectives. This is,
he contends, ‘arguably the essential difference between environ-
mental policy integration and policy integration in general’
(Lafferty 2001:10). In his view, environmental policy integration
implies:
• the incorporation of environmental objectives into all stages of
policymaking in non-environmental policy sectors, 
• a specific recognition of this goal as a guiding principle for the
planning and execution of policy;
• an attempt to aggregate presumed environmental consequences
into an overall evaluation of policy, and 
• a commitment to minimise contradictions between environ-
mental and sectoral policies by giving priority to the former
over the latter (Lafferty 2001:10). 
Lafferty’s definition addresses the normative issue of prioriti-
sation of environmental concerns. It pictures environmental
objectives as fundamental premises throughout all policy
processes. Furthermore, it breaks with the earlier assumptions of
‘balancing’ and ‘conflict solvability’ by explicitly making envi-
ronmental concerns central in all policymaking. This is, argues
Lafferty, motivated by the increasing recognition that there are
environmental/ecological objectives ‘which simply cannot be
“balanced” with political goals that challenge the basis’ for life-
support systems (Lafferty 2001:11). 
However, if such infusion of, and prerogative for, environ-
mental concerns in all policy were taken to imply that
environmental objectives should always come before other objec-
tives of societal governance, then democratic norms and the value
of autonomy would seem to be endangered. In particular, the
effectiveness/efficiency argument for integration may find such
norms and values burdensome. How the balance between democ-
racy and autonomy on the one hand and an ecologically rational
pursuit of sustainability on the other should be achieved is thus a
most crucial issue for ecological governance.
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Common criteria for operational and effective integration
The perspective of ecologically rational governance used here is
particularly concerned with the institutions, processes and poli-
cies of government. Historically, governments have developed
patterns of differentiated sectoral responsibility. To elaborate the
concept of environmental policy integration into operational
criteria for integrated ecological governance, one should thus
relate it to the structures and processes of government.
Effective integration means that environmental concerns are in
fact taken into account at all stages and levels of policy- and deci-
sion-making with as little sacrifice as possible in terms of time,
money and human input. To achieve this ecological efficiency in
a sector of government makes it necessary for the responsible
bodies to identify the sector’s environmental problems as well as
the key actors and how to relate to them. Furthermore, there
should be a strategy for achieving sectoral environmental objec-
tives with target levels and dates, as well as plans for sectoral
environmental action, linked to the sector’s budgeted resources.
To enable judgements about impacts there should be arrange-
ments and procedures through which the actual achievement of
environmental/ecological objectives can be monitored and meas-
ured. One should note, however, that this type of integration
could still be analysed as intra-sectoral. ‘Effective environmental
policy can be realised only if infrastructure policies become “ecol-
ogised”’ (Knoepfel 1995:214). 
However, the extent to which sectoral agencies have been
internally ecologised ‘does not presuppose an overarching
primacy for environmental goals at the cabinet level’ (see Lafferty
2001:12). What one may call inter-sectoral integration comes
about only if and when the ecological concerns are given a
specific weight in relation to other sectoral objectives, all the way
from equal to ‘more equal than others’. The analysis thus
concerns what is the ‘basic mandate for environmental privilege’,
and what are the measures for driving this home within and –
above all – across the different sectors. Central government – read
the Cabinet – has many regulatory, economic and informative
instruments to steer the sectoral agencies towards a preferred
balance among economic, social and ecological aspects of sustain-
able development. These include such features as special
constitutional provisions on environmental rights, Cabinet long-
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term sustainable development strategies, the designation of a
specific body with cross-sectoral co-ordinating responsibilities,
monitoring feedback reporting arrangements, as well as specific
mechanisms for solving conflicts between ecological and sectoral
objectives (see Lafferty 2001:14).
To provide a baseline for analysing the effectiveness and inte-
gration aspects of rational ecological governance, we can now
formulate the following criteria: 
• Ecological governance is effective in so far as ‘ecological’
values and norms, ecological capacities, and codes of ecologi-
cally good conduct are actually integrated into the political and
administrative decision-making process of sectoral agencies
and authorities.
• Ecological governance is integrated in so far as ‘ecological
concerns’ are given specific weight or preference through polit-
ical decisions at the highest level of authority, and when this is
communicated and implemented into the political and admin-
istrative decision-making process of sectoral agencies and
authorities.
Providing the base for sectoral integration
Early signs of policy co-ordination and sectoral environmental
responsibility
A peculiar feature of the Swedish system of government is the
division between ‘political’ ministries and ‘administrative’ agen-
cies at the central level. The Cabinet and the Ministries in Sweden
deal almost exclusively with policy formulation. The Cabinet, and
thus the Ministry of Environment, has access to the constitution-
ally ‘independent’ national agencies and boards and their
expertise when formulating new policies or revising old ones. The
Cabinet as a collective, not the individual minister, issues imple-
mentation directives to these central agencies, but Ministers
cannot decide on policy implementation, i.e., decisions on indi-
vidual cases. This is, constitutionally, a matter for about 70
central national agencies, the nowadays 21 Regional
Administrations, and the 289 local governments, the latter also
enjoying a wide sphere of authority on local matters, such as
taxation and physical planning. 
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For more than two decades after the introduction of ‘modern’
environmental policy in the 1960s, environmental issues were the
preserve of the Ministry of Agriculture. As the major governmen-
tal agency for environmental affairs, the SEPA was given the
mandate to protect the environmental ‘sector interest’ against
that of other sectors. The major 1987/88 Environmental Bill
spoke of a new strategy: ‘A successful environmental management
presupposes that care for the environment is integrated into the
development plans for different sectors of society . . . [who have]
. . . a responsibility to prevent new environmental damage’
(Cabinet Bill 1987/88:85, p. 35 f.). The Ministry for Energy and
Environment established in 1987 was to have ‘an offensive and
co-ordinating role within the Cabinet’; it should instil environ-
mental aspects into other policy sectors, and thus also into other
Cabinet Ministries (Cabinet Bill 1987/88:85, p. 28). Energy issues
were brought back into the Ministry for Industry in 1990, when
the Ministry of Environment took over issues of national physical
planning from the Ministry of Housing and Physical Planning.
The new Ministry of Environmental Affairs was strengthened to
fill the role as co-ordinator of environment-related issues at the
Cabinet level (Loftsson et al. 1993:71).
The 1990/91 Environmental Bill acted further on the integra-
tion theme. The Cabinet stated that the ‘mission of the 1990s is
to readjust all societal activities in an ecological direction’. To this
end, the Cabinet now proposed that the future environmental
policy should include ‘increased sectoral responsibilities and
decentralisation to secure broad support for environmental
management, including individual, business, and municipal
action as well as participation by public agencies and units in all
sectors of society. A stronger emphasis must be put on evaluating
the results of policy measures and instruments’ (Cabinet Bill
1990/91:90, pp. 11, 13). The bill strengthened the environmental
responsibilities of the national agencies for road, air and railway
traffic, agriculture, fisheries, and forestry. Their charters would
from then on require them to ‘elaborate sectoral plans and
programmes with precise environmental objectives to bring about
the implementation of nationally determined goals in the most
cost efficient way’. The central environmental agencies – SEPA
and the Chemicals Inspectorate (Kemikalieinspektionen) – should
provide information and knowledge to the sectoral agencies, and
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actively co-operate with them to formulate, follow up and evalu-
ate sectoral action plans (Cabinet Bill 1990/91:90, p. 66). 
The sectoral perspective thus began to recede around 1990. It
now gave way to a view that environmental concerns should be
integrated into other policy areas as a ‘sectoral responsibility’,
explicitly including not just government – all sectoral agencies
and all levels – but also private economic and social actors.
However, such integration was still more of an aspiration than an
actual, effective change. There was no clear-cut weighting of this
environmental responsibility relative to other sectoral objectives.
This is revealed in the 1991–94 Right-Centre Coalition
Government’s discussion on long-term sustainable development:
‘Concern for the environment must influence decision-making at
all levels and in all sectors of society. This means giving prior
consideration to the environmental impact of every decision that
might have a major impact on the environment.’ (Cabinet Bill
1992/93:100, Part 15, p. 2). But what would such ‘prior consid-
eration’ actually entail in relation to other policy objectives and
impacts?
‘Common cause’? Integrating policy objectives for sustainable
development
It is evident that the issue of integration was brought to the fore
even more intensely as a result of the commitments made by
Sweden at the UNCED conference in 1992. Sustainable develop-
ment in the sense discussed in the Brundtland report, and laid
down in Rio, now emerged as the point of departure for bills
across the political agenda. A first answer to the question of rela-
tive weight came with the 1993 decision on forestry policy; the
objective of environmental quality should have equal weight to
the earlier one of durable, effective and gainful production
(Cabinet Bill 1992/93:226, p. 26). 
However, the role of environmental and sustainability
concerns varied a lot in the wave of cabinet bills that followed
particularly in the parliamentary year 1997/98. Bills on trans-
portation and consumer policy gave the clearest indication.
Transportation policy objectives should be subordinate to other
comprehensive societal goals. With respect to the environment,
the Swedish transport system should be developed to ‘promote
good environmental and resource management’ (Cabinet Bill
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1997/98:56, p. 16 f.). Long-term sustainable development should
also have a clearer role in consumer policy. The Cabinet deemed
it necessary to take action to give this objective the ‘same weight
as other objectives’ in this field (Cabinet Communication
1997/98:67, p. 2 f.; italics mine). 
Other policy statements were not as distinctive. In an earlier
bill to change planning regulations, the Cabinet stated that plan-
ning is ‘part of a coherent policy for sustainable development’,
and local physical planning should be ‘successively developed
towards increased attention to environmental concerns’ (Cabinet
Bill 1994/95:230, pp. 30, 45 ff.; italics mine). The culture policy
bill stated that nature and culture are intimately linked.
Therefore, the ‘culture sector’ must spread information about the
cultural-natural heritage and ‘actively participate in the public
debate to promote sustainable development’ (Cabinet Bill
1996/97:3, pp. 126 ff.; italics mine). The 1997 sustainable energy
bill was hammered out after tough negotiations to secure a parlia-
mentary majority. The bill stated that one objective of future
energy policy would be to ‘ease the transformation to an ecologi-
cally sustainable society’, through increased energy efficiency and
reliance on renewable energy sources (Cabinet Bill 1996/97:84, p.
7 f.; italics mine). 
The bill on fisheries and agricultural policy contended that
measures must be taken in ‘all policy areas’ to bring Sweden
towards ecologically sustainable development. The formal
‘sectoral responsibility’ for central agencies means that they ‘must
actively work to decrease the environmental burdens’ of their
sectors and develop action plans for that purpose (Cabinet Bill
1997/98:2, pp. 5 ff.; italics mine). Both the 1992 UNCED and the
1996 Habitat conferences were seen as bringing new dimensions
to housing policy. In addition to the historic ‘social housing
policy’ objective, this policy should now ‘create conditions’ for
sustainable development, including its ecological dimension. The
LIP programme would be a major measure in this respect
(Cabinet Bill 1997/98:119, pp. 38 ff.; italics mine. See above,
p. 78).
A stream of governmental policy proposals in the latter part of
the 1990s thus infused ecological values and norms into sectors of
crucial importance to the fate of the environment. This incorpo-
ration of sustainable development as a policy objective in key
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sectors of society was, however, at the level of intentions. It was
furthermore done with differing clarity and determination. The
integration of ‘sustainable development’ in the hierarchy of
sectoral policy objectives would thus have to be backed by
common rules, procedures and denominators to create a truly
integrated and effective ecological governance. 
‘Common rules’; a new, comprehensive environmental code
In the 1980s, it became increasingly evident that existing Swedish
legislation concerned with environmental quality and the
management of natural resources was insufficient to come to
grips with the new generation of diffuse pollution problems. The
challenges posed by the quest for sustainable development, and
the joining of the EU further accentuated the need for an inte-
grated body of law to regulate the society-nature relationship.
The 1989 Environmental Protection Commission’s report of
1993 proposed an amalgamation of more than a dozen environ-
ment-related laws into one single Environmental Code, intended
to ‘protect human beings, nature and the environment generally’,
where the latter included ‘land, water, air, biological life and also
human settlement’. The Commission recommended a shift from
control of individual pollution sources to legally binding ‘envi-
ronmental quality standards’, to be issued by the ‘Government or
an authority empowered by the Government’ (SOU 1993:27, Part
I, pp. 49, 52, 58). The Right-Centre coalition hurried its Code bill
to parliament in August 1994 but lost the September election. The
incoming Social Democrats recalled the Bourgeois bill and issued
new directives to the now renamed Environmental Code
Commission, who presented its final report in summer 1996. Just
before Christmas 1997, the Social-Democratic Government
finally sent its proposal for a new Environmental Code to
Parliament, who passed the bill the following year. 
The objective of the 1998 Environmental Code is to ‘promote
a sustainable development to ensure that present and future
generations have a good and healthy environment.’ (SFS
1998:808, §1). The Code amalgamated no less than 15 different
environment and natural resource-related Acts, and a special bill
was passed to adjust all pertinent legislation to the Code (Cabinet
Bill 1997/98:90). The Code contains ‘general protection rules’
with legally binding principles such as Polluters’ Pay, Best
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Possible Technology, Least Harmful Product Substitution, and
Least Harmful Location. There is also a Mandatory Duty to
Collect Relevant Information and Knowledge before taking any
action potentially dangerous to human health, natural resources
and the environment (SFS 1998:808, Ch. 2). Legally binding
Environmental Quality Standards are introduced, together with a
further widening of the area of mandatory Environmental Impact
Assessments. All this reflects the Government’s emphasis on inte-
gration and internalisation of the sustainability objective into all
walks of life (Cabinet Bill 1997/98:45, p. 201 ff.; SFS 1998:808,
Chapters 5 and 6). 
Seeing the Environmental Code as a means of ‘inspiring those
actors to think and act in such a way that they anticipate the
mandatory rules of the Code’ (Cabinet Bill 1997/98:45, p. 161),
the Government presented motivations that hint at a particular
view of integrated and effective ecological governance. The legal
framework of the Code would build a platform for ‘decentralised
and preventive environmental measures’ from which ‘different
actors – business, central and local administrations, associations,
households and others – can formulate their environmental strate-
gies’. The Government thus saw the Code as a central means to
‘promote the development towards a sustainable society’ (Cabinet
Bill 1997/98:45, p. 170).
Even if the new legislation turns out to be successful in inspiring
such anticipatory and environmentally favourable behaviour,
there might still be conflicts of interest over the use and manage-
ment of natural resources, and over the necessity to protect the
environment. A crucial test of the Code’s integrative strength is
thus whether it contains rules giving specific weight to environ-
mental concerns in crucial decisions. The Cabinet stated that the
Code is ‘not superior to other laws’, and should be ‘applied in
parallel to other laws regulating such activities, measures, facilities
and products covered by the Code but directed at other issues.’
Insofar as there would be a conflict between the Code and other
statutes and ‘there is no prescription as to which rule should have
precedence, such conflict should be resolved by applying general
legal principles’ (Cabinet Bill 1997/98:45, pp. 190 ff.; italics mine). 
It is true that the Environmental Code incorporates some of
the balancing sectoral perspective of the 1969 Environment
Protection Act (SFS 1998:808, Ch. 2, §7). There are, however,
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some priority rules. A balancing of economic and ecological
aspects must never violate an environmental quality standard (see
Gipperth 1999:176 f.). There is a stop rule; an activity can be
stopped or legally prohibited if it is judged as a threat to human
health or environmental quality. Only the Cabinet may issue an
exemption from this rule (SFS 1998:808, Chapter 2, §§ 9–10). In
the case of conflicts over the use of natural resources or areas
deemed of ‘national interest’, priority should be given to such
use(s) that are most compatible with the promotion of long-term
sustainable management (SFS 1998:808, Chapter 3, § 10). 
Making sectoral integration work 
‘Common responsibility’ for sustainable development; the
greening of agencies’ programme
Presenting his Social-Democratic Cabinet Policy Platform in
March 1996, the new Prime Minister Göran Persson proclaimed
the achievement of the ‘ecologically sustainable society’ as a new
and ‘noble’ mission for Sweden’s government. ‘Environment must
be an explicit and long-term priority’, and Sweden should be ‘an
international driving force and a forerunner in the endeavours to
create an ecologically sustainable development’ (Parliamentary
Record, March 22, 1996). That there was a determination to give
ecological concerns greater emphasis was revealed in many ways
in the months that followed. One sign was the swift change in
content of the annual Cabinet Communication to the Parliament
on the State of the Swedish Environment. Unlike earlier reports,
the one from January 1997 (and those issued ever since) did not
address individual environmental problems. Instead, it took as its
point of departure the argument that the political objective of an
ecologically sustainable society includes adjustments to both eco-
system capacities and socio-economic growth and welfare, and
requires integration of ‘environmental care and resource manage-
ment . . . into all processes in society’. The report contended that
‘different societal sectors must assume an increased responsibility’
in this respect (Cabinet Communication 1996/97:50, p. 4).
This shift in problem views was accompanied by changes in
organisation. Internalisation and anticipation would be promoted
not only through common causes in general policy statements and
common rules of the Environmental Code. Sectoral agencies
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would have explicit responsibilities to address ecological
concerns. The formation in January 1997 of the Delegation for
Ecologically Sustainable Development (DESD) within the
Cabinet was a core element in the Social-Democratic strategy.
Consisting of the Ministers of Environment, Agriculture,
Taxation, Basic Education, and the Junior Minister of Labour,
this group’s first, and explicitly short-term, assignment was to
‘develop a platform for the Cabinet’s comprehensive policy for an
ecologically sustainable society.’ (Cf. Cabinet Bill 1997/98:150,
Part 5). 
Only two months later, in March 1997, the five Ministers
presented their proposal for ‘A Sustainable Sweden’. Defining
sustainable development in terms of protection of the environ-
ment, efficient resource use, and secured long-term eco-system
capacity, the Ministerial Delegation emphasised the inter-related-
ness of economic, social and ecological aspects of sustainability.
To ‘create the conditions’ for ecologically sustainable develop-
ment, there must be political measures to encourage new
behavioural patterns, and to select the most resource efficient
policy alternatives. The system of governance needed would go
far beyond that of environmental policy, involving all levels of
government from the international to the local, as well as target
groups and individual citizens. 
The Delegation proposed a host of mechanisms for sectoral
integration and internalisation of the sustainability objective. One
concerned environmental objectives for all relevant sectors in
society (see above, pp. 64–7 on the NEOs). Another would
consist of a Greening of National Agencies Programme. This
involved a common responsibility to organise for and carry out
ecological sustainability assessments of all major agency actions,
as well as a ‘greening’ of public purchase tenders. An elaborated
system of Sustainable Development Reports based on commonly
developed indicators should be set up to allow for environmental
auditing of sectoral development (Cabinet Bill 1996/97:150,
Part 5).
In this programme of greening public agencies, the Cabinet
could build on already initiated changes. Its Environment
Advisory Board reported in 1996 and 1997 on the sectoral inte-
gration of ecological concerns, recommending both a general and
a specific environmental and sustainability responsibility for
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sectoral agencies (SOU 1996:112 and 1997:145). The general
sectoral responsibility meant that the Director-Generals of all
governmental agencies would now have to ‘take into account’ the
demands on the agency activities following on not just from envi-
ronmental policy, but from the objective of ecologically
sustainable development (SFS 1995:1322, § 7). 
A 1998 Cabinet decision prescribed a specific sectoral respon-
sibility for 24 national agencies. These agencies ‘shall integrate
environmental concerns and resource management in their activ-
ities and promote ecological sustainability within their sector’ in
line with the ‘overarching objectives for ecologically sustainable
development’ (Cabinet Communication 1998/99:5, p. 13). First
and foremost, sectoral agencies are required to identify their envi-
ronmental roles in relation to their ‘core’ sectoral missions. They
must furthermore assess how sectoral activities affect ecological
aspects of sustainable development, and develop sectoral objec-
tives and targets under the NEOs (see above, pp. 65–8). Some of
them are specifically pointed out as ‘responsible for the NEOs’;
the SEPA accounts for eight of these objectives. Four central
agencies are pointed out as particularly responsible for ‘compre-
hensive’ cross-sectoral NEO issues, connected to the
environment, physical planning the cultural environment and
human health (Cabinet Bill 2000/01:130, p. 226 f.). 
All agencies and authorities covered by these aspects of
sectoral responsibility for sustainable development are required
to describe the socio-economic consequences of the objectives and
targets to allow for cost-effective sectoral measures, and co-
operate with sectoral actors as well as other agencies to promote
sustainable development. Furthermore, they are expected to
describe and evaluate progress and problems related to their
ecological sector responsibility in their annual reports to the
Cabinet (Cabinet Bill 1997/98:145, p. 173 f.). The SEPA and the
National Audit Office were given mandates to develop gener-
alised forms for such reports, which would contribute further to
the internalisation of the agencies’ ecological responsibilities
(Cabinet Bill 1996/97:150, Part 5). 
There has been a swift spread in the public sector of
Environmental Management and Auditing Schemes (EMAS). This
involves systematic environment-related work in accordance with
‘greening’ objectives and guidelines formulated in action plans,
130 Sweden and ecological governance
2579Ch5  12/8/03  11:54 AM  Page 130
precise lines of environmental responsibility, as well as routines
for monitoring and performance evaluation. The EMAS was
introduced in 24 state agencies in 1997, and has been successively
widened. By the end of 2001, nearly all of the totally 234 state
agencies, authorities and administrative units ordered by the
Government to introduce EMAS, were actually doing so (Cabinet
Communications 1998/99:5, p. 12; 1999/2000:13, p. 10;
2000/01:38, p. 14; 2001/02:50, p. 17; see Table 5.1.). 
Table 5.1 The Adoption and Development of Environmental
Management and Auditing Schemes (EMAS) in Swedish National
Governmental Agencies and Units 1997–2001
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Swedish national govt. units
beginning EMAS work 24 38 35 38 96
Cumulated number 24 62 97 135 231
Source: www.environ.se, as of 2001–11–19
It is interesting to note the Cabinet’s expectations as to what
this infusion of common ecological responsibility would entail.
‘Sweden’s long-term and systematic transformation work will
prove that it is possible to find ways of integrating objectives of
ecological sustainability into different policy areas and make
them co-operate with the development within those areas’
(Cabinet Communication 2000/01:38, p. 11). This integration is
seen as a means for systematically steering the policies for sustain-
able development, as well as a means for decentralising ecological
governance to the agencies and to relevant target groups and
actors. This in turn will allow for anticipation of environmental
effects at an early stage, leading to cost-effective preventive
action. But for this to materialise there must be mechanisms for
decision-making in cases of conflicting objectives of sectoral
development and environmental quality. There are now regula-
tory and administrative mechanisms and incentives for bringing
attention to such conflicts early on in the planning and decision-
making process (Cabinet Communication 2001/02:50, p. 18).
Still, however, the final and authoritative balancing of policy
and sectoral objectives should come through the overarching
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budgetary and regulatory decisions by the Parliament and the
Cabinet (Cabinet Bill 2000/01:130, p. 23).
‘Common yardstick’: a system of indicators to monitor (and
evaluate?) sectoral ecological performance
It is one thing to ‘encourage internalisation of environmental
values among economic actors, i.e., make them feel responsible
for the environmental impact of their action’. It is another to
assess the progress towards environmental and sustainability
objectives. This necessitates ‘reliable data on the state of the envi-
ronment’ related to production and consumption processes in the
different sectors as well as for society as a whole. And it implies
the importance of ‘making such information part of the standard
operating procedures of sectoral agencies and ministries’ (Jansen
et al. 1998:294 ff.). The major alternatives discussed have been
those of green indicators and State of the Environment reports
integrating physical, economic and environmental data. There are
at least three alternative types of indicators in use. First, there are
descriptive indicators in line with the European Environmental
Agency’s work on indicators according to a Drivers-Pressures-
State-Impacts-Response (DPSIR) model (see SOU 1999:127, p.
27). Performance indicators compare actual conditions ‘with a
specific set of reference conditions’. Efficiency indicators aim at
providing insight ‘in terms of the efficiency of the resources used,
the emissions and waste generated per unit of desired output’
(Smeets and Weterings 1999:11 f., 14).
The process of developing the indicators followed two lines. In
accordance with a 1997 Directive, the Cabinet’s Environmental
Advisory Board presented a series of proposals in 1998 and 1999
for a number of aggregated ‘green’ key indicators, eleven of which
would be immediately put into use and six others projected for
the not too distant future (see SOU 1998:170). This aggregate
approach was influenced by the OECD work on indicators based
on the Pressure-State-Response model (OECD 1993). The Board
proposed aggregate green indicators as descriptive measures of
pressure (the uses of energy, materials and chemicals), state
(greenhouse effect, eutrophication, acidification, air quality in
urban areas, and biological diversity), and response (environmen-
tally adapted travel and transport, consumption, work processes,
and changing nutrient cycles). As ‘key’ indicators they should,
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argued the Board, reflect ecologically strategic conditions. They
should be measurable over long periods, and as far as possible be
based on available data. Furthermore, they should provide for
easy oversight, be few and easily understood by everyone. The
‘key’ indicators would thus provide a good base for public debate
on sustainable development in Sweden (SOU 1999:127, pp. 7 f.,
21 f.). 
At the same time, a Swedish system of indicators would also
have to be detailed enough to allow for monitoring the progress
towards the 15 National Environmental Objectives and the many
interim targets and sectoral goals formulated to operationalise
these NEOs. The green key indicators should therefore be linked
with the system of 210 very detailed indicators for monitoring
NEO progress worked out by the SEPA. This disaggregated SEPA
system of indicators and measures was developed on the
European DPSIR model (see SEPA 1999). The purpose is mainly
descriptive, i.e., to follow the development and see whether, and
at what pace, the NEOs are approached. If the level of aspiration
were increased to include also to what extent actions taken to
make progress towards the NEOs are cost-effective, even more
detailed information would be necessary. This would be provided
by continuously updated knowledge from research, environmen-
tal monitoring, special commission reports, official statistics, etc.
(SEPA 1999). 
The Environmental Objectives Commission reporting in the
year 2000 followed the same line of reasoning. The Commission
stated that green key indicators provide a good oversight of the
progress towards a sustainable society. However, they might give a
too simplified picture in view of the many and complex demands
for information among different target groups. The Commission
thus suggested a total of 159 indicators to follow-up and evaluate
progress, and pointed out 25 agencies and units as responsible for
one or several indicators at the central governmental level. Out of
these 25, the eight agencies with ‘main responsibility’ for the 15
NEOs should co-ordinate monitoring and ‘evaluate the effective-
ness of policy measures and actions within their target sectors’
(SOU 2000:52, Part 2, pp. 726 f., 732 f.). 
However, the NEO system’s complex web of structures and
processes obviously necessitates some sort of co-ordinating hub to
sort out the mass of data and provide guidance, oversight and
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continuous refinement and evaluation of progress measurement.
The NEO Commission thus argued that the since the SEPA is
already designated as having an overarching responsibility to co-
ordinate the environmental policy field, this responsibility should
be extended also to the monitoring and evaluation of progress
towards ‘Sustainable Sweden’. To this end, the Commission
proposed the establishment of an Environmental Objectives
Board (EOB) within the SEPA. This Board would be charged with
co-ordinating monitoring and evaluation of NEO progress, point-
ing out and suggesting necessary changes in policy to improve
goal attainment, and with identifying needs to improve monitor-
ing and evaluation. Although closely connected to the SEPA, the
new Objectives Board should report directly to the Cabinet (SOU
2000:52, Part 2, pp. 723 ff.). 
In its NEO Bill to Parliament, the Cabinet argued for a some-
what smaller number of indicators to monitor progress. At the
same time, the Cabinet clarified and extended the responsibilities
of the Environmental Objectives Board. The Board is charged
with effecting a co-ordinated and unified system of monitoring
and reporting on the progress from all agencies and authorities
under the NEO system. To this end the Board is to suggest NEO
indicators as well as ‘green key’ indicators, and to provide moni-
toring and reporting guidelines to all responsible agencies and
authorities. Most interesting is that the new Objectives Board is
charged with the task of ‘illuminating possible conflicts between
the NEOs and other policy objectives set by the Parliament’
(Cabinet Bill 2000/01:130, p. 229; italics mine). The composition
of the Environmental Objectives Board appointed in December
2001 provides a hint of what the Cabinet included in its under-
standing of ‘ecological governance’. Together with officers from
the NEO agencies, there are representatives from other sectoral
agencies, the Regional Administrations, local government, inter-
est organisations and business (see www.environ.se). No doubt,
the EOB’s further work will be heavily influenced by the efforts
to go beyond green ‘key’ indicators to provide a system of indica-
tors covering all aspects of sustainable development. A first report
on such an integrated system of indicators was published in May
2001 as part of Sweden’s preparations for the Rio+10 conference
in 2002 (SCB 2001).
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A ‘common account’: producing ‘green’ records and ‘green’
budgets for ecological governance
Clearly the agencies’ responsibility to assess the ecological conse-
quences of their own actions and the sector’s development in
general will push decision-makers to integrate environmental
concerns. The same is true for the obligation to keep numerical
tabs on ecological key aspects of agency actions and sectoral
developments. Not the least will the EOB efforts to provide
sectoral agencies with standardised ways of reporting on NEO
developments force the agencies to elaborate their ‘ecological
routines’. The ultimate purpose of this whole exercise of moni-
toring the NEO process is to provide the basis for a conscious and
continuous move towards what is here called ecological gover-
nance. However, it is evident from the many reports and bills on
this subject that developing this basis is not solely a matter of
measuring developments toward sustainability. It is also meant to
provide decision-makers, targets groups and the general public
with means for meaningful participation in the debate over gover-
nance, and thus to promote individual autonomy. 
The ‘key’ indicators are obviously meant to meet the need for
easily understood, yet very meaningful information about the
state and trends of Sweden’s ecology (‘ecology’ here interpreted in
the same way as ‘economy’ in, e.g., State of the Economy reports).
The more elaborate system of NEO indicators provides decision-
makers and sectoral interests with the means of assessing their
actions. The NEO Commission proposed, and the Parliament
confirmed, an elaborate system of reporting on the basis of indi-
cators. Every year, the Cabinet is to provide Parliament with an
account of how the NEO work progresses. This annual report is
to be based on a selection of indicators, and is expected to give
enough information for decisions to change or intensify action
in areas where the process does not run on schedule (Cabinet
Bill 2000/01:130, p. 230). There is already a tradition of how
and when these reports are delivered to Parliament that reveals
the degree of importance given to the indicators. Beginning in
spring 1999, select green ‘key’ indicators are presented to
Parliament in connection with the ‘State of the Economy’ reports
and the Budget Bills (see Cabinet Communication 2000/01:38,
p. 13).
However, even if monitoring and indicators are means to
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describe the direction, intensity and scope of change towards the
goals of ecologically sustainable development in Sweden, this is
not enough for meaningful political debate over ecological gover-
nance. There must also be some account that allows for
evaluating whether the measures taken toward ecological sustain-
ability are actually working and if so, whether and to what extent
they are cost-effective or could be improved in that respect. This
is achieved by integrating the descriptive indicator system based
on data from environmental monitoring with economic and phys-
ical data to establish so-called environmental accounts (see EEA
1999). Following a 1992 Cabinet request, the National Institute
for Economic Research (NIER, Konjunkturinstitutet) ran a five-
year programme to develop monetary environmental accounts
and environmental economic models to present and assess impor-
tant connections between economy and environment in Sweden.
The ultimate purpose is to systematise environmental and natural
resource statistics and to integrate these data with economic
statistics. In a parallel process, Statistics Sweden (SCB, Statistiska
centralbyrån) has developed physical environmental accounts,
i.e., a system of statistics where pressures on the environment and
the use of physical natural resources are linked to economic statis-
tical data on production and consumption (Konjunkturinstitutet
1998:3 f.). 
By the end of the 1990s, these integrated National
Environmental Accounts had been developed so far that they are
in effect functioning as a ‘satellite’ to the National (Economy)
Account. New areas are developed and included over time, such
as the environmental impact of imported goods and services, envi-
ronmental pressures from different categories of goods, water and
forestry accounts, and the environmental impact of household
behaviour (Cabinet Communication 2001/02:50, p. 27). The
importance for environmental policy integration is shown by the
fact that the 1999/2000 Commission on Sweden’s Long-term
Development extensively used environmental accounts to adjust
the estimations of the prospects for long-term economic and
social welfare sustainability in Sweden (SOU 2000:7, Ch. 5; see
also Apps. 2 and 7). National environmental accounts also
came to use in the proceedings of the Commissions on Climate
and on NEOs (see SOU 2000:23, chs.12–13; SOU 2000:52,
part 2, Chapters 24–25). The integrated economic and physical
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environmental accounts will – together with the elaborated
system of descriptive indicators – provide the basis for the ‘deeper
evaluation’ of progress towards ecologically sustainable develop-
ment that the Cabinet is to present to Parliament every fourth
year (Cabinet Bill 2000/01:130. p. 230).
A ‘common purse’; green procurement and green tenders
throughout the public sector 
One of the major points in the spring 1997 report from the
Cabinet’s Delegation for Sustasinable Development concerned the
possibilities of making the public sector a ‘forerunner’ towards
sustainable development by utilising its position as a strong
market actor. The size of governmental final consumption ranges
between nine and 25 per cent of total GDP expenditures in the
OECD countries (14 per cent in Sweden). An average of three-
quarters of public purchases are on current consumable goods
and services. The greening of public procurement is viewed by the
OECD as an ‘innovative tool capable of providing cost-effective
opportunities’ and as having ‘a crucial role in supporting innova-
tion’ of greener technologies and promoting greener production
and consumption patterns (OECD 1999a:35; OECD1999b:4). 
It goes without saying that the greening of public procurement
and public tenders will also function as a strong mechanism for
integrating environmental concerns into public agencies and
authorities at all levels. Thus the Cabinet Delegation for
Ecologically Sustainable Development recommended that the
1996 guidelines for ‘environmentally adapted public procure-
ment’ developed by the SEPA and two other agencies should be
successively updated by way of integrating experiences from the
‘pilot’ EMAS agencies as well as from local and regional levels
and international developments (DESD 1997). The Social-
Democratic Government’s Policy Platform of 2000 further
emphasised the will to integrate ‘environmental demands into all
public procurement’ (Cabinet Communication 2001/02:50, p.
18).
By then, the Cabinet’s Committee for Ecologically Sustainable
Procurement (CESP) had been working since early 1998. Its
mandate up to the end of 2001 was to promote ecologically
sustainable procurement throughout the public sector. A central
concern is with effectiveness/efficiency; the Delegation should
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concentrate on such goods and services ‘where the greatest bene-
fits of applying requirements on ecologically sustainable
development can be achieved’. Other parts of the CESP’s mandate
indicate that the development of green procurement routines is
expected to promote integration of environmental concerns. The
Committee should disseminate knowledge, experiences and best
practice knowledge, initiate training programmes and seminars
for purchasers, and not the least, develop a common, Internet-
based instrument/guide for green procurement for the entire
public sector. Through an extended mandate, the CESP should
furthermore analyse the need for a special produrement policy for
the entire public sector (CESP 2001:5 f.).
In its final September 2001 report, the Committee presented a
new Internet-based instrument intended to ‘help public sector
organisations integrate environmental concerns into their
procurement of goods, services and contracts’. This joint mecha-
nism to be used throughout the entire public sector originally
included environmental requirements and information for about
70 different product groups. The requirements range from
mandatory demands over evaluation criteria to information on
producer/seller qualifications (EMAS, ISO 14001 certifications),
and eco-labelling of the goods or services in question. Upon deliv-
ering its report, the Committee pointed out that its integrative
tool is quite far-reaching; the EU Commission’s interpretative
document issued in summer 2001 on environmental concerns in
public procurement was more narrow. It meant that several of the
Swedish CESP’s requirements must be lifted out, reformulated
and – perhaps – reintroduced at a later stage (CESP 2001:17, 45
ff., 62; see SOU 2001:31, pp. 176 ff.).
Furthermore, the Committee found a need for a more devel-
oped, common policy for green procurement in the public sector.
Existing policies are usually too general to provide enough guid-
ance. Not only the regulations in the Environmental Code, but
also, and particularly, the demands stemming from the revised EU
rules on eco-labelling and on EMAS necessitate a common policy.
This should contain specifications of how the policy is integrated
within the organisation, what role it is expected to play in
achieving the objectives of green procurement, as well as how
principles of precaution and substitutability are integrated in
the policy. Naturally, procurement policies should also include
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the environmental requirements on sellers, goods and services, as
well as mechanisms for monitoring and feedback on the greening
of agency procurement (CESP 2001:53 f.). The government has
yet (end of 2001) to act on the CESP’s recommendations.
Towards an effective and integrated organisation for
ecologically sustainable development?
‘An offer they can’t resist’? The mix of instruments to bring
about effective ecological governance
It was stated at the outset of this chapter that there are two differ-
ent but interrelated problems with respect to integrated ecological
governance. The effectiveness/efficiency problem has to do with
how to achieve greater environmental effectiveness through cost-
effective policy integration. The question is how to organise the
structures and processes of governance so that ecological
concerns are instilled into the workings of traditionally non-envi-
ronmental sectoral policies and agencies in the most cost-effective
way. This organisational aspect of environmental policy integra-
tion could be taken to include several measures. One concerns
institutional structures to bring attention to issues of sustainabil-
ity. Another is the conscious infusion into day-to-day decision-
making processes of instruments that promote continuous atten-
tion to ecological concerns. Furthermore, there are strategies and
means of monitoring ecological performance in terms of resources
used and results achieved. 
Quite clearly, the Swedish government has embarked on a
conscious use of these strategies to promote an effective inclusion
of environmental concerns at all stages and levels of governmen-
tal decision-making. It is also clear that these concerns have been
widened to include the ecological aspects of sustainable develop-
ment into the social, economic and cultural aspects traditionally
pursued in the governance of the Swedish welfare state.
Objectives related to ecologically sustainable development are
explicitly inserted into all sectoral policies that have large actual
and/or potential consequences for such development. All agen-
cies, authorities and administrative units are now charged with a
‘sectoral responsibility’ for promoting ecologically sustainable
development. Most of them experience this as a general duty on
the leadership laid down in the General Agency Ordinance.
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However, as many as 24 agencies have a special sectoral respon-
sibility for the environment, with more far-reaching demands on
their performance.
The sectoral responsibility serves as a trigger to bring the
authorities’ attention to environmental and ecological constraints
on, and effects of, their efforts to implement their traditional
sectoral objectives. Their attention to these constraints and effects
is furthermore triggered by the NEOs, since not only the ten agen-
cies with particular NEO responsibilities, but also a host of other
sectoral agencies are expected to play important roles in develop-
ing further sectoral and regional sub-goals and interim targets.
Many of the acts regulating the use and management of natural
resources for different sectoral purposes are linked to and co-
ordinated with the Environmental Code. The principles contained
in the Code (see above, pp. 126 f.) thus also relate to public sector
actions potentially affecting environmental quality, as do the
binding principles of good husbandry laid out in the Code.
Agencies are also expected to carry out environmental impact
assessments of their major actions. The sectoral responsibility
also includes monitoring and evaluation of progress towards sub-
goals and interim targets. Furthermore, the policy for green
public procurement forces all agencies to look hard at their
routines and habits in terms of environmental standards, materi-
als flows and resource efficiency. What all this means is that
Swedish public agencies find themselves obliged to integrate envi-
ronmental concerns throughout the decision-making process. 
The massive introduction of EMAS into more than 200 agen-
cies and units is evidently a measure designed to provide for
effective environmental work throughout the public sector at the
national and regional levels. As noted earlier, the Social-
Democratic Government has seen this tool as a way of
decentralising ecological governance to the agencies, expecting
that it will lead to early and effective action: ‘EMAS promotes
overview and efficiency in the work for ecologically sustainable
development’ (Cabinet Communication 2001/02:50, 18).
The reader may interject that such utterances by government
are nothing but aspirations and expectations. Students of gover-
nance know that the implementation literature is replete with
accounts of great political expectations becoming ruins of hope
in the mazes of bureaucracy. Should we believe that all these
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integrative measures and schemes will actually become effectively
enforced and implemented throughout the public sector in
Sweden because of a favourable administrative culture? Or must
central government use much stronger mechanisms to make sure
that the different units effectively integrate environmental
concerns into their outward sectoral as well as inward adminis-
trative actions? And, most critically, will these mechanisms
actually come to function as expected?
As to the first question, it is reasonable to judge Swedish
bureaucracy as effective in carrying out mandates and missions. A
glance at the annual reports to government from the NEO agen-
cies reveals that they have taken their NEO responsibility quite
seriously. Just as an example, the National Board for Housing
and Planning (NBHP, Boverket) tripled its use of resources to
processes for refining the relationship between planning regula-
tions and guidelines and the NEO at the turn of the century
(NBHP 2001:18). The Chemicals Inspectorate states that its activ-
ities in the year 2000 was characterised by ‘active anticipation’ of
implementing the ‘Non-toxic Environment’ NEO once it is passed
by Parliament (www.kemi.se). The SEPA set up a special NEO
Agency Group to support the co-operation among agencies with
specific sectoral NEO responsibilities in 2001 (www.environ.se). 
Jumping directly to the third question, it must be kept in mind
that both the integration of ecological concerns into decision-
making processes, and the continuous monitoring, evaluation and
feedback of information with regard to progress, put new and
quite strenuous burdens on the agencies. It may therefore take
some time before the agencies can meet these demands. A report
from the National Audit Office (NAO) examines agency work on
the NEO ‘No Eutrophication’ in the five central agencies
concerned with that objective, as well as the Regional
Administrations. Its conclusions provide for some guarded
pessimism. The feedback information is diverse, not well co-ordi-
nated, and in some areas totally void of systematic statistical data
(National Audit Office 2000:90). The information in the agen-
cies’ Annual Reports on their own environmental work is
‘fragmented’ and presented in very general (non-measurable)
terms. Activities are not properly related to costs and effects, thus
not allowing for assessments of the cost-effectiveness of environ-
mental integration. The report concludes that more precise
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government demands for feedback information in the annual
Letters of Regulation (regleringsbrev) issued to governmental
agencies just before the beginning of the new fiscal year would
have positive repercussions throughout the administrative system.
Through conditions laid down in those Letters, more streamlined
measurement and reporting on progress closely linked to inputs,
and more of co-operation on monitoring could be achieved
(National Audit Office 2000:47 ff., 89 f.). 
The report just mentioned refers to agency work in 1997, i.e.,
before the final formulation of the 15 NEOs. This brings us back
to the second question. Yes, central government does have meas-
ures at its disposal to make sure integration of ecological concerns
into policy implementation is an offer that sectoral agencies
cannot resist. The budget allocations provide a crucial means in
this respect. In the Letters of Regulation just mentioned, Cabinet
Ministries can put forth very specific objectives and detailed
conditions for how the agencies should allocate their funds. The
agencies are forced to account for how they spent their budget
allocations, and whether and to what extent they achieved the
objectives. This they should do in their demands for budget allo-
cations in the following years as well as in the annual reports.
Whether or not in response to the critical assessments of the
National Audit Office, this tool is increasingly sharpened to make
agencies and units respond to the demands for integration of envi-
ronmental concerns. Thus the Letters of Regulation issued by the
Environment Ministry in December 2001 contain a considerable
number of specifications for what the NEO responsible agencies
within its domain are expected to perform and deliver as feedback
information on the progress and effectiveness of ecological inte-
gration (see http://miljo.regeringen.se/index.htm). This provides
the Cabinet with possibilities to follow up on environmental inte-
gration and to make changes for further effectivisation of the
process. 
With regard to the effectiveness/efficiency dimension of policy
integration, we may thus draw a two-pronged conclusion.
Sweden’s approach to ecological governance contains several
means and mechanisms to make integration effective in so far as
‘ecological’ values and norms, ecological capacities, and codes of
ecologically good conduct are consciously and continuously
brought into the political and administrative decision-making
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process of sectoral agencies and authorities. At the same time,
there are still problems with respect to the (measurement of the)
efficiency of actual performance, as well as with respect to co-
operation and co-ordination among responsible agencies in
reporting on the progress of integration.
Gaining weight? The role of ecology in integrated governance
for sustainable development
The most crucial question remains; are ecological concerns now
fully integrated in Swedish policy-making, within as well as
across sectors? In terms of the criteria for policy integration in
general proposed by Underdal – (see above, p. 119) – there is
inclusiveness in terms of space, time, actors and issues. All agen-
cies in sectors with recognisable impacts on the environment, and
indeed all other units of national government, have a statutory
sectoral responsibility to take ecological concerns into account,
and to evaluate their actions and performance in environmental
terms. The NEO process means that this responsibility will have
a long-term endurance and engage governmental units in ‘ecolog-
ical dialogue’ with all relevant actors (see, e.g., SOU 2001:20,
passim). This also means that the Swedish efforts towards envi-
ronmental integration also fulfil one of Lafferty’s criteria – (see
above, p. 120) – for such integration. Environmental objectives
are incorporated into all stages of policymaking in non-environ-
mental policy sectors.
That leaves the criteria of aggregation and consistency. It was
noted above that aggregation means that policies and policy
measures are evaluated from some overarching criterion or prin-
ciple, and that consistency connotes that the components of the
policy are in agreement. As I have tried to show in earlier chap-
ters, the Swedish government has increasingly emphasised that its
pursuit of sustainable development also includes the ecological
dimension. The 1996 policy platform of the Social-Democratic
Cabinet assumed that goal conflicts among sectoral objectives
could be resolved through strategies of ecological modernisation.
By making ‘green’ an overarching criterion for economic and
technological development, economic growth and socially and
ecologically sustainable development could be brought into
consistency with each other. 
Much has been said about the shortcomings of ecological
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modernisation as a strategy for policy integration to achieve
sustainable development (see, e.g., the overview in Carter
2001:211 ff.). As shown above, the Swedish Government’s
pursuit of this strategy seems to have been more of a short-term,
stopgap measure to grab the political initiative on environmental
issues. Some features of the LIP program implied that environ-
mental objectives were indeed subsidiary – in overall political
terms – to those in economic and labour market policies (see
above, p. 78).
The NEO process and the agencies’ sectoral responsibility for
ecologically sustainable development go much further in meeting
the aggregation and consistency criteria of policy integration. To
paraphrase Lafferty, these central features in Sweden’s ecological
governance do in effect provide a ’basic mandate’ for environ-
mental and ecological concerns, politically determined by the
Parliament and the Cabinet. They become comprehensive societal
objectives, and the sectoral responsibility forces all units of
government to analyse and take into account presumed environ-
mental consequences in the overall evaluation of their decisions.
As stated earlier, Lafferty argues that this is ‘the essential differ-
ence between environmental policy integration and policy
integration in general’ (Lafferty 2001:10). 
Still, we are left with the most fundamental question concern-
ing environmental policy integration, i.e., that of its strength. The
fact that sectoral agencies show signs of effective ‘ecologisation’
does not automatically mean that there is a political, inter-
sectorally applied principle lending a privileged position to
ecological concerns. Let us assume that the sectorally responsible
agencies’ analyses of some sectoral decisions find that there are
contradictions between ecological concerns for the sustainability
of life-support systems on the one hand, and traditional sectoral
objectives on the other. What do the Cabinet and Parliament have
to say about how such conflicts are to be resolved? In Lafferty’s
words, we ask whether there exists an explicit ‘basic mandate for
environmental privilege’, i.e., a political commitment to minimise
contradictions between environmental and sectoral policies by
giving some recognised priority or strength to the former over the
latter (Lafferty 2001:10; italics mine). 
As we saw in the former section, central government – read the
Cabinet – does use regulatory, economic and informative instru-
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ments to steer the sectoral agencies towards taking ecological
concerns into account in their work. What we are looking for here
is whether some of these measures also function as weighting
devices. Quite clearly, the Letters of Regulation do exhibit such
functions. The Cabinet (a) attaches ecological conditions to the
agency budget allocations, (b) specifies certain environmental
objectives to such sectoral policies as agriculture, forestry, trans-
port, and housing and planning, and furthermore (c) demands
specific feedback reporting on agency performance. This in effect
means that central government gives specific weight to ecological
concerns and values pertinent to sectoral policies. 
The strong political backing for the NEO strategy and its
generational perspective on ecologically sustainable development
also implies the weight given to ecological concerns in the politi-
cal and administrative decision-making. There are also some
mechanisms for administrative co-ordination among the agencies
with specific and/or NEO responsibilities of some importance
here. The Environmental Objectives Board in operation since
early 2002 is charged with developing and issuing guidelines for
how all NEO-responsible agencies should monitor and evaluate
progress towards the NEOs. The Board is also mandated to
provide a comprehensive and co-ordinated annual NEO report to
the Cabinet (www.environ.se). 
Still, there will be conflicts between sectoral and environmen-
tal objectives. Expressions such as ‘Sweden should continue to be
a forerunner in the transformation to sustainable development’
that includes not just economic and social but also ecological
aspects which are ‘interdependent and must be weighted in a
balanced way’ does not provide precise guidance as to how such
conflicts are to be handled (Cabinet Communication 2001/02:50,
p. 5). What then about the recent authoritative statement on
Sweden’s ‘National Strategy for Sustainable Development’,
prepared for the Johannesburg meeting? One key passage is
worth quoting at length:
The society of the future must be formed within the limits set by
nature, environment and human health. To reach this long-term
objective, economic growth, social consensus and environmental
protection must be co-ordinated in a mutually enforcing manner.
The strategy for sustainable development views the concern for
environment as an important driving force for growth, development
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and employment. The transformation demands new solutions, new
and environmentally friendly technology, environmentally adapted
production of goods and services, new methods of transportation
and new ways of producing energy. An active social policy, compet-
itive business, and a stable economic growth are important building
blocks for transforming Sweden into an ecologically, socially and
economically sustainable society . . . A renewed and long-term
sustainable policy for welfare and social justice does not contradict
economic growth, but is rather a condition for our long-term
common welfare. (Cabinet Communication 2001/02:17)
Could this be read as ‘a commitment to minimise contradic-
tions between environmental and sectoral policies by giving
priority to the former over the latter’ (see Lafferty 2001: 10)? My
answer is a tentative ‘Yes’. We have seen earlier that statements
from the Swedish Government indicate that the three aspects of
sustainable development should be given equal weight in the
efforts to transform Sweden into a sustainable society. What we
find in the Swedish Johannesburg Report may well be seen as a
further step forward. The first sentence of the quote explicitly
places long-term social welfare and economic growth within the
limits of nature. There is also an explicit view of environmental
concern as a long-term driving force for social and economic
development, and as a condition for long-term common welfare.
Together with the statement that the three aspects of sustainable
development should be managed in a mutually enforcing manner,
one must conclude that, at least in principle, the Swedish
Government places the ecological aspects of sustainable develop-
ment at the centre. Temporally rational ecological governance
recognises the limits of the commons, and co-ordinates all aspects
of long-term sustainable development to protect the natural base
of social welfare and economic growth. 
As noted above, the Cabinet holds the view that in practice, the
final and authoritative balancing of policy and sectoral objectives
should come through the overarching budgetary and regulatory
decisions by the Parliament and the Cabinet (Cabinet Bill
2000/01:130, p. 23). What remains to be seen is thus to what
extent Parliament and the Cabinet are prepared to use their budg-
etary and regulatory powers to influence the final and
authoritative weighting of environmental and sectoral objectives
to keep environmental concerns at the centre of future resolutions
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of conflicts among societal objectives. The common yardsticks
described earlier, and even more so the common accounts now
introduced and used in the Cabinet’s annual Finance Plan, do
indeed provide means for enlightened political decisions.
There are thus clear attempts in Sweden to aggregate presumed
ecological consequences into an overall evaluation of future poli-
cies, i.e., the common cause, the common yardstick, the common
account. At the same time, we find remnants of ecological
modernisation’s win-win-assertions; policy-driven green techno-
logical change will provide important building blocks for
‘Sustainable Sweden’ and thus promote both economic growth
and social welfare. For those acquainted with Sweden’s political
history since the 1930s, in particular the building of the social
welfare state, this should come as no surprise. Even as a forerun-
ner in the march towards an ecologically sustainable society,
Sweden heads for the ‘middle way’.
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6
Democracy and ecological
governance – a balancing act
Sustainability and democracy: a political dilemma
Legitimising the balance between sustainability and autonomy;
the need for democratic politics
As pointed out in Chapter 1, this book builds on the normative
argument that ecologically rational governance must strive for
sustainability within the limits set by democracy and individual
autonomy. The relationship among these values is quite complex.
On the one hand, effective and in the longer term successful
ecological governance relies on quite radical changes in present
values and behaviour in the direction of substantial restrictions
on individual autonomy of choice. This could be used as an argu-
ment for constraints on democratic participation in order to
prevent political conflicts and ease the introduction and imple-
mentation of radical measures (see Lafferty and Meadowcroft
1996:257). On the other hand, the very fact that progress towards
sustainability presupposes far-reaching value changes implies that
citizen participation would be a necessary prerequisite for
successful ecological governance. Comprehensive value changes
simply cannot achieve political legitimacy without widespread
democratic participation in the process of change.
However careful the balance is struck between sustainability
and autonomy in the practical implementation of ecological
governance, there will be ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in the conflicts
over when, how, why and by whom resources should be used.
The stronger the value of autonomy is pursued at present, the
more individual actors today can utilise natural resources in ways
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not compatible with the need for long-term, sustainable resource
management. Or to turn this argument around; the stronger the
pursuit of long-term ecological sustainability, the more threat-
ened may be the value of individual autonomy. While ecological
governance for sustainability must profoundly affect all and
everyone in order to be successful, it cannot achieve legitimacy
without offering each and everyone a possibility to participate in
the formation and implementation of such governance. Susan
Baker has succinctly summarised this dilemma of ecological
governance: 
If new governance is to be increasingly relied upon as a way of
governing the crisis of environmental governability, then new ways
will have to be found to ensure greater societal participation in
environmental policy-making while at the same time guarding
against any erosion of the principles of democratic government.
(Baker 2001:121)
Baker’s last words are important; attempts to make ecological
governance both effective and democratically legitimate are made
in a context of traditional democratic processes. When a larger
number of groups and interests are brought into such governance,
‘special’ interests are bound to appear. Such interests are often
entrenched in policy communities or issue networks based on
values contrary to sustainability, and might not necessarily take a
favourable view of sustainable development. But locking out
some groups from participation would mean a break with the
values of democracy and individual autonomy. So, the efforts to
bring about ecologically rational governance must ultimately
observe the limits on their legitimacy drawn by the values of
democracy and individual autonomy. Only when formulated and
implemented in an open, participatory process of democratic
decision-making could massive policy changes deeply affecting
individual autonomy be considered legitimate and thus politically
sustainable. 
Participation and autonomy for whom: market actors or
democratic citizens? 
As the earlier chapters reveal, ecological governance for sustain-
ability does have important spatial, temporal, cognitive, and
integral implications for both the democratic process and its
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outcomes in terms of individual autonomy. Such governance
creates new levels and new entities of governance, thus providing
several new points of access for public participation in the policy
process. It opens up new temporal dimensions, implying that the
democratic process should take into consideration the interests of
future generations not yet appearing on the political scene. By
bringing in cultural traditions and local knowledge of man-nature
relationships, widened participation challenges traditional
methods of policy-making, where science and technology are
used to determine ‘objectively’ the problems to be addressed.
Perspectives of public participation and individual autonomy
challenge the implementation of sustainability not just on
whether or not integrative mechanisms effectively promote that
value, but also on whether such mechanisms are consistent with
individual freedom of choice and rights to self-determination. 
How, then, could democratic participation be promoted and
individual autonomy safeguarded in a system of governance
geared towards ecological sustainability? In the latter half of the
1990s, it was increasingly argued that this question was wrongly
put. Proponents of ecological modernisation held that promotion
of green growth would do away with the presumed conflict
between sustainability and individual freedom of choice. By
promoting green growth, governments could provide a win-win
solution in tune with the prevailing logic driving actors in the
market (see Jansen, Osland and Hanf 1998:291 ff.). However,
this view has been questioned on grounds of both sustainability
and autonomy. As for sustainability, ecological modernisation
‘follows, in essence, past patterns of economic development,
particularly the equation of economic growth with human social
progress’ (Barry 1999:252 f.). A comparative study of West
European environmental governance furthermore found evidence
that ‘none of the most active promoters of ecological modernisa-
tion will achieve its goals in terms of the central categories and
criteria of environmental policy’ (Jansen, Osland and Hanf
1998:319). 
In terms of democracy and individual autonomy, ecological
modernisation is criticised because its strong emphasis on market-
based instruments addresses individuals and groups in society as
producers and consumers rather than as ‘democratic citizens
under the law’ (Barry 1999:227). It encourages people to think in
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terms of marginal behavioural change guided by the criterion of
individual economic gain. This, argue the critics of ecological
modernisation, is not compatible with the massive change in
cultural values necessary to achieve ecologically sustainable
development. Such changes must be based on free and informed
deliberations on what the institutionalised societal values should
really be about. This implies a concern with measures for partici-
patory democracy where autonomous citizens are ‘encouraged to
consider the interests of all those potentially affected by the
democratic process’ (Barry 1999:228 f.). 
When individuals are addressed as citizens, their sphere of
autonomy is widened. They are empowered to participate in, and
deliberate over which collectively binding decisions should be
made with respect to resource use and management. Democratic
governance, in which citizens also have a guaranteed sphere of
influence over collective matters, is after all ‘a process in which
we all come to internalise the interests of each other and
indeed of the larger world around us’ (Goodin 1996:18).
Goodin’s words point out the dual nature of the sustainability-
autonomy relationship. A participatory democratic process offers
the promise of respect for the integrity of the commons (citizens
taking responsibility for the fate of the larger world surrounding
them) as well as for the value of autonomy (citizens coming to
respect the rights of other individuals). In conclusion, I agree with
the argument that only through democratic participation can
society create ‘a shared public basis on which to ground the
legitimacy of restrictions and corrections’ that are considered
necessary to achieve ecologically sustainable development
(Achterberg 1993:91).
Solving the dilemma: measures for participatory and legitimate
ecological governance
Much has been done to create such a basis since environmental
policy became a policy field in its own right in the 1960s. The
field has been marked by a distinctive drive for new means and
channels of participation. Some argue that following the Rio
Summit and the Agenda 21 process of the 1990s, ‘citizen partici-
pation is seen as the defining characteristic of sustainable
development’ (Baker 2001:119). Compared to the ‘traditional’
policy-making process, many innovative measures have been
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introduced to bring different actors and the public together in free
and open discourse to reach decisions through the strength of the
better argument (Dryzek 1995:302). 
Right-to-know legislation has been extended, and brought into
use in processes of physical and infrastructural planning. The
same is true for public hearings; it would nowadays seem almost
unthinkable to launch large development projects without open
hearings that involve affected interests. Environmental NGOs
have enjoyed a firmer legal standing and widened possibilities of
appeal. The concept and procedures of Environmental Impact
Assessment, once introduced in the US National Environmental
Policy Act, have found their way into a host of national legisla-
tions, thereby enlarging the public’s possibilities of participation
and influence. Environmental mediation and regulatory negotia-
tion are examples of efforts to bring relevant actors and
affected interests into the decision-making processes of ecological
governance. 
It should be noted that by being in essence a multi-level system
of ‘nested enterprises’, ecological governance is dependent for its
democratic legitimacy on each level having spheres of autonomy
that allow for meaningful popular participation (Ostrom 1990:
89 f.). Decentralisation and delegation of authority and responsi-
bility are called for in this respect, as are specific programmes
directly addressing local and ecosystem-based entities of
governance with recognised spheres of competence. The inter-
generational perspective of ecological governance calls for
mechanisms to enhance the interests of future generations. There
are proposals to give rights to future generations in order to guar-
antee sustainability (see Wissenburg 1993). To pass the test of
legitimacy, however, ecological governance must not only be ‘just
in time’ but also ‘just now’, i.e., it must observe the rights and the
autonomy of present generations. In line with the argument made
on pages 148 ff. we could view several of the measures for
increased participation as ways of safeguarding those values.
With respect to the democracy and autonomy aspects of
ecological governance, the following criteria can be formulated:
• Governance is ecologically rational in terms of democracy to
the extent that the management of environment and natural
resources is subjected to political debate and decision-making
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in democratic processes open to meaningful public participa-
tion at all levels of governance.
• Governance is ecologically rational in terms of individual
autonomy to the extent that the choices of policy measures
used in such governance are made with a view to safeguarding
individual rights both now and in the future.
In the following, I first of all analyse the formal regulations
surrounding citizen access to public information in general, and
on environment-related issues in particular, as well as the rules
safeguarding individual rights and freedom of choice. Then I look
into the points and channels of access and participation in the
process of policy formation, followed by a study of participation
in two processes of local ecological governance. The chapter then
traces the official views of participation in future ecological
governance, and ends with an analysis and judgement of how the
discovered Swedish patterns correspond to the criteria just
outlined.
Formal ecological governance in Sweden; access to the commons
and enclosures for individuals 
An open political process; common access to information
The Public Access to Information Principle has been a funda-
mental part of Swedish law since 1776. The present rules on
public access to official documents are found in one of Sweden’s
constitutional laws – the Freedom of Press Act. They guarantee
the right of Swedish citizens to obtain access and insight into
administrative documents and activities. The principle further-
more means that the public and the mass media – newspapers,
radio and television – have the right to obtain information about
state and municipal activities (the following builds on
Government Offices 2000). The principle is expressed in various
aspects of access, freedom of expression and communication:
• Access to official documents;
• Freedom of expression for civil servants and others;
• Communication freedom for civil servants and others;
• Access to court hearings;
• Access to meetings of decision-making assemblies.
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The public access concerns official documents. A document is
official if it is held by a public authority, or can be regarded as
having been received or drawn up by a public authority. Drafts,
written communications or other working material are not
considered official if the draft is not used when the issue is finally
decided upon, or if they have not been retained for filing. It is
often easy to conclude that written paper documents are ‘held’ by
a certain public authority. Electronically processed data, AV
recordings, and the like are considered as held both by the public
authority storing the recording, or having a computer terminal
link-up, or having facilities to obtain printouts. 
The character and topics of certain official documents qualify
them as secret. This means that the public is not entitled to read
the documents and the public authorities are forbidden to make
them public. Official documents other than the following ones
listed in the Freedom of Press Act may not be kept secret in order
to protect interests:
• Sweden’s national security and foreign relations;
• Sweden’s central financial, monetary and foreign exchange
policy; 
• public authorities’ inspection, control or other supervisory
activities;
• prevention and prosecution of crime;
• Sweden’s public economic interest;
• protection of individuals’ personal integrity or economic
conditions;
• preservation of animal or plant species.
Those wishing to obtain an official document (provided it is
not judged to qualify as secret) have the right to read the docu-
ment at the place where it is held. They are not required to
describe the document precisely to obtain it. The authority must
make available the necessary technical equipment for compre-
hending the document. Claimants are also entitled to obtain a
transcript or a copy of the document for a fixed fee. As for
computerised documents or data, authorities should provide
printouts. Requests to obtain official documents must be dealt
with speedily by the authority. Unnecessary delay is not permit-
ted. Authorities cannot demand that persons who wish to obtain
an official document identify themselves or state what the
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document will be used for. If a request relates to a document
falling under some provision of the Secrecy Act, the authority has
the right to ask the applicant about identity and purpose. If the
applicant refuses, he or she relinquishes the possibility of obtain-
ing it. If authorities reject the request for a document, or supply
the official document subject to reservations, the applicant is enti-
tled to appeal for a court review of that decision. 
There should be no doubt that this constitutionally guaranteed
openness is of utmost importance for the democratic character
and the protection of individual autonomy in the processes of
ecological governance. However, there have been concerns that
the privatisation and contracting out of policy implementation as
well as the Swedish membership in the European Union might
shrink the citizens’ possibilities to retrieve information for use in
the democratic debate. In its January 2002 Democracy Bill, the
Cabinet thus proposed that private firms contracted to carry out
public duties, private schools with public financing, and the docu-
ments from preparatory bodies under the Municipal Council
should fall under the principle of public access to documents. This
may in fact be interpreted as a widening of public access from
government to governance. Sweden furthermore succeeded in
achieving its objective for the leadership term in Spring 2001 to
widen public access to EU documents (see Cabinet Bill
2001/02:80, pp. 99 ff., 113). 
Public access to the governance of the commons; the law of the
land
To further illuminate the prospects for democracy and individual
autonomy in ecological governance, let us now look more specif-
ically into how access, participation and protection of individual
rights are formally outlined in legislation pertinent to environ-
mental and natural resource issues.
As mentioned above (see p. 126 f.) the 1998 Environmental
Code is construed as an amalgamation of a large number of acts
covering – in principle – every aspect of human activity that might
have an impact on environmental quality and natural resources.
Activities that are expected to have considerable such impacts
must apply for permits, granted by the Cabinet, environmental
courts, regional administrations, or local governments, depending
on the scale of the activity and the scope of expected impacts.
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What is of particular interest here is how the Code regulates
duties to provide information, as well as rights of participation in
such processes. When laying out the law of the land in this
respect, we will also be covering physical and infra-structural
planning in general.
Descriptions and assessments of environmental impacts of
everything from specific projects to general policies have been
discussed and used in various ways ever since they were put on
the books through the US 1969 National Environmental Policy
Act. In ideal fashion, Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
procedures involve not only descriptions of the proposed activ-
ity’s potential environmental impacts, but also of such impacts
from alternative ways of carrying out that activity. Furthermore,
an ideal type EIA includes comparative evaluations and assess-
ments of the environmental acceptability of these alternative
courses of action. A basic idea behind the demands for EIAs is to
provide possibilities for open debate on the proposed action,
involving, e.g., those potentially affected by that action through
access to public hearings, and rights of appearance and argument
before the decision-making body. 
A first, and rather limited version of the EIA procedure was
introduced in Sweden in 1981, providing merely for description
of potential impacts (EID) of projects needing permits under the
Environmental Protection Act. This legislation at the same time
made mandatory a procedure of early and active counsel between
relevant authorities and affected interests before making decisions
on projects potentially harmful to the environment. This thinner
EID requirement was gradually made applicable to more and
more issues and areas, particularly when several resource-related
acts were put under the umbrella of the Natural Resources Act in
the late 1980s. A National Audit Office review in the mid-1990s
found several flaws in the EID procedures. The general public and
environmental NGOs were often getting access too late in the
process. EID reports often failed to describe the environmental
impact of alternative ways of implementing large resource-related
projects. EIDs of large water exploitation projects only described
the impacts of profitable alternatives (National Audit Office
1996).
The 1998 Environmental Code contains specific regulation on
the procedures and content of environmental impact assessments.
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All activities requiring a permit under the Code are subjected to
the EIA requirement (Cabinet Bill 1997/98:145, pp. 278 ff.). Both
the general public and particularly affected interests have the
right to be informed of a pending permit application. They also
have the right to comment on both the application and the related
EIDs, the content of the latter being specified in the Code
(Cabinet Bill 1997/98:145, p. 292). One could describe the new
EIA as a two-step process. All actors in the process of applying for
a permit must seek early counsel with relevant supervisory
authorities, usually the Regional Administrations, and with
potentially affected interests. At this stage, the applicant should
provide at least a preliminary EID to allow for discussion of envi-
ronmental impacts. Both affected interests and the general public
have the right to present arguments at this stage (Cabinet Bill
1997/98:145, p. 282 f.).
In the second round, the general public and the affected inter-
ests have the right to retrieve information on both the application
and the full EID, except for such details that can be labelled busi-
ness secrets. The Code makes it mandatory for responsible
authorities to announce publicly that the application is made and
that an EID is available. This goes also for site inspections to
allow for participation from the public and affected interests. The
Code particularly regulates the procedures involving projects with
‘considerable’ potential effects on the environment. Should the
supervisory authority find, after the first round, that this is the
case, an enlarged EIA procedure is called for. An enlarged counsel
is then mandatory, involving relevant national agencies, local
governments, as well as environmental NGOs. Furthermore, all
affected interests with a legal standing must be involved, i.e.,
those with property rights or with ongoing economic activities in
the area where the applicant wants to locate the project. In terms
of content, the EID must now cover all aspects of relevance,
including alternative locations and – where possible – alternative
technologies (Cabinet Bill 1997/98:145, pp. 286 ff.).
Seen in combination with the general rules of public access to
governmental information, the EID/EIA requirements connected
to the permit procedures laid out in the 1998 Environmental
Code have increased the opportunities for citizens and potentially
affected interests to retrieve information. The procedures guaran-
tee public access to the proceedings of those authorities making
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decisions on permit applications, in most cases the Environmental
Courts. While this could be seen as opportunities for the public to
influence decisions in the direction of sustainable development,
there is, as we have emphasised throughout this book, also
another side to it, i.e., that of safeguarding autonomy. When
there are such opportunities to protect and promote the value of
sustainability, what happens to the protection of individual rights
and the enhancement of individual autonomy in the sense of
reasonable freedom of choice? 
Enclosures of the commons. Safeguarding individual rights and
freedom of choice
Much of the governance for sustainability is concerned with
protecting and enhancing the viability and productivity of ecosys-
tems. To this end, a common interest can be construed with
regard to such values as biological diversity, water quality, etc.
What occurs when a government or an authority decides to put
certain claims and restriction on part of the territory (see above,
p. 62 on the concept of ‘national interest’ in physical planning) is
not just an ‘enclosure’ of the commons in the name of sustain-
ability. It also constitutes an infringement on individual
autonomy. Certain present or prospective economic and social
uses of the land are put under restriction. Industrial and exploita-
tive action is prohibited. Citizens used to enjoying the unique
Swedish common law practice of Common Right to Access to all
land not under cultivation find themselves fenced out or subjected
to restrictions on their freedom of movement. 
How does Swedish law strike the balance between preserving
the integrity of the commons and valuing individual autonomy?
Discussing this crucial issue in relation to the new Environmental
Code, the Minister of Justice took as his starting point the
Swedish constitution which states that to justify intrusions on
private property and on individual rights, the common interest
identified must be very ‘important’ or ‘urgent’. The principle to be
applied in relation to issues of ecological sustainability should,
concluded the Minister, be that they are often of such importance
or urgency as to motivate intrusions on individual rights. While
such intrusions always presuppose a reasonable proportionality
between common gain and private loss, the wording of the Code
Bill implies that the future balance might be shifted towards a
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broader interpretation of common gain (Cabinet Bill 1997/
98:145, pp. 320 ff.).
Thus, the scope or magnitude of intrusions on behalf of
sustainability might increase over time. If intrusions on private
property and individual freedom become broader and more
frequent, the issue of compensation becomes even more crucial
than before. The Environmental Code deals with compensation in
the traditional Swedish way. Compensation is afforded when
decisions to establish areas of nature conservation, biodiversity
and water protection or cultural reserves involve appropriation
of land or make on-going land-use ‘essentially more difficult’
in the ‘affected part of the property’ (Cabinet Bill 1997/98:145,
pp. 546 ff.).
Why this particular delineation of the circle of actors entitled
to compensation? What about the general public suddenly closed
out from areas of common access as a result of new economic
activities permitted under the Environmental Code? To answer
this question, one is forced to analyse the concept of ‘legal stand-
ing’ and its implications for individual autonomy. As we saw
earlier, both the general public and the property owners in an
area affected by a proposed economic activity with potentially
harmful environmental consequences have the right to state their
case in a permit proceeding. But in traditional Swedish legislation
related to natural resources, legal standing in the sense of right to
appear and right of appeal was offered only to those owning adja-
cent property. As for the Environmental Protection Act, legal
standing in this sense was linked to those caused to suffer defin-
able damage or some other inconvenience from environmentally
harmful activities, not necessarily owning property. The
Environmental Code establishes a more uniform concept of legal
standing, based on this latter interpretation. However, those
made to suffer because there are infringements on the Rights of
Common Access are not afforded legal standing (Cabinet Bill
1997/98:145, p. 485 f.). It goes without saying that this excludes
a large potential circle of actors from legal rights of appearance. 
However, the Environmental Code also contains some new
statutes enlarging the possibilities for environmental group
action. This comes in the form of a right to legal standing for
environmental NGOs. Such organisations can, as we saw earlier,
participate in the decision-making processes on permits under the
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Code. What is really new is that such NGOs now also have the
right to appeal against decisions by permit-granting bodies.
Provided such organisations are open to all, have been active for
more than three years, and provided further that they have a
membership of more than 2,000 persons, they can appeal against
permit decisions, and environmental court rulings, as well as deci-
sions to exempt some activity from Environmental Code
procedures. They can act on behalf of common environmental
interests, or on behalf of some particularly affected interests
(Cabinet Bill 1997/98:145, pp. 487 ff.).
To summarise, the law of the land provides citizens and affected
interests with several formally guaranteed opportunities for
becoming informed and participating in the policy process. There
may of course be some unequal distribution of capabilities among
different categories of actors and interests to fully utilise these
opportunities. What becomes crucial is the extent to which
governments at different levels actually live up to the provisions
for public participation and the right of individuals to be informed
on issues that may affect their rights and future freedom of choice. 
Participation in Sweden’s ecological governance: who is, and
who should be sharing the commons of policy-making?
Commissioned to participate: organised interests and
environmental policy-making
Governmental commissions are very important vehicles for policy
formation in Sweden. Working on terms set up by a Ministry, a
commission investigates a policy problem and reports back to the
Ministry. The composition of commissions may vary depending
on the perceived political centrality of the problem. The more
crucial the topic in the eyes of the government, the more carefully
balanced is the representation. Commissions may be parliamen-
tary, meaning that the political parties are represented, or
representative of the interests perceived to become affected by the
reform proposals of the commission, or they may be expert
commissions to deal with a more technical problem. It is quite
usual for commissions to establish close contact with public agen-
cies, industrial branch organisations, NGOs, and individual
experts during their period of investigation. They may also
arrange hearings on particular topics related to their terms of
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reference, or use such hearings for testing out some of the propos-
als contemplated. Commissions are thus very important as a
means of bringing in and accommodating the views of different
political, economic and social interests in Swedish society. They
have been described as vehicles for producing relevant knowledge
on social problems, as an arena for crafting compromises and
creating consensus, and as a Cabinet instrument for strategic
political planning (Johansson 1992:17). 
What happens after the Commissions present their reports is
equally important for the possibilities of participation in policy-
making. The reports are usually sent out to all relevant authorities
with a ‘request’ to comment. ‘Invitations’ to comment are also
sent to branch organisations and NGOs related to the report’s
topic. In principle, the opportunity to provide written comments
is accessible to everyone interested in the topic. Together with the
original commission report, these ‘remittals’, i.e., written
comments, are then used as the basis for the Cabinet Bills sent to
Parliament (Uhrwing 2001:71 ff.). 
Commission reports on issues related to sustainable develop-
ment are thus of utmost importance for the democratic aspects of
ecological governance. The proposals in these reports set the
agenda for the further stages of the policy process. In so far as the
suggestions of these reports are not vehemently challenged in the
remittal process, they usually find their way into a Cabinet Bill.
When the Cabinet enjoys a majority in Parliament, the sometimes
only slightly modified Commission proposals become the law of
the land. In this and the following part, we will look into (a) the
scope and reach of participation in commissions related to ecolog-
ical governance, and (b) the content of recommendations for
public participation proposed by the two commissions on NEOs
and climate reporting in 2000.
A recent study of three environmental policy-making processes
analysed the scope and reach of interest participation, from
commissions all the way through to the submission of written
comments and appearances before ministers and department offi-
cers. Interests are not only represented as members on the
commissions. They are also participating through experts
working for the commissions. Furthermore, they are invited for
counsel and to hearings during the early stages of the commis-
sions’ work. But there is also a reverse process. Interest
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organisations initiate contacts with the commissions both
formally and in more informal ways. After the commission
report, vast numbers of interest organisations take part in the
‘remiss’ procedures. This participation comprises not only those
organisations invited to give comments, but also those sending in
comments on their own initiative. In fact, in two of the three
policy-making processes under scrutiny, the number of voluntar-
ily provided comments turned out to be larger than that of those
invited. In the case of the commissions reporting on Sustainable
Development in Sweden’s Mountainous Regions, the number of
voluntarily provided written comments was quite large. This was
in no small amount the effect of the nation-wide association of
snow-scooter owners’ campaign to have small local scooter-
owner clubs sending in comments to protect their interests of free
movement in the mountains (Uhrwing 2001, passim).
Two major commission reports related to sustainable develop-
ment were presented to the national government in the year 2000.
Both the Commission on National Environmental Objectives
(NEOs, see above, p. 65 f.) and the Climate Commission were
parliamentary. Representatives of the political parties investi-
gated future policy alternatives for sustainable development
assisted by experts and representatives of affected interests. Both
provide typical examples of how commissions are used for gath-
ering knowledge, creating consensus and help the Cabinet set the
political agenda. 
The NEO Commission was parliamentary; all parties in the
Riksdag were represented. The membership further comprised
several central agency officers. Of the 19 experts working in the
commission, four came from interest groups, while the other 15
represented Cabinet ministries. The Commission took in a large
amount of material from a total of 44 governmental agencies and
regional administrations. Part of that material was based on a
process of counselling between agencies and organised interests.
Furthermore, the Commission instituted five thematic Working
Groups. These groups arranged seminars involving both experts
and organised interests. The Commission furthermore co-
ordinated its work through counselling with no less than 14 other
Commissions. Five hearings were held with business organisa-
tions and NGOs to provide for consensus and ‘anchoring’ of the
proposals (SOU 2000:52, pp. 93 ff., Apps. III, IV, and VIII). 
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Table 6.1 Categories of suppliers of written comments (Remiss) on the NEO and Climate Commission Reports
Report Suppliers of written comments
Central Regional level* Local Labour Business NGO’s Courts Research Total
Agencies govt’s market org’s inst’s
org’s
Reg County Env. other
Adm’s Councils
NEO 43 21 5 14 3 44 6 23 2 19 180
Commission
SOU 2000:52
Climate 28 5 1 8 6 52 8 9 4 23 144
Commission
SOU 2000:23
*Remark: Reg Adm’s = Regional Administrations, i.e., the regional arms of central government. County Councils = popularly elected
regional bodies mainly responsible for the health policy sector.





































The Climate Commission was also parliamentary with all
Riksdag parties represented. The membership further comprised
several central agency officers. Expertise was linked to the
Commission in the form of an economist advisory group, and
there was close co-operation with relevant central agencies. Two
hearings were held with representatives of business organisations
and NGOs (SOU 2000:23, p. 1 f.).
The following stage of providing for written comments from
central agencies, affected interests, and others affected by and/or
interested in the topic, included a very wide spectrum of the
Swedish society. The large number of central agencies involved is
a reflection of the fact that they are most often requested and not
just invited to supply comments, as are all or a specified number
of regional administrations. Research institutions are frequent
remiss providers. Perhaps the most remarkable pattern from these
two reports is the heavy representation of business organisations,
while voluntary NGOs, particularly those with an environmental
agenda, are less prominent. This is of course very much due to the
small number of nation-wide environmental NGOs in compari-
son to business. 
As revealed by Uhrwing’s recent study (2001) of interest organ-
isations’ access to the corridors of power, however, there are also
other, and for the prospects of democratic ecological governance
somewhat disturbing factors at work here. Uhrwing seeks to find
out for whom participation in these forms and stages of policy
formation for ecologically sustainable development really
provides means for influence. She concludes that while the remit-
tal of written comments is open to all, it is by and large mostly a
symbolic form of participation. What really counts is to be a
member of, or provide experts to, a Commission. However, she
also finds that to get access to such positions in the process,
organised interests seem to have to possess certain characteristics.
They must be large enough to afford full-time secretariats and to
have their own, in-house expertise. It furthermore helps if a busi-
ness/labour organisation or a voluntary NGO is dominant within
an area under investigation by a governmental commission. 
By far, however, the most important conditions for access to the
innermost rooms of power relate to the nature of expertise that
organised interests and others can provide. What Uhrwing calls
the technocratic norm prevails. This norm builds on the assump-
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tion of an ‘immense need for information and technical expertise.
Therefore, this kind of information and expertise was demanded
from interest organisations if they wanted to gain access to the
most meaningful forms of participation in the processes’ (Uhrwing
2001:301). Not surprisingly, business organisations much more
often have the resources necessary to participate on these condi-
tions, and are thus able to get greater access into the corridors of
power than NGOs presenting their argument in what would be
interpreted as much more value-laden terms. 
Participation in ecological governance: active citizens or
incentive-reacting consumers?
Given Uhrwing’s conclusions about the importance of specific
organisational resources for effective participation and influence,
it is of interest to compare the contents of recommendations for
participation in three commission reports issued in the year 2000,
all with a bearing on the future of Sustainable Sweden. The very
first commission to report in the new millennium was that of the
parliamentary Democracy Commission. Entitled Sustainable
Democracy!, its 300-page report discusses the prospects for a
widened democratic citizenship. The Commission leaned heavily
on the discourse on deliberative democracy, and contended that
representative democracy is not enough. Citizens should be
allowed to commonly deliberate on different political solutions
and their consequences throughout the policy-making process so
that they are provided with real possibilities of influence (SOU
2000:1, Ch. 1).
The Democracy Commission thus saw active citizenship as a
condition for sustainable democracy. When citizens discern a
clear relationship between participation and the content of public
decisions, there are good prospects for a sustainable democracy
with trusted political institutions and highly legitimate policy
decisions. Given the allusion to sustainability in the title of the
Commission’s report, one is led to assume that this would partic-
ularly hold for the democratic challenges posed by the quest for
sustainable development. These challenges are after all prime
examples of problems closely related to citizen participation and
political legitimacy. 
Thus it is of crucial interest to find out how democratic
participation is treated in the two major commission reports
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related to sustainable development and issued in the year 2000.
As already pointed out, both the Commission on National
Environmental Objectives and the Climate Commission were
parliamentary. Representatives of the political parties investi-
gated future policy alternatives for sustainable development
assisted by experts and representatives of affected interests.
Indeed, the title of the 400-page NEO Commission report – The
Future Environment – Our Common Responsibility – would
seem to indicate a participatory perspective to legitimise politi-
cal action with a cross-generational time horizon. On the other
hand, the Climate Commission’s 500-page report – Proposals
for a Swedish Climate Strategy – leads one to think of an immi-
nent battle rather than common democratic deliberations. As it
turns out, both commissions seem to play on themes not totally
in harmony with the ideas of democratic citizen participation.
Contrary to the perspectives of the Democracy Commission, we
are here confronted with a top-down perspective, where actions
are to be taken not in dialogue with participating citizens, but
for the most part in the form of signals to consumers and
customers to change their market behaviour.
A content analysis of the three commission reports confirms
this conclusion. As shown in Table 6.2, the Democracy
Commission refers to individuals as ‘citizens’ 250 times, i.e., a
rate of nearly once every page. Of the 174 times individuals are
referred to in some other capacity the market-related epithet
‘customer’ appears only seven times. In the two reports on ecolog-
ically sustainable development, however, the perspective is
opposite. The NEO Commission and the Climate Commission
refer to ‘citizens’ only sixteen times in their total 1,900+ pages.
Indeed, the dominant view of two reports on sustainable devel-
opment and future ecological governance puts that of the
Democracy Commission on its head. Whereas that commission
refers to citizens in a positive and active context 119 times, it
refers to civic ‘duties’ only five times. The Climate and NEO
Commissions view individuals mainly as customers and
consumers, passive in the political sphere and predominantly
acting on signals in the market. The NEO Commission refers to
active consumers, while the Climate Commission tends to treat
individuals as passively reacting to market incentives rather than
actively participating in the collective decision-making process.
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Table 6.2 Group references, and initiation and direction of activities, in three future-related Swedish Commission
reports issued in the year 2000
Group reference Initiation and direction of activity
Commission Citizen Customer/ Dialogue From Towards From Towards
report consumer/ citizen citizen customer/ customer/
individual consumer/ consumer/
individual individual





SOU 2000:52 10 358 5 – – 48 18
Climate
Commission
SOU 2000:23 6 109 – 4 5 10 22





































Thus, the commissions on sustainable development seem to act
as if the normative issues of ecological governance are already
settled. To a large extent, the role of the individual is reduced to
one of ‘changing behaviour’ in response to future policy. This
policy is often the result of negotiations over very specific issues
of policy implementation among authorities, branch organisa-
tions, and individual enterprises. Now, one could of course argue
that issues of ecological governance concern problems that are so
complex both technically and politically as to render it well nigh
impossible to accommodate broad public participation. There is
need for expert judgement, and there is need for a distribution of
roles between state and market. But as argued above, neither tech-
nological expertise, nor business calculi can claim legitimacy
when it comes to which values should be guiding the future
ecological governance and the society-environment relationship
to be achieved by such governance. The question, then, is whether
the general pattern found through our content analysis holds up
when we analyse how citizens actually participate in the imple-
mentation of policies related to ecological governance. Two cases
are of special interest here; the Swedish Local Agenda 21 process,
and the implementation of the government’s support to LIPs for
sustainable development (see above, pp. 32 ff., 76 ff.).
With or without the people: democratic ecological governance in
practice
Ecological governance with the people? Sweden and Local
Agenda 21
Swedish local governments enjoy a constitutionally guaranteed
autonomy on matters related to the welfare of its inhabitants and
the development of the municipality. Local governments have a
monopoly on physical and infrastructural planning within their
boundaries, although such planning is subject to restrictions
placed by environmental law and regulations safe-guarding indi-
vidual rights to welfare, security and property. Local governments
also have the right to tax the income of their inhabitants, and to
enter into agreements with other municipalities to provide differ-
ent welfare services (see Lundqvist 1998). 
The Swedish Local Agenda 21 process began within a year
after the 1992 Rio Conference, and covered most municipalities
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in Sweden (Cabinet Bill 1993/94:111 p. 64; see Eckerberg et al.
1997; see above p. 33). An internationally unique activity was
launched to engage grassroots citizens and interest organisations
in outlining visions and developing programmes for local sustain-
able development. Very early on, in 1994, central government
formulated a national plan for Agenda 21, and the Environment
Ministry presented a guide for Local Agenda 21 in the same year
(Cabinet Bill 1993/94:111; SOU 1994:128). The purpose of the
National Committee for Agenda 21 set up in 1995 was to stimu-
late local work on Agenda 21 as well as to take in data from local
experiences. To this end, the National Committee arranged
several meetings at the regional level as well as with different
sectors of society. The Swedish Association of Local Authorities
(SALA) continued to stress the bottom-up approach by collecting
information and spreading data in order to support LA 21 activ-
ities among its members, i.e., the local governments (Eckerberg
1999:19 f.). 
Already in 1996, about half of Sweden’s 289 municipalities
had employed special LA 21 officers. Two years later, 70 per cent
of the local governments had employed a full-time or part-time
Agenda 21 co-ordinator. It should be noted that this increase was
supported by central government, which used money from the
labour market funds to finance local hiring of such co-ordinators.
By the end of 1998, 56 per cent of Sweden’s 289 municipalities
had local Agenda 21 plans. As for the political status of these
plans, it is notable that most of them had been formally adopted
through decisions by the Municipal Councils. Furthermore, most
local governments located responsibility for co-ordination of LA
21 directly with the Municipal Board, i.e., the leading popularly
elected Council politicians, whereas only about one tenth located
it with the Environment and Health Board (Eckerberg et al.
1997:56 ff.; Eckerberg 1999:16 f.). 
This political treatment of the issue and the allocation of co-
ordinating responsibilities can be seen as an indication that
Agenda 21 was perceived as extending beyond traditional envi-
ronmental policy to involve all aspects of sustainable
development. One close observer of the Swedish LA 21 process
argues that there is tendency to emphasise the ecological over
other aspects, both at the local level and in national programmes.
Agenda 21 is largely perceived as a renewal and expansion of
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environmental policy, not involving economic and social aspects.
Indeed, most LA 21 co-ordinators have been drawn from the
community of environmental professionals (Eckerberg 2001:17).
Municipal action on LA 21 did not stop at planning. Four out
of five municipalities have allocated special funding towards
LA 21 activities. The level of funding increased somewhat since
1995. This said, one should note that while some local govern-
ments keep up the funding, others have cut down their LA 21
budgets. However, there is a tendency towards a growing gap
between ‘pioneering’ municipalities and those who have cut down
on staff and resources for LA 21. About 30 per cent have reduced
their inputs in terms of both funding and staff (Eckerberg
2001:17). 
A survey carried out in late 1998 found 97 per cent of the
municipalities reporting quite conscious steps to engage citizens
and interest groups in the LA 21 process. Two thirds of the
municipalities arranged special courses and seminars or held open
hearings and discussion meetings. Over 70 per cent of the munic-
ipalities provided LA 21 information brochures or leaflets to local
households, or arranged exhibition and market events. Voluntary
study organisations and environmental movements were engaged
in over half of the municipalities. Every second local government
made conscious efforts to involve village and community based
voluntary organisations. About two thirds of the municipalities
reported that they had established some permanent forum for
exchange of ideas around LA 21 (Brundin and Eckerberg 1999).
Studies of ‘pioneer’ municipalities further reveal this participatory
thrust. One municipality engaged LA 21 workers in home visits to
most of the municipality’s households. Leading politicians within
some local governments have taken part in initiating bottom-up
projects (Eckerberg et al. 1997: 69 f.).
What, then, has actually been achieved in terms of public
knowledge and involvement? A national survey in 1996 revealed
that about 40 per cent of the population had knowledge of the
Local Agenda 21 concept. About 20 per cent recognised at least
one on-going LA 21 project, while only three per cent were actu-
ally involved in such a project (Eckerberg 1999:21). This may
seem like a disappointing figure, given the massive information
activities. A closer study of local governments that have formed
consultation groups for LA 21 indicates the difficulties of citizen
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involvement in decision-making. The experience is that it is easy
to create interest in ‘neighbourhood’ issues, but more difficult
when broader issues are on the agenda. This holds even if the
message of sustainable development is made as operational and
simple as possible. The study concludes that ‘even where great
efforts were made to create conditions for participatory democ-
racy, the results are often discouraging in terms of maintaining
this interest’ (Eckerberg 2001:33). 
All in all, however, the major impression of the Swedish LA 21
process is one of strong emphasis on participation and informa-
tion to the public, and of a conscious interplay between national
initiatives and local action. This is not the least revealed in the
titles of contributions from Swedish researchers to comparative
studies on LA 21 implementation. Sweden has been seen as
‘setting the pace’, as combining municipal and national efforts for
‘quick progress’, and as being ‘at the leading edge’ in the LA 21
process. In a 1999 comparison, Sweden scored highest among
the studied countries in terms of timing and broad-based imple-
mentation (Eckerberg, Coenen and Lafferty 1999:242 ff.). The
crucial question, however, is how strong this local participatory
process really is. What happens to citizen participation when
Swedish local governments are targeted for central government
funding to promote local investment programmes for sustainable
development?
Ecological governance without the people? Local management
of the LIP process
When the Social-Democratic Cabinet launched its programme to
fund Local Investments Programs (LIPs) for Sustainable
Development in 1997 (see above, pp. 78 ff.), municipal govern-
ments were, as we have seen, amidst the LA 21 process. Almost
three out of five Swedish municipalities had adopted Agenda 21
action plans for sustainable development by 1998, and most of
these plans were adopted during 1997, i.e., just about the same
time as the central government launched the LIP process. The
central government’s view of the relationship between the LIPs
and the LA 21 process was summarised by the 1997 National
Agenda 21 Commission’s report. LIP ‘is directly linked to the
Local Agenda 21 process. In this way, a linkage has also been
established between the local level and the central decision-
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making functions of the Cabinet and the Parliament’ on issues of
sustainable development (SOU 1997:105, p. 11). In its budget bill
for 1998, the Cabinet stated that ‘local support is required in
order for the ecological dimension within societal development to
succeed’ and that ‘local Agenda 21 work should be brought into
the investment programme’ (Government Bill 1997/98:1,
Spending Area 18, p. 43).
One would thus expect a rather close relationship in content
between municipal LA 21 plans – many of them worked out in
dialogue with local citizens, NGOs and other associations – and
the LIP applications sent in to the Environment Ministry. One
could also interpret the Cabinet’s wordings as an expectation of
an LIP process on the local level as participatory as that of LA 21.
However, nation-wide surveys of the LA 21 co-ordinators do not
seem to corroborate these assumptions. These key actors seem
doubtful about the connections between the two programmes.
This holds both for municipalities receiving grants as well for
those not succesful in getting grants. Only five per cent of the LA
21 co-ordinators considered the two programmes closely
connected, while close to half said they were partly connected.
Ten per cent reported no connection whatsoever, and two out of
five co-ordinators did not know of any such connection. Having
focused on ‘soft’ sectors and broad citizen participation in the LA
21 process, local governments now looked to ‘hard’ sectors and
to local business elites in the LIP programme (Brundin and
Eckerberg 1999). Whereas the LIP programme focused on ecolog-
ical efficiency through ecological modernisation, LA 21 was
concerned with a much broader range of activities (see Eckerberg
2001).
The two programmes also seem to differ substantially in terms
of local participation, particularly when it comes to what groups
or circles of actors were involved. Only one third of the local
branches of the Swedish Nature Conservancy Organisation – the
leading Swedish environmental interest group – were invited by
local governments to comment on LIPs in the first round of appli-
cations (Kågesson and Lidmark 1998). When preparing for the
second, 1999 round of LIP applications, one fourth of the local
governments engaged their citizens in the process through the
creation of networks and other methods. However, contacts with
local business were much more lively. As many as three out of
172 Sweden and ecological governance
2579Ch6  12/8/03  11:55 AM  Page 172
four municipal LA 21 co-ordinators reported that local industry
and business had been involved in the process of applying for a
LIP grant. This is quite different from the LA 21 process, where
just over one third of the municipalities reported a high degree of
business involvement. The grassroots perspective so evident in the
LA 21 process was thus much less prominent in the LIP process
(Brundin and Eckerberg 1999). 
In fairness, however, one should point out that there are vari-
ations to this pattern. The National Audit Office found both
municipalities with broad involvement from the population, and
others where the links to the local scene were quite weak
(National Audit Office 1999b:53 ff.). One reason given by local
governments was that the short time for LIP applications made it
difficult to ‘establish a broad citizen participation’ in the process
(Auditors of Parliament 1998/99:52). Given this, there would
seem to have been all the more reason for the municipalities to
build upon the already available LA 21 plans that enjoyed broad
popular recognition and support from local networks. Evidently,
however, many local governments actually preferred to put
forward other projects – often involving infrastructural develop-
ments based on energy efficiency and increased employment – in
co-operation with local economic interests. In a quite consider-
able number of cases, the LA 21 achievements thus seem to have
been neglected. The LIP process thus came close to ‘governance
without the people’, and – in effect – also local ‘implementation
from above’ (see Lundqvist 2001a).
We thus encounter two local processes and two patterns of
participation. One is geared towards citizen involvement all the
way from ideas and visions to practical measures. The other
seems more linked to socio-economic interests with resources of
importance to the success of the local investment programmes. A
most crucial question thus arises: Given these patterns, and given
further the inclination towards market-based action to achieve
sustainable development found in our content analysis of recent
commission reports, what is the official view of participation and
involvement in Sweden’s future ecological governance?
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Sustainability and democratic participation: does Sweden solve
the political dilemma?
Towards sustainable public participation? National government
and the ‘new ecological governance’
Already the title of the NEO Commission’s report – The Future
Environment – Our Common Responsibility – makes allusions to
participation for all and everyone. And the opening phrases of the
report’s chapter on ‘The New Environmental Work’ (a literal
translation; my remark) seem to corroborate this impression:
The objective of solving the large environmental problems of today
within one generation demands widespread participation. It
cannot be unilaterally realised by legal and administrative action.
It is necessary for all to take on this responsibility. (SOU 2000:52,
p. 115)
This is reiterated in the Cabinet’s NEO bill accepted by
Parliament. Legal and administrative action may provide a basis
for action, but that action must involve all and everyone. At the
same time, there is an undercurrent indicating that the objectives
of widespread responsibility may not solely be to guarantee indi-
viduals some influence as subjects in the structures and processes
of ecological governance. The diffusion of responsibility is part of
a conscious effort to establish consensus and co-operation around
specific views and strategies for sustainable development:
The new NEO structure provides for comprehensive and effective
environmental management with participation from all strata in
society. A common framework of objectives gives the direction for
how to achieve an ecologically sustainable society through
management by objectives and results. (Cabinet Bill 2000/01:130,
p. 18; italics mine)
When we turn to how and in what capacities these ‘strata in
society’ are to participate and take responsibility, a very special
pattern emerges. The Cabinet actually begins its outline of the
new environmental governance by discussing environmental
behaviour from the viewpoint of the individual as a market actor
responding to economic signals. Thus, economic and commu-
nicative policy instruments are seen as major ways of distributing
responsibilities in accordance with the environmental load caused
by the individual. Furthermore, the Cabinet sees pressures from
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customers and market demands as equally important driving
forces for business as regulatory and administrative measures
(Cabinet Bill 2000/01:130, p. 18 f.).
Indeed, firms and enterprises stand out as very important
actors. By responding to customer pressures and market demands
through measures such as EMAS, environmental certification,
and eco-labelling of products, and by assuming the producer
liability throughout the product’s lifecycle, these economic actors
are at the centre of ‘new environmental governance’. The concept
of ‘sectoral responsibility’ is central to the achievement of the
NEOs. Public authorities and business share ‘sectoral responsibil-
ity’ for NEO achievement in the respective sectors. And while the
Environmental Code and ensuing legislation and administrative
guidelines provide the basis for environmental governance, regu-
latory power should be used sparingly, and complemented by
other strategies. Indeed, the NEO bill foresees a specific mode of
governance that both echoes Sweden’s historic adherence to
welfare state corporatism and resembles modes of environmental
governance found in, e.g., the Netherlands. A core element in
‘new environmental governance’ will consist of voluntary agree-
ments between government and business, where ‘affected firms
and sectors take a large responsibility for active environmental
management’ (Cabinet Bill 2000/01:130, pp. 19 ff.). 
What then, about voluntary organisations and NGOs as repre-
sentatives of individuals and groups interested in or affected by
the ecological governance just outlined? The Cabinet Bill accepted
by Parliament deals explicitly with such organisations and their
role in a mere 12 lines out of a total of 10 pages discussing ‘new
environmental governance’. The Bill acknowledges that voluntary
NGOs have for decades carried out activities of great value for
the environment. On such issues as nature conservancy and eco-
labelling, they have even spearheaded policy development.
Continues the Bill:
It is the Cabinet’s view that free, active and radical environmental
NGOs, networks and other organisations acting on the basis of
voluntary engagement will play important roles also in future envi-
ronmental governance. Thus, environmental NGOs should also in
the future act autonomously and independently of government, at
the same time as they enjoy recognition and support from the
authorities. (Cabinet Bill 2000/01:130, p. 19)
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When going more deeply into the Government’s argument on
who should be at the centre of future ecological governance, we
thus find corroborated the pattern revealed by the content analy-
sis of key Commission Reports. Individuals are primarily viewed
as market actors responding to market signals. These signals will
increasingly be formed in accordance with agreements among the
actors really occupying centre stage in Sweden’s ‘new ecological
governance’, i.e., public authorities and business organisations
sharing and acting out their ‘sectoral responsibility’ for NEO
achievement.
Democracy and autonomy in Sweden’s ecological governance;
what will elites and citizens share in common? 
What, then are the prospects for democracy and individual auton-
omy in ecological governance? To say the least, we have
discovered a mixed pattern. On the one hand, we have found that
the law of the land is quite generous. The public’s right to get
access to official documents related to broad policy-making or to
particular decisions affecting individuals, groups, or their envi-
ronment is wider and more far-reaching than in most other
countries. Affected interests enjoy the right to early counsel on
resource- or environment-related issues requiring permits under
the Environmental Code, as well as to take part in public hearings
and site inspections. The concept of legal standing in such
processes now also includes those affected interests not owning
adjacent property, thus enlarging the enclosure around individual
rights and individual autonomy. And – most notable in the
Swedish context – environmental NGOs have been afforded legal
standing as plaintiffs; they can appeal against decisions on behalf
of the common interest. Furthermore, we have found that the
policy process is quite open. Organised interests regularly partic-
ipate as members. All such interests, as well as any individual
interested in a policy proposal formulated through a governmen-
tal commission, are free to provide written comments to the
government. 
On the other hand, we have found that in reality, these formal
possibilities are not used in full, or envisaged to be used in full, to
create deliberative democratic ecological governance characterised
by widespread participation. Started with much fanfare and
backing from central and local government, and seeing more grass-
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roots activity than in most other countries, the Swedish Local
Agenda 21 process has lost some of its momentum to become – at
best – a routine activity entrenched in municipal bureaucracy.
When central government began waving wads of money before
local governments to engage them in the LIP process, many munic-
ipalities seemed to skip the participatory LA 21 process for that of
BAU – Business As Usual. This meant working out local LIPs
emphasising jobs and infrastructure development in co-operation
with local elites. And – most notable – the future ‘new environmen-
tal governance’ envisaged by major Commissions and
acknowledged by Parliament seems to build on a triumvirate.
Carrying out their joint ‘sectoral responsibilities’, governmental
agencies and organised business interests are expected to interact
to provide customers with economic incentives and communica-
tive signals to change towards more sustainable behaviour. The
Swedish wordings on the future role of environmental NGOs
could in fact be interpreted as ‘an invitation with the elbow’. They
are ‘allowed’ to continue their activities as voluntary organisations
within ecological governance.
This mixed pattern lends itself to different interpretations. If
we adopt an ‘elite-centred’ view of participation, Sweden’s ‘new
environmental governance’ might look like co-operative manage-
ment regimes. Such regimes involve ‘a number of social partners
in a collaborative attempt to resolve specific environmental diffi-
culties’. The use of Commissions, the remiss procedure, and the
public access to official documents could be taken as correspon-
ding to one characteristic of a regime that rests on processes of
open, discursive consensus formation. Furthermore, the sectoral
responsibility shared among governmental agencies and organ-
ised sectoral interests – officially viewed as a core element in the
‘new environmental governance’ – implies that once the parties
have come to some agreement, they assume some joint responsi-
bility for implementing that agreed-upon strategy. It may even be
argued that by incorporating the ‘mobilisation, compliance-
enhancing and legitimating potentials’ of crucial socio-economic
organised interests, central government tries to ensure that co-
operative management sectoral regimes of ecological governance
actually succeed in terms of sustainability, thus enhancing the
legitimacy of such policies (see Lafferty and Meadowcroft
1996:257 f.).
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However, if we adopt the ‘citizen-centred’ view of democratic
participation outlined in the beginning of this chapter, several of
the features of Sweden’s existing and ‘new environmental gover-
nance’ could be questioned. It is true that the right of access to
information covers all and everyone. It is furthermore true that
the remiss procedure is in principle open to all. And it is true that
the efforts made to plant LA 21 processes firmly with the grass-
roots on the local level have been remarkable successful by
international comparison. It is, however, equally true that many
of these rights and processes are, or have turned out to be,
symbolic in character. The channels for citizen participation do
not on the whole prove meaningful in terms of actual influence.
Instead, the more resourceful actors participating at different
stages in the process stand the best chances of actually influenc-
ing decisions. As for the future, citizen-centred participation in
the NEO processes and climate strategies is best characterised as
one where voluntary environmental NGOs are expected to play a
mostly complementary role relative to governmental agencies and
organised socio-economic sectoral interests. 
It may, of course, be argued that this is politically the most
realistic way of involving citizen-centred participation in ecologi-
cal governance. Public participation then functions as a
complement to, and a control on, democratically elected repre-
sentatives at different levels as they make decisions on policies for
sustainable development, and as an additional input to ecological
problem-solving. 
However, problems of legitimacy may arise when ecological
governance comes to involve specific channels for compromise and
accommodation between governmental bodies and organised
sectoral interests. Based on Uhrwing’s findings, we may argue that
resourceful and thus influential as they are, socio-economic
sectoral interests could be assumed to use their position to try to
change the balance of the management by objectives strategy for
ecological governance to make it more advantageous to them.
Indeed, the Cabinet’s NEO Bill does not formalise, but only
loosely outlines the procedural features of this strategy. The agree-
ments may therefore come to be concluded without the kind of
early counsel and public hearings required for permit procedures
under the Environmental Code, and may not be fully accessible
through citizens’ rights to retrieve information, because of the
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possible secrecy of business information. Citizens and environ-
mental NGOs cannot therefore be sure that sectoral agreements
actually observe ‘the parameters within which co-operative
management regimes’ are expected to operate under Sweden’s
NEO strategy (see Lafferty and Meadowcroft 1996:260 f.). 
What happens, then, when we confront these mixed patterns
and interpretations of Sweden’s ‘new environmental governance’
with our criteria for democratic and participatory ecological
governance observing individual autonomy? To begin with indi-
vidual autonomy, the formal aspects of Sweden’s ecological
governance seem to have widened the respect for individual
integrity and freedom of choice. Ownership of property is no
longer the sole condition for legal standing and right to compen-
sation when people experience harm from others’ environmental
and resource use. When looking at the envisaged ‘new environ-
mental governance’, one could contend that the pronounced
preference for market-based and communicative policy measures
changes the context of choice, but leaves much room for individ-
uals to autonomously determine the content of their choices. This
might serve to enhance the political legitimacy for the state and its
role within ecological governance (see Lundqvist 2001b). 
When we turn to democracy and citizen participation, we must
conclude that by almost any formal standard, the Swedish process
is very open. It provides for widespread citizen and interest group
participation, built on general access to rich information, all the
way from policy formation to the implementation of specific deci-
sions. In reality, however, the envisaged future structure and
process of ecological governance show features that are more
elite- than citizen-centred. While both organised sectoral interests
and the general public utilise and are bound to the Swedish
commons, the former will enjoy a much closer relationship with
governmental agencies than the latter. Citizens and environmen-
tal NGOs will have a much more complementary role in the
structure and processes of ecological governance. Given that the
core of Sweden’s ecological governance – the NEO strategy – is
less formalised, the prospects for citizen and NGO insight and
influence will depend heavily on what willpower and resources
they can muster. If these groups find themselves fenced off from
the commons of NEO processes, the ‘new environmental gover-
nance’ could meet with problems in terms of the legitimacy of
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policies and measures. There is thus every reason to return to this
problem of democracy and legitimacy in ecological governance
(see below, pp. 197–200).
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7
Where the buck stops:
governmental power and authority
in democratic ecological governance 
Ecological governance and the authority of government 
The preceding chapters analysed what Sweden has done, and how
far that country has come, in creating structures and processes of
governance for the sustainability of the commons and the auton-
omy of the individual within the limits of democracy. One
conclusion is that while the logic of ecological rationality may
seem attractive in terms of sustainability and autonomy when laid
out as an ideal type, its practical implementation will most
certainly involve conflicts and compromises on both accounts.
Compared to historic patterns of resource management and
behaviour, ecological governance for sustainability implies
‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in terms of individual autonomy and
freedom of choice different from those we are used to identifying
in traditional struggles over social and economic issues of
development. 
Governments engaging in efforts to bring about sustainable
development will thus encounter political opposition and compe-
tition among conflicting values and interests. The pursuit of
ecological sustainability adds new dimensions to the steering of
human behaviour, and brings to the fore crucial issues about the
ecology of governance itself. When push comes to shove, the
political legitimacy of the ‘sustainable society’ project depends on
how government can and does use its political authority towards
other crucial actors in society to bring about ecologically rational
governance. 
Political authority involves power to make decisions that are
binding on others and to force these others to act according to the
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intentions of those holding power. Those in charge of political
government can exercise coercion to bring about the desired reac-
tions among the others. In modern democracies, the scope and
wielding of such power is intimately linked to legitimacy.
Although the possibility of using force to achieve compliance is
always present, liberal democracies ideally strive to have author-
itative decisions accepted with maximum consent and minimum
coercion (see Raphael 1990:74 ff.; Birch 1993:31). Political
authority 
is best described as a combination of political power and legiti-
macy, where power is the ability to get things done and legitimacy
is the quality of ascribed entitlement to exercise that power. (Birch
1993:32)
This means that although authoritative political action through
government may be necessary to achieve certain objectives, such
action is subject to limitations set by democratic norms of indi-
vidual freedom and autonomy. This study of the Swedish
experience shows that the quest for ecologically sustainable devel-
opment – (and, by implication, also its social and economic
aspects) – implies that political government should be vested with
far-reaching power and authority. At the same time, norms of
individual autonomy, i.e., individuals’ right to make their own
choices of the ‘good life’ call for restraints on governmental
authority. In liberal democracies, the norms of autonomy and
freedom of choice place restrictions on the legitimate use of such
authority (see, e.g., Jones 1994:124 ff.). 
The governance perspective brings out quite succinctly the
problems of balancing the authority of democratic government so
that such authority is at the same time both enough to provide for
development towards desired objectives and limited enough to
allow for the individual autonomy necessary to provide legiti-
macy. But whereas the normative reasoning just presented seems
to have broad acceptance, empirical treatises on the actual
authority of government in governance show some contradicting
patterns.
One line of research on governance treats central government
as one among other players in a system of self-organising, steer-
ing-resistant networks, increasingly dependent on bargaining
skills rather than legal authority in a process of negotiation over
182 Sweden and ecological governance
2579Ch7  12/8/03  11:56 AM  Page 182
policy content. The core of governance consists of inter-linked
networks and communities with both public and private sector
participants, mutually interdependent on each other for resources
such as money, expertise, and legitimacy. Key figures are those
who hold nodal positions in the wider decision network and make
judgements about linkages or what to communicate to whom.
This would seem to indicate that some actors are more powerful
than others in the processes of mutual adjustment among actors
and networks striving to control crucial resources. However,
networks are first and foremost self-organising and self-governing
entities, ’not controlled by any single superordinate actor, not
even the government’ (Kickert 1993:275). As cited already in
Chapter 1, this view holds that because ‘integrated networks
resist government steering, develop their own policies and mould
their environments’, governance comes close to ‘governing
without government’ (Rhodes 1996:652, 658). 
Against this view of the government as a team player, another
school holds that the state indeed retains the role of umpire in the
political game. The government has a legitimate hold on such
crucial resources as forcing sanctions, enabling it to ‘steer’ policy
objectives and outcomes through conscious use of structural and
processual strategies. Governments do ’establish the basic param-
eters within which markets, and even social groups, function’
(Pierre and Peters 2000:25, 39). Indeed, the state continues to
function as the ‘needle’s eye’ in the nested, multi-level institution-
alisation of the logic of ecological rationality. Upward to the
international and global levels, the state has the power to enter
into binding agreements and assume duties in the common
pursuit of global sustainability. Downward to regions and munic-
ipalities, the state can delegate responsibilities or issue mandates
for implementing these internationally agreed measures. The state
is vested with constitutionally legitimised resource-mobilising
capacity and coercive competence and authority in its own right.
These powers place government in the key position in the
processes of governance (Lundqvist 2001a).
Sustainable development presents complications to both the
normative delineation of legitimate political authority and the
empirical views of government’s role in governance. The magni-
tude of the problems to be solved and the entangled web of societal
relations touched by the challenge of sustainable development
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seem to make necessary an expansion of governmental authority.
The tradition of the modern welfare state has provided experiences
and fostered expectations that government should actively provide
opportunities to their citizens to make autonomous choices of the
‘good life’. And unless political government is vested with author-
ity to secure ecologically rational resource management to provide
such opportunities, then as a consequence the possibilities for indi-
viduals to exercise autonomy are circumscribed. 
To this we must add the different dimensions of rational
ecological governance discussed in earlier chapters. The temporal
dimension would seem to speak in favour of strengthened
political authority to make legitimately binding long-term
commitments for society as a whole. At the same time, the spatial
dimension calls for multi-level governance, involving several
governmental levels as well as non-governmental actors (see Hirst
2000:22 ff.). This logically calls for a diffusion of state authority,
upward and/or sideways to the international level as well as
downward to regional and local governmental levels. The scale of
such a problem as climate change necessitates a global approach;
‘ecologism in one country’ is certainly not a sustainable option.
The variation in eco-system scales means that management
authority has to be vested in several levels below the state, some
of which may already enjoy legitimate spheres of power and
authority on their own. Ecologically rational governance also
involves self-governing by actual resource users. This may be
good for autonomy, but implies a dilution of political authority
to bring about sustainable development.
The knowledge dimension challenges political authority from a
somewhat different angle. Whereas politicians are elected and
administrators are appointed to exercise authority, scientists have
special knowledge that make them authorities in their own right
within their specialties (see Birch 1993:30). What is ‘sustainable’
development is beleaguered with uncertainties that call for scien-
tific research, evaluation, and recommendations. When the issues
up for decision are particularly marked by such characteristics, it
could mean that political authority becomes somewhat of a
hostage to the authority of knowledge. Also the organisational
and administrative dimension of ecological governance is crucial.
Integration of ecological concerns into sectoral policies and
bureaucracies may lead to confusion as to where the buck really
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stops, thus detracting from governmental authority to effectively
pursue sustainable development. Last but not least, we have seen
that the pursuit of sustainability has important implications for
the democratic dimension of ecological governance and the legit-
imisation of governmental authority.
In the rest of this final chapter, I will discuss how the emerging
system of ecological governance in Sweden affects the political
authority of democratic national government. As the previous
chapter indicated, governmental authority plays a crucial role in
protecting individual autonomy and providing the means for
democratic participation. My analysis of effects on political
authority will be made with this in mind. This will pave the way
for an assessment in the final chapter as to whether the Swedish
government is actually straddling the fence over to sustainable
development, and whether this expands or limits citizens’ oppor-
tunities to make autonomous choices of the good life. To refer
once again to my opening question, I want to find out whether the
Swedish example does tell us something about the possibilities to
‘govern ourselves so as to value democracy and individual auton-
omy and still retain the integrity of the commons’.
Fencing out or fenced in? Governmental authority and the
governance of space
The spatial dimension of ecological governance puts governmen-
tal authority to the test. As for sustainability, spatially rational
ecological governance must adapt to relevant ecological scales.
Governmental authority may have to be transferred upward from
the national level, downward to regional and local levels, as well
as reallocated across those levels, all in order to manage the
health and sustainability of ecosystems. As for autonomy, norms
of democracy point towards configurations of authority in
spatially rational ecological governance that recognise the right of
individuals – stakeholders, resource users, or groups valuing
certain ecological features – to devise their own allocations of
authority for governing a commonly shared resource. 
The Swedish response to the ecological challenges to govern-
mental authority has so far been somewhat wavering. There
are some conscious moves towards ecosystem-relevant allocation
of authority with respect to coastal zone management, and a
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catchment approach to water management will be implemented
within the next few years. The major pattern so far, however, is
to contain governmental authority within traditional, man-made
geographical boundaries (see Chapter 2).
To fully appreciate these tensions among sustainability, auton-
omy and governmental authority, it seems appropriate to look
more closely at the problem of multi-level governance. The reader
may by now have thrown her or his hands in the air many times,
asking in frustrated terms why there is no treatment of the rela-
tions between Sweden and the EU in the different chapters,
despite obvious linkages to the European dimension. Membership
of the EU changes and irrevocably meshes governance in both the
Union and its member states. The principles of regional integra-
tion and subsidiarity do indeed have significant implications for
governmental authority in ecological governance, not just for the
national but also for lower, intra-national levels.
The present Swedish process of implementing the EU
Framework Water Directive provides a most vivid illustration of
the tensions for governmental authority created by spatial ecolog-
ical governance. In anticipation of the coming Directive, the
Cabinet in 1996 appointed a Special Commission to propose a
new system for water administration. The October 1997 report
recommended that Sweden be divided into ten Catchment
Districts, each with a special Catchment Authority comprising
two or three regional administrations and all local governments
within the district. This unit should have authority to decide on
collectively binding management plans and issue permits under
the Environmental Code. Within the District’s major catchments,
local governments should consolidate water issues into one deci-
sion-making unit per catchment (SOU 1997:99, pp. 49 ff., 69 ff.).
These recommendations resemble Ostrom’s model of ‘nested
enterprises’ (Ostrom 1990:90) in that they were knit to the exist-
ing allocation of authority among regional administrations and
local governments. However, the Commission also recognised the
water users’ legitimate right to organise for a common manage-
ment of the shared resource. Public authority could be delegated
from the Catchment Authority to ‘local environmental manage-
ment co-operatives’, but only if they fulfil certain criteria for joint
associations laid down in the Swedish Constitution (SOU
1997:155, p. 81 ff.). 
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The EU Water Directive became effective in Sweden on 1 July,
2001. In October of that year, the Swedish Government
appointed a special commissioner to work out proposals to estab-
lish Swedish water catchment districts as required under the EU
Directive. His terms of reference clearly indicate the tensions
created by the Directive’s demand for special levels and units and
proper allocation of authority to bring about ecologically rational
water management. The catchment-based Water Districts
demanded under the EU Directive should build primarily on the
existing 21 Regional Administrations, with some 10 to 12 of these
being designated to have authority over entire Catchment
Districts, thus even for the geographical areas outside the admin-
istrative borders. Special Catchment Delegations set up within
those Regional Administrations should be vested with authority
to promulgate water action plans, following co-ordination and
counsel with local governments in the Water District. To further
‘nest’ the enterprise of new catchment-based water management
within existing structures of authority, the Commissioner
should also evaluate the need for Cabinet or central agency
confirmation of Water District management plans. As for water
stakeholders and their right to organise for self-management, the
Commissioner was expected to suggest concrete forms for ‘water
management co-operation’. In particular, the legal aspects of
delegating authority to such co-operative networks, be they
voluntary or established through administrative proceedings,
should be illuminated (Directives M2001:01). 
We thus have a situation where the authority of national
government is fenced in by this authoritatively binding, suprana-
tional EU decision aimed at securing the sustainability of water
resources through an organisation based on nature-given bound-
aries. In reaction to this, the Swedish Government seems to be
busy building this new structure without totally compromising
traditional lines of authority. In terms of effective pursuit of
sustainability, one could of course say that this is an appropriate
strategy. The competence, overview and co-ordination necessary
for relatively swift production of management plans and concrete
measures are already vested in the Regional Administrations and
the local governments. 
It would seem that autonomy is less well off than is sustain-
ability in the directives for water governance presently discussed.
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What is surprising is that this occurs amidst good examples of
ecologically rational management of Swedish water resources.
Landowners with water rights are entitled by law to establish
their own Fishing Management Areas in collectively owned lakes
and streams. From all we know, these FMA associations are quite
successful examples of local co-operative management of vital
ecosystems (SFS 1981:533; see Olsson and Folke 2001;
Lundholm 1999). The competence and local knowledge built up
in the Water Management Associations presently doing most of
the monitoring of water quality in lakes and streams would also
seem to provide a good basis for local ecosystem management
units. They could thus be charged with considerable authority to
govern common water catchments (see Gustafsson 1995). 
In a preparatory report presented in June 2002, the commis-
sioner went to some length in arguing for only four very strong
Catchment Districts, while discussing arguments for stakeholder
self-governance more superficially (Water Administration
Commission 2002). This view of what constitutes an ‘appropri-
ate’ authority distribution indicates that effectiveness in the
pursuit of sustainability is a powerful underlying argument for
securing strong governmental authority in ecological governance.
It implies that the democratic argument of transferring authority
to those actually using or sharing ecosystems is still met with
political hesitation, as if increasing autonomy might jeopardise
the achievement of sustainable development by allowing people
too much space for decision-making.
Going slow by running too fast? Political authority and the
governance of time
We have defined temporally rational ecological governance as
governance adapted to ecological cycles. This exposes govern-
mental authority to some formidable cross-pressure. The political
authority of democratic governments is linked to election periods.
Those in power may feel forced to institute as much of their polit-
ical ideas as possible into laws, regulations and administrative
processes, all in the hope of binding subsequent political majori-
ties to development paths of longer duration. However, this
built-in propensity towards short political time horizons becomes
quite problematic to temporally rational ecological governance as
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it depends on authority that can be sustained over a longer period
of time than usual political cycles. 
At issue here is how the authority of government can be used
to handle this conflict between short-term political conditions
and longer-term ecological desirables. We have seen how
Sweden’s national government has tried several ways to achieve
temporally rational ecological governance. What are the
prospects for the longer term with respect to governmental ability
to wield political authority over and within governance? Do
certain strategies tend to confirm long-term governmental author-
ity, while others tend to squander it in the political eagerness to
pursue such governance?
First and foremost, some of the strategies used to ‘save’ time by
constraining the choices of present in favour of those in the future
rest firmly on governmental authority. Physical planning has been
used over the past decades to regulate, and often determine with
a high degree of finality, the use of Sweden’s ecosystems
and resources. Ratified by Parliament and resting on the
Environmental Code, nation-wide planning decisions have
imposed authoritative long-term restrictions on land use. The
national governmental purse is also used to wield long-term
binding authoritative decisions. Funds for securing biodiversity –
including buying valuable areas – more than tripled around the
millennium shift, representing the fastest increase among budget
items for environment after 1998 (Cabinet Bill 2002:100, p. 35).
At the local level, the municipalities’ monopoly on physical plan-
ning within their geographical territory gives them formidable
authority. It should be noted, however, that the last decade has
found local governmental planning authority more and more
dependent on negotiating with private interests for the realisation
of local development objectives. 
This would seem to indicate that as we move from rather clear-
cut government-dominated situations to governance situations
involving efforts to bring other actors ‘on schedule’ through
persuasion, negotiation and bargaining, governmental authority
might become less affirmative and less identifiable. At first sight,
the Swedish NEO strategy seems firmly based on governmental
authority. A Cabinet Bill passed by Parliament confirms the polit-
ical intent of government to move society towards sustainable
development ‘within one generation’. However, the implementa-
Where the buck stops 189
2579Ch7  12/8/03  11:56 AM  Page 189
tion of temporal ecological governance through NEOs presup-
poses that non-governmental actors perform roles that might
otherwise have been within the realm of public bureaucracies. In
such a process of reaching negotiated ecological consensus with
key actors and target groups in society at large, it may well be that
authoritatively formulated political objectives and targets become
adapted to the options acceptable and the capacities available to
the actual NEO implementers. 
Two alternatives of temporal ecological governance provide
cases in point here. The ‘closing of eco-cycles’ presumes political
authority to be essential to initiate and promote such measures to
‘save time’ through infrastructural measures and incentives.
However, the success is in no small measure a matter for market-
related processes of demand and supply of recycled/recyclable
materials and products. If government wants to speed up
processes through authoritative decisions, it might find itself
going into domains of autonomy and individual choice viewed as
essential to democratic government, and experience losses in the
legitimacy upon which that authority ultimately depends. 
An even more challenging case for governmental authority is
the one of eco-efficiency, i.e. of ‘beating time’. This concerns
global processes of economic and technological change, large-
scale processes of market behaviour and market developments.
To put it euphemistically, it seems very problematic that national
democratic governments elected on short terms would be able to
provide authoritative incentive structures for governance to steer
these global, long-term processes. 
Temporally rational ecological governance thus presents two
particularly formidable challenges to governmental authority.
One is time itself. The cross-generational horizon necessitated
when taking sustainable development seriously means that the
much shorter politically relevant time periods make problems for
continuous affirmation of governmental authority. Governments
trying to institutionalise as much of their strategy as they can
within the mandate period, in the hope of setting the course
firmly for sustainable development, expose themselves to political
risks. Too much output from government in too short a time may
lead to implementation deficits (see O’Toole, Jr. 2002). This
would lead to questioning of the legitimacy of the strategy and
thus a loss of political authority for government.
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Another is the circle of actors in ecological governance; the
wider that circle of actors, and the more dependent the govern-
ment becomes on their long-term co-operation, the more
problematic becomes a consistently upheld strategy based prima-
rily on governmental authority. The NEOs, and the eco-cycle and
eco-efficiency strategies embedded in Sweden’s drive towards
ecological governance, all rest heavily on the will among firms
and business organisations, stakeholder groups and the general
public to take on designated roles in ecological governance. A
strong flexing of governmental authority would – as the literature
on conditions for successful implementation clearly illustrates –
have negative repercussions on that will. Therefore, governments
may find themselves forced to accommodate the views of those
groups, either from the outset with a view to at least get off to a
relatively quick start, or gradually as the intricacies and problems
of strategy implementation unfold. Either way, there is reason for
recycling Hamlet’s words: ‘[E]nterprises of great pith and
moment, with this regard their currents turn awry, and lose the
name of action’.
The Swedish case is of interest on both accounts. The epitome
of Sweden’s flirt with ecological modernisation – the LIP
programme – is a prime example of how government used its
political authority to speed up the country’s turn onto the path to
a sustainable society. But what comes across from the account of
the case is first and foremost that you can go slow by running too
fast. The desires for swift implementation of the programme led
to strong exercise of central governmental authority. This may
have seemed quite logical for strategic political reasons, but the
results in terms of sustainable development have not been overly
successful.
The other example is the ongoing process of implementing
National Environmental Objectives. Intended to run for the
next 20 to 25 years, and involving all strands in society, this
programme confronts government with the problem of keeping
the processes and structures of temporal ecological governance
active as well as consistently working towards the agreed objec-
tives. To make all these possibly conflicting interests and actors
go along, however, government may have to adapt both the inten-
sity and the pace of the long march towards sustainability. And in
retrospect, at the perceived end of that march, it may turn out
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that governmental authority could have been more consistently
affirmed. To quote a conclusion by the Dutch government after
three successive rounds of National Environmental Plans with
heavy use of negotiated ecological agreements with target groups:
Those agreements ‘did – in fact – result in increased efficiency, but
in retrospect, the impression is that the stakes could have been set
higher’ (NEPP 4 2001:9; italics mine). Negotiations aimed at
agreements tolerable to target groups may be good from an
autonomy point of view. However, they run the risk of watering
down objectives and requirements, and thus dimming the
prospects of achieving sustainable development within the time
frames originally established. 
On tap or on top? Political vs. scientific authority in ecological
governance
Democratic political authority involves the ability to legitimately
use (the threat of) coercion by those who are elected to be in
authority, or those appointed to exercise authority through some
form of delegation of political authority from elected representa-
tives. When we move from politics to science, we are dealing with
another type of authority. Scientists have special knowledge that
makes them personal authorities within their fields (see Birch
1993:30). The scientifically grounded views from frontline
researchers on what constitutes the most effective ‘solutions’ to
‘problems’ of ecologically rational governance are authoritative
in this sense. 
Issues of sustainable development are particularly marked by
uncertainties that call for scientific research, evaluation, and
recommendations. At the same time, ‘political authority in the
modern state is wielded by identifiable and fallible human beings’
(Birch 1993:30). Elected politicians in power most often do not
possess special knowledge or qualities that lend them personal
authority in the sense just outlined. To wield political authority in
a system of ecological governance involving experts, technicians
as well as target groups thus forces political representatives to
come out from behind their veils of ignorance to make sure their
decisions are accurate enough to make them legitimate in the eyes
of the citizens. One should not forget, however, that they have an
asset not available to others, i.e. the legitimate right to exercise
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authority backed by democratic legitimacy. As Birch puts it,
having such right ‘is four fifths of the battle’ (Birch 1993:30). 
Using this advantage to force political decisions could mean
losses in legitimacy, particularly if the knowledge base of those
decisions becomes so thin as to make the outcomes non-transpar-
ent to affected interests and the public. Good governance
presupposes adequate policy theories. There is thus a need to
strike the balance between the two bases of authority. On norma-
tive grounds, the balance should be in favour of governmental
authority. Scientific and expert knowledge is necessary on issues
of ecological governance, but it ‘should not be used to authorita-
tively determine, as opposed to inform, either the “problem” or
the “solution”. Once these major issues have been democratically
decided, then technical considerations may be appropriate.
Experts ought ‘to be “on tap, not on top”, as it were’. (Barry
1999:200)
What is, then, the evidence from the Swedish case? Has that
country been able to craft a system of governance that is ecologi-
cally rational in the sense that scientific knowledge and expertise
is brought in to support political judgement on how best to use
and manage natural resources to achieve sustainable develop-
ment?
The pattern found seems to support Birch’s view of the upper
hand of political authority. By using the traditional Swedish
process of establishing investigatory commissions with specified
terms of reference, the government brings qualified scientific
advice and counsel into the policy process, but reserves the last
word for political judgement. For a small country like Sweden,
this could mean that political authority sometimes has to rely on
a very thin base of relevant knowledge. To resolve this, the
Swedish government has acted much in accordance with the old
Roman device ‘Divide et impera’. Gone is the dominance of
research directed through programmes written by environmental
bureaucrats, and funded by boards closely knit to the Swedish
Environmental Protection Agency. Those wielding the ultimate
governmental authority nowadays have on tap a wider and more
pluralistic community of research and expertise for the decisions
on how to organise governance for sustainable development.
This should not be taken to mean that even if it is on top,
governmental authority is always inclined to tap all available
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science and expertise to strike an ecologically rational balance
with the authority of knowledge. We have seen from chapter 4
that considerations of political gain (the LIP process) and/or of
economic gain (the Hallandsås Tunnel) have led government to
shove aside and even ignore well-founded scientific or expert
advice that – if heeded – might have been more beneficial to local
environments and longer-term sustainable development. It should
be noted, though, that the early Swedish process on climate
change reveals a very intimate, and quite fruitful interaction
between the two types of knowledge. On the other hand, the later
stages in the process of ironing out the Swedish position on
climate change indicate a move from on top to on tap. Using
Birch’s metaphor, one could say that political authority in the
guise of top-level Ministry officers began to cover ‘four fifths of
the battle’.
What these findings reflect is that the balance between the
authority of knowledge and the authority of political government
is always precarious, because of the different sources and charac-
teristics of these two types of authority. What this implies for
ecologically rational governance is that the balance may have to be
somewhat indeterminate, and also changing with the issues at
hand. It is clear, however, that both are necessary, given the long-
term perspectives and the wide latitude of uncertainty linked to
issues of sustainable development. What is equally clear is that
longer-term legitimacy of governmental authority in rational
ecological governance is dependent on its wise use in two aspects.
First, government must secure a dynamic climate for developing
scientific knowledge on all aspects of sustainable development.
Second, government must ascertain that this knowledge base is
wisely tapped into ecological politics. If not, the legitimacy neces-
sary for upholding a continued authoritative position in ecological
governance, i.e., for democracy to stay on top without the threat
or actual use of coercion may dwindle, according as there is
evidence that the integrity of the commons is compromised.
Whose table? Political authority and the integration of
ecological concern
Integration of ecological concerns into the structures and
processes of governmental agencies is promoted in order to make
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the governmental role in ecological governance as effective as
possible in the pursuit of sustainable development. At the same
time, this integration puts new and quite strenuous burdens on
the agencies, dedicated as they are towards promoting other
sectoral objectives on the basis of quite special, and over a longer
term achieved knowledge and expertise. We also know that policy
implementation is replete with accounts of great expectations
becoming ruins of hope in the mazes of bureaucracy. 
The fate of governmental authority in ecological governance is
closely linked to that of integration. Enabled to legitimately use
(the threat of) coercion through some form of delegation of polit-
ical authority from elected representatives, agencies and
bureaucrats may gain or lose legitimacy – and thus the foundation
of authority – depending on how the quality, consistency and
transparency of their decisions and actions are conceived by those
affected and by the general public. After all, people may reject
governmental authority because of ‘objections to specific policies
pursued by the government’ (Birch 1993:36). There is all the more
reason to assume that such situations could occur with regard to
policies for sustainable development, since these policies will
most probably include measures and outcomes that are re-distrib-
utive in relation to the present relationship between governmental
policies and different societal interests. 
This problem of authority makes itself felt in at least two ways.
One is internal. Will the environmental concerns be integrated in
such a way as to actually have an impact on the decisions of
different sectoral agencies? That is, will a specific agency’s deci-
sions reflect an apprehension of these concerns that render them
legitimate in the eyes of the affected interests and the general
public? The other is external. It concerns how conflicting perspec-
tives on policy ‘privilege’ are reconciled to allow for both
individual agencies and the governmental apparatus at large to
appear to speak with one voice on matters of ecologically sustain-
able development. At issue is the prevention of situations where
governmental authority dwindles because agencies discredit the
legitimacy of government’s drive for sustainable development
through actions revealing a ‘not my table’-attitude towards envi-
ronmental concerns.
Furthermore, governmental authority may become diffused as
an effect of target group participation in policy implementation.
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Many measures presuppose that non-governmental actors – busi-
ness, producers in industry and agriculture – perform roles that
might otherwise have been within the realm of public bureaucra-
cies. As evidenced in so many other cases, it is perfectly possible
that ecological governance may also give rise to issue networks,
policy communities that are able to adapt policy measures to the
options acceptable and the capacities available to them as actual
implementers of public policy (see Daugbjerg 1998). This may
cause losses of legitimacy for those measures, and thus ultimately
losses in governmental authority in ecological governance.
How has governmental authority fared in the Swedish efforts
to integrate ecological concern into sectoral policies and agencies?
The account in Chapter 5 indicates that sectoral policies are
nowadays always integrating the ‘common cause’ of sustainable
development. This sectoral integration means that ‘economic and
other considerations are interwoven with ecological concern in
planning and decision-making’. Agencies with specific sectoral
responsibilities thus have to ‘integrate ecological concerns and
resource management in their actions and promote work towards
ecological sustainability within their whole sector’ (Cabinet Bill
2001/02:172, p. 106). The continuous Greening of Agencies
Programme involves ‘common yardsticks’ of green performance,
and ‘common purses’ in the form of green procurement and green
tender programmes. 
The annual reports of the agencies reveal a preparedness to
observe and implement the new ecological responsibilities
bestowed upon them by government. However, the duty to mix
ecological with economic and other considerations might lead to
difficulties. Ultimately, conflicts of interest may occur both within
the agency and among sectoral actors. Does government succeed
in avoiding situations where agencies with green sectoral respon-
sibilities tend to ‘pass the buck’ from their tables, i.e., is
government effective in authoritatively asserting ‘where the buck
stops’? 
My tentative answer to this question is yes. The Swedish
national government has at its disposal an institutionalised capac-
ity to make sure not only that agencies take their ecological
responsibilities seriously, but also that there is a balancing of
ecological and other concerns compatible with centrally deter-
mined priorities. The historically developed mix of legal,
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economic and other incentives and checks is also actually used to
make the infusion of ecological concern effective and durable.
The Letters of Regulation attached to budget allocations to the
agencies have a key role here, in particular since the administra-
tive culture is traditionally very much geared towards abiding by
these detailed instructions from government.
Still, integration may cause problems for governmental author-
ity in ecological governance on two accounts. One concerns the
relationship between central and local government. Since
Sweden’s municipal governments enjoy far-reaching self-determi-
nation in taxation and – particularly crucial here – physical
planning, questions may arise about which governmental table
the buck should stop at. If demands for locally determined
ecological management are not adequately dealt with, or if local
ecological activities seem to count for little (as experienced in the
clash of principles of the LIP and LA 21 programmes), losses of
legitimacy may occur, thus affecting governmental authority
across levels of governance. The other problem concerns the legit-
imacy of central government in the governance for sustainable
development. The prestige put into the long-term programme for
‘Sustainable Sweden’ makes it extremely important that the
processes and measures infused by government into ecological
governance prove successful. If they do not, the blame will partic-
ularly fall on national government, which may lead to losses in
the legitimacy of that programme. 
No trespassing? Political authority and individual autonomy in
ecological governance
The question of how we should govern ourselves so as to value
democracy and individual autonomy and still retain the integrity
of the commons directs our attention to three things. First, ‘to
govern ourselves’ refers to ‘governing’ and ‘governance’. The
concept of governance traditionally connotes the ‘act or process
of governing’, but has nowadays come to comprise all the mech-
anisms and instruments that can be used to direct social
development in directions reflecting the authoritative will of the
community (see Lafferty 2002). Second, such an authoritative will
here concerns the quest for changing society towards ecologically
sustainable development. Governance should be ecologically
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rational in its use of mechanisms and instruments to retain the
integrity of the commons. Third, the ‘how’ directs our attention
to how governmental authority could be exercised in such ecolog-
ical governance. To gain legitimacy, government must act within
limits set by the values of democracy and individual autonomy.
But is it possible to lay down precise limits for the ‘enclosure’
around individual autonomy necessary to secure a democratically
legitimate exercise of governmental authority? This is particularly
relevant for ecological governance in the pursuit of sustainable
development, literally concerned as it is with the survival of the
commons, without which any such enclosures would be impossi-
ble as well as void of meaning. 
Arguably, the limits to governmental authority cannot be laid
out in some purely ‘physical’ fashion. What governmental author-
ity can be used to achieve is – as we have repeatedly pointed out
– dependent on what those subjected to that authority judge as
legitimate, even in the face of formal democratic rights and duties.
Governments in liberal democracies use their authority to
promote certain objectives, most often by way of providing
opportunities for citizens to choose and enjoy the good life. But
while this may become the case for some, one must not forget that
inherent in that exercise is the potential restriction on others’
freedom of action and/or expression. These are central aspects of
democratically legitimate governance. If government goes far in
promoting ecologically rational governance, it may restrict one
part of the good life at the expense of another (see Raphael
1990:74 ff.). 
In line with this, we early on argued that in democratic ecolog-
ical governance, government should steer with ‘minimum
coercion and maximum consent’. But this balance is extremely
precarious. Valuing democracy and individual autonomy very
highly might compromise the integrity of the commons, and the
opposite may lead to losses of democratic legitimacy. As I have
argued elsewhere, the ecological state should appear as ‘a green
fist in a velvet glove’ (Lundqvist 2001b).
What, then, are the conclusions from the Swedish experience to
date? The traditionally generous formal ‘enclosures’ around indi-
vidual autonomy and individual rights have actually been
widened. The rights of access and information make Swedish citi-
zens privileged in comparison to those of many other countries.
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Legal standing in environmentally related decision-making is
provided to wider circles and in more cases. On this score, it
would thus seem as if the national government has used its
authority to promote individual rights and freedoms of action
and expression within the policies for sustainable development. 
When we turn to the exercise of those freedoms, i.e., actual
public participation in the emerging structure of ecological gover-
nance, the picture becomes more shaded. True enough, the broad
public participation in the Local Agenda 21 process has rightfully
earned Sweden a favourable record in comparison with many
other countries. It is also true that by way of participating in
NGOs or other interest organisations, Swedish citizens have
access to the process of policy-making, e.g., in the commissions
and during the remiss process. They may thus be able to influence
how governmental authority should be used to achieve sustain-
able development. And it is furthermore true that in the ‘New
Environmental Work’ envisaged by national government, public
participation is foreseen as a vehicle for successful implementa-
tion of strategies for sustainability.
There are, however, also tendencies for public participation to
become an icon, or a symbol, in the actual pursuit of ecological
governance. When central government pushed its LIP
programme, municipal governments do not seem to have
consciously used the potential for participation developed in the
LA 21 process. In the central policy documents outlining in detail
the strategies for ecological governance over the next two
decades, ‘New Environmental Work’ takes on a different
meaning. Government will use – and share – its authority to
promote sustainable development in co-operation with such
organised interests as business and producers in industry and
agriculture. We find that members of the public are more
frequently addressed as customers and consumers in the market
place than in their capacity as citizens in a polity. 
We thus see two patterns here. There is a generous formal
enclosure protecting citizen freedom of action and expression. But
there is also a tendency not to fully use this potential for demo-
cratic input from the citizens into the actual future protection of
the integrity of the commons. To reuse the metaphor on the role
of scientists in ecological governance, citizens are not ‘on tap’, as
it were. This peculiar Swedish mix of governmental authority and
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individual autonomy has deep roots in the development of both
democracy and the welfare state. There is a long-standing consen-
sual political culture in which highly organised interests play a
central role in public policy-making as ‘caretakers’ of different
aspects of the good life. This has made it possible to proceed with
maximum consent and minimum coercion without lively individ-
ual citizen participation.
But should not citizens as autonomous individuals be ‘on top’
in democratic ecological governance? In the representative demo-
cratic sense they of course are. But the deliberative recipe of
‘simply increasing the participation of citizens in democratic deci-
sion-making is no guarantee that they will act responsibly,
motivated by concern for the common ecological good’. What
that good is, and what does or does not lead to ecologically
sustainable development, is too surrounded by extreme uncer-
tainty to easily lend itself to definition through popular majority
vote. What is important in terms of participation is first and fore-
most ‘the possibility of transforming unecological preferences in
the light of debate’ (Barry 1999:232). It is above all for such
reasons that the balance between authority and autonomy in
Swedish ecological governance may have to be reconsidered as the
cross-generational striving for sustainable development proceeds
in the years to come.
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8
Straddling the fence: on the
possibility of sustainability and
democracy in advanced industrial
nations
At the heart of this study of Sweden and its efforts to create struc-
tures and processes for ecologically rational governance has been
the political dilemma posed by sustainable development. Taking
as my point of departure the normative question of ‘How are we
to govern ourselves so as to value democracy and individual
autonomy and still retain the integrity of the commons?’ and by
measuring the empirical evidence of Sweden’s ecological reforms
against several criteria for rationally ecological governance, I
have sought to answer the following question: To what extent do
policy measures taken in Sweden to achieve ecologically sustain-
able development shape and/or rearrange the structures and
processes of governance in such a way that the collective outcome
is ecologically rational and democratically acceptable?
The choice of Sweden as the single case for an empirical study
of the compatibility of democratic and ecological governance was
made on mainly two grounds. One was consciously heuristic;
Sweden is viewed in recent scholarly debate as a forerunner on
matters of environmental and ecological policy, and its launching
of the programme for ‘Sustainable Sweden’ seemed to corrobo-
rate that view. If any country has come anywhere near meeting
the criteria for ecologically rational government, Sweden might be
that country. Given the evidence laid out in the preceding chap-
ters, what remains to be assessed here is whether this is actually
the case. The other was concern for cumulativity; much has been
written on how ecological governance or an ecological state
should be designed and function, as well as on the pros and cons
of the probability for such governance to emerge. However, there
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is not a whole lot of empirical research on whether and how such
governance is actually working. The question, then, is how the
evidence from the empirical ‘front’ case of Sweden squares with
recent scholarly statements on governance for sustainable devel-
opment, and how this might influence the current discourse. 
Clearly, much of the Swedish strategy for a ‘sustainable society’
is still in the making. Still, enough has been done to (a) warrant
some conclusions as to the prospects for ecologically rational
governance; (b) address some salient issues for democratic ecologi-
cal governance, and (c) outline some crucial aspects of governance
as a conceptual framework for studying how societies try to solve
their relationships to the natural environment. This will be done in
a two-pronged way. First, I summarise and evaluate the Swedish
case by juxtaposing the empirical evidence presented in the previ-
ous chapters with the general criteria for ecologically rational
governance presented in the first part of Chapter 1. 
Second, I confront the Swedish case with arguments put forth
in recent comparative studies of environmental politics and poli-
cies for sustainable development. One line of argument concerns
the possibility for democracies in advanced industrial states to
actually get over the fence to the greener side, i.e., to organise for
sustainability. The editors of Governance and Environment in
Western Europe argue that democratically elected politicians are
locked into the logic of competition in global markets. The need
to secure continued economic growth and social welfare for the
citizen forces them to secure hegemony for the strategy of ecolog-
ical modernisation. This fencing in of the discourse makes
environmental policy fully compatible with the logic of global
market competition, thus most probably blocking the move
towards rational ecological governance (Jansen, Osland and Hanf
1998:292 ff., 313 ff.). Another view is found in Implementing
Sustainable Development – Strategies and Initiatives in High
Consumption Societies. Building on the different national reports,
the editors of that volume conclude that the expanded normative
conceptual scope of sustainable development has been taken seri-
ously and that governments – at least among the ‘enthusiastic’
states – are committed to ‘carrying forward and deepening
the quest for “sustainability”’, thus going beyond the strategy
of ecological modernisation (Lafferty and Meadowcroft
2001b:454 ff.).
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Another line of argument deals with the democratic aspect of
ecological governance. In Environmental Governance in Europe.
An Ever Closer Ecological Union? the authors argue that the
models for achieving ecological governance within the European
Union actually come a long way in bringing about such a union.
At the same time, the procedures by which this is done – govern-
mental negotiations to find contingent majorities, Commission
initiatives, little input or participation from the European
Parliament, etc. – point to a democratic deficit (Weale et al.
2000). Drawing on that discussion, I analyse whether such ‘EU-
like’ elements of the Swedish strategy as the NEO implementation
process can sustainably uphold the criteria for autonomy and
democracy that we have here defined as part and parcel of ecolog-
ically rational governance. 
Straddling the fence; Sweden on the move towards ecologically
rational governance
As the logic of ecological rationality has been defined throughout
this book, the pursuit of sustainability is normatively constrained
by the value of democracy and individual freedom and autonomy.
To enable conclusions about the extent to which Sweden is
approaching ecologically rational governance, four normative,
and ideal-type set of criteria for ecologically rational governance
have guided the analysis:
• Ecologically rational governance is adapted to ecologically
relevant boundaries.
• Ecologically rational governance is adapted to natural eco-
cycles and to the safeguarding of inter-generational equality
without sacrificing norms of socio-economic justice embraced
by the present welfare state.
• Ecologically rational governance has institutional capacities to
interpret and effectively transform scientific sustainability-
directed arguments into integrated and collectively binding
policies and decisions legitimised by representative democratic
government.
• Ecologically rational governance effectively brings socio-
economic activities within the scale of the ecological resource
base with minimum coercion and maximum consent and
without fettering initiatives conducive to efficient resource use.
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As for spatial rationality, we have first of all found that there
are changes occurring toward units based on nature-given rather
than man-made borders. The remarkable thing here is that it is an
external factor – the EU Water Directive – that seems to be the
prime mover towards spatial reforms of the Swedish administra-
tion, on the basis of the catchment concept. However, there are
also signs that such rationality is not easily implemented. Even in
areas where such reforms are particularly called for, such as
climate change, old administrative fences are still standing and
directing the path. To take just one example, the 2002–04
national subsidy programme for local climate measures is prima-
rily following municipal boundaries. Concerns for experience,
expertise and effectiveness still speak very strongly in favour of
minimal administrative changes and against dramatic societal
reorganisation.
With respect to temporal ecological rationality, it is remark-
able that the democratic political system in Sweden has managed
to commit itself to a time frame for ecological governance that
stretches as far as one generation into the future. Furthermore,
there are precise timetables for most of the first decade in terms
of what should be achieved when and by whom. Admittedly,
many of the details are still to be worked out together with target
groups and affected interests. This leaves room for compromises
that could detract somewhat from the projected strategies and
achievements. At the same time, the long process leading to these
time tables may have created a sense of commitment among
involved actors and interests that can not be broken without
incurring considerable social costs in terms of trust and reciproc-
ity. Future developments are furthermore dependent on a steady
flow of reliable, complementary and yet critical knowledge on
progress as well as on new or unsolved problems. The eternally
uneasy relation between authority based on scientific knowledge
and authority based on political legitimacy will thus continue to
be a crucial issue for ecologically rational governance.
Governmental bureaucracies at all levels will in all likelihood
continue to occupy a central position in ecological governance. It
is thus vital that they can continuously watch and take care of the
ecological dimension of sustainable development. The Swedish
case provides valuable insight on how integration of ecological
concern can reach all corners of the public sector. The ‘sectoral
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responsibility’ mechanisms established over the last few years –
above discussed as common ‘cause’, ‘yardstick’, ‘account’ and
‘purse’ – all impose on different bureaucratic units a duty to
constantly observe and assess the ecological consequences of their
actions, and act to protect ecological values under the
Environmental Code and the NEO programme. It is important to
note that this imposition is based on central government’s
willingness to continuously use the means at its disposal to
authoritatively enforce its strategies for sustainable development.
The question that emerges here is why this infusion of ecolog-
ical concern into sectoral administrations seems to have been so
relatively easy to achieve in Sweden. Earlier studies of environ-
mental politics in developed countries contend that long-term
strategies for sustainable development cannot be launched
without highly developed systemic capacities for co-ordination
and direction (see Jänicke 1997). As an advanced industrial
nation, Sweden possesses both the economic as well as the scien-
tific and organisational capacity necessary for pursuing
innovative strategies for ecological governance. One should
particularly emphasise the comparative advantage of a unitary
political system in formulating and pursuing coherent policies;
the number of possible veto points within such a system is low
compared to federal systems. 
However, structural systemic characteristics and capacities do
not suffice as an explanation. They may bring innovation and
effectiveness to strategies for sustainable development but at the
same time score low on legitimacy. To achieve both effectiveness
and legitimacy, explicit, orderly and continuous involvement of
target groups in implementation is an important factor. Such
involvement seems to warrant specific preconditions in terms of
political culture (see Jänicke 1997). Both the introduction and the
success of such involvement are dependent on collective memories
on both sides of the public-private divide. In political systems
where relations between government and target groups have
historically developed through processes of consensus, the politi-
cal culture is much more favourable to solutions building on high
degrees of target group involvement. 
Sweden’s political culture has traditionally built firmly on
consensus and cooperation. The development of the post-war
welfare state, metaphorically referred to as the ‘People’s Home’,
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was in large measure achieved through neo-corporatist co-opera-
tion between the state and large organised interests (Rothstein
1992; see also Tilton 1990:125 ff.). The picture of the ‘Green
People’s Home’ can be seen as instrumental in getting acceptance
for the further ‘consensualisation’ of environmental politics that
is in effect embedded in the involvement of well-organised target
groups in implementation of the Swedish strategy for solving all
major environmental problems ‘within one generation’. This
involvement all the way from investigatory Commissions to the
operationalisation of sectoral, regional and local environmental
quality objectives no doubt helps in gaining acceptance and legit-
imacy for measures taken within ecological governance.
This brings us up close to the democratic aspects of ecological
governance. We have found that while providing a comparatively
generous enclosure of individual autonomy in terms of rights of
access and information, the emerging Swedish system of ecologi-
cal governance is more keen on organisational than on citizen
participation. True enough, there are provisions for public hear-
ings during the decision-making process, and there was at first
quite lively public participation in Local Agenda 21 activities.
However, other studies strongly suggest that in the formally very
open process of policy-making, well-organised special interests
tend to gain favoured positions thanks to their superior resources
compared to individual citizens and loosely formed action groups
(Uhrwing 2001). Furthermore, we have interpreted the envisioned
‘new environmental work’ of implementing ecologically sustain-
able development, e.g., through the NEOs, as treating members of
the public more as members of interest organisations or market-
based actors reacting to stimuli from industry and business than
as citizens engaging in collective ecological management. 
What we have here is a rather clear-cut example of path
dependence. As was just said, the ‘Swedish model’ that developed
when Sweden was building the social welfare state involved close
co-operation between the democratic and administrative organs
of the state on the one hand, and organised social and economic
interests on the other. The post-war Swedish politics aiming at
sustainable social welfare and economic growth is best charac-
terised as a search for collectivist and corporatist rather than
individualistic and pluralistic processes and solutions. When the
Social-Democratic government evoked the vision of a ‘Green
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People’s Home’ to gain acceptance for its LIP programme of
ecological modernisation, it deliberately used this quite successful
historic process to legitimise this way of organising the society-
nature relationship. The historically developed organisation of
social governance thus stakes out, but also fences in, the path for
the broader future-oriented processes in ecological governance. It
is part of a cluster of factors that bias a country ‘in a more
supportive direction for sustainable development’ (see Lafferty
and Meadowcroft 2000b:424).
On balance, then, how far has Sweden come towards ecologi-
cally rational governance? As for the spatial dimension, it is fair
to say that there are moves to change man-made jurisdictional
boundaries and adapt to scales compatible with the boundaries of
natural ecosystems. In temporal terms, Sweden already scores
high in adapting socio-economic processes to natural eco-cycles.
The process of implementing the National Environmental
Objectives is quite unique. It represents the so far most
pronounced commitment of present and future generations to
intergenerational equality, at the same time as it safeguards the
norms of socio-economic justice of the present welfare state.
Sweden has built up, and continues to develop institutional
capacities for interpreting and transforming scientific sustainabil-
ity-directed arguments into integrated measures for sustainable
development. Those measures are legitimised and made collec-
tively binding through decisions in democratically elected bodies.
One should not, however, hasten to conclude that Sweden is
nearly over to the other greener side of the fence. There are still
some hurdles in the way. We have seen that validated scientific
and expert arguments are not always given attention in policy
decisions and resource management. And the core problem of
ecological governance is still there; do the steps taken so far
provide for both autonomy and sustainability? The NEO strategy
can be interpreted as an effort to bring about ecologically sustain-
able development with minimum coercion and maximum
consent, and without fettering initiatives conducive to economi-
cally effective resource utilisation. It is important to note the
path dependency of that strategy. The ‘corporatist’ governance
through co-operation between national government and organ-
ised interests that helped build the social welfare state is now
envisaged as the vehicle also for building the sustainable society. 
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The real test is whether this political strategy really could
effectively bring socio-economic activities within the scales of the
ecological resource base. As already said, this is too early to tell.
But as a ‘forerunner’ and an ‘enthusiast’ with respect to issues of
sustainable development, Sweden is now straddling the fence to
get over to the greener side. The experience of Sweden can thus
provide important stimuli to the scholarly debate on the problems
and possibilities for ecological governance to achieve sustainabil-
ity while upholding individual autonomy, public participation
and democracy. To assess the usefulness of the Swedish case for
future comparative studies, let us therefore confront it with some
recent inputs into the comparative study of policies for environ-
mental quality and ecologically sustainable development.
Forever fenced in? The prospects of governance for
sustainability in advanced industrial countries 
The editors of Governance and Environment in Western Europe
present a grim view of the possibilities for democratically elected
politicians in capitalist nations to opt for ecologically rational
governance. In order to win elections, they have to establish a
record of delivering the economic and social welfare citizens
aspire to. Therefore, the political leadership has to make the
national economy stable and competitive, so that tax income
increases enough to pay for continued economic and social
welfare for the citizenry. To take seriously the arguments made by
biologists and ecologists for radical structural changes could seri-
ously threaten the national economy and thus the deliverance
capacity of the political leadership. In short, political leaders in
democratic and industrialised nations are fenced in by the logic of
competition in global markets. 
Consequently, political leaders have to find ways of handling
the ecological problematic in ways compatible with the market
logic. The solution, argue the volume editors, is to secure discur-
sive and political hegemony for the strategy of ecological
modernisation. Policy-makers seek to convince key socio-
economic interests that environmental protection can be turned
into a ‘positive-sum game’ by providing incentives that help
create new eco-technological markets. In this way, industry finds
anticipatory development of green technology profitable, and
the politicians can preach ‘green growth’. Indeed, the editors
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conclude that the ‘strategy of ecological modernisation is not only
compatible with, but may even be seen as part of the overriding
project of the ruling policy elites to expand the logic of the insti-
tutional order of the market.’ (Jansen, Osland and Hanf
1998:313 ff.; quote from p. 318). 
The editors of Implementing Sustainable Development –
Strategies and Initiatives in High Consumption Societies
disagree with ‘the triumph of this sort of eco-modernist perspec-
tive’. Instead, the globally expanded commitment to sustainable
development functions as a normative external force that makes
governments, particularly in the ‘enthusiastic’ states, incorporate
sustainable development ‘as a high-profile, officially sanctioned
standard, against which environment and development initia-
tives can be weighed.’ This is furthermore ‘associated with
innovation in the environmental policy domain, and govern-
ments remain formally committed to carrying forward and
deepening the quest for “sustainability”’ (Lafferty and
Meadowcroft 2001b:454 f.). 
This should not, however, be taken to mean that sustainable
development is achieving the kind of unilateral discursive and
policy hegemony ascribed to ecological modernisation by Jansen
et al. First of all, the sustainable development discourse leaves
more open the scope of institutional reform, such as internalisa-
tion and participation. The steps taken even by forerunner states
are best seen as ‘pragmatic efforts at implementation . . . to match
the ambitious’ language of the UNCED programme. Second, the
engagement in sustainable development has had a more pluralist
character. But the direction of the movement is clear: ‘True
sustainable development has been broadly accepted as a legiti-
mate goal – and this has a determinate normative and policy
content’ to move the governance of the society-environment
relationship beyond the strategy of ecological modernisation
(Lafferty and Meadowcroft 2000b:452 f.).
To sum up: The ‘eco-modernist’ interpretation encloses nations
within the parameters drawn up by the competitive market logic.
It is politically impossible for the individual country to proceed
beyond ecological modernisation. The ‘sustainabilist’ interpreta-
tion views nations as politically and morally committed to a
globally acknowledged agenda to achieve economically, socially
and ecologically sustainable development. This prods the individ-
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ual country to proceed beyond present policies to bring about
ecologically rational governance. 
Sweden presents a critical case for testing the eco-modernist
view. It is a highly industrialised state, heavily dependent on its
competitiveness in international markets for economic stability
and resource mobilisation for the social welfare state. At the same
time, it has a record of being a forerunner and enthusiast in the
global and regional search for sustainable development. In order
to systematise this assessment, some core characteristics of
ecological modernisation and sustainable development identified
in recent discourse are outlined in Table 8.1.
Table 8.1 Ecological modernisation and sustainable developments: a
comparison of core elements
Problem/issue/ Major approach/views of
dimension/ Ecological modernisation Sustainable development
relationship
Geographical dimension Primarily national, ‘enclosure’ Global and national,
within traditional boundaries ‘commons’ define
appropriate areas
Character of environmental Sectoral, ‘medial’ problems Long-term, global, cross
problem possible to control and sectoral high-consequence-
contain risk potential
Economy/environment Growth can be ‘greened’ Shifts in pros/cons patterns
relationship through technological necessary, changes in
development quality of growth through
decoupling
Policy instruments Mainly economic, but also Regulatory action a
regulatory incentives for necessary base for all other
green technology; use of measures
voluntary agreements
Social dimension Win-win solutions possible, Conflicts unavoidable,
thus implying harmony distributive justice must be
among interests part of ecological measures
Institutional/ Existing institutions can Significant modifications are
Administrative dimension handle the problems through called for, and structural
effective internalisation changes may be needed
Source: Builds on Jansen et al. 1998; Langhelle 2000; Lafferty and Meadowcroft
2000b
There are several aspects of the Swedish case that might first
tempt us to conclude that what has actually been achieved is
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nothing more than a ‘Swedish model’ of ecological modernisa-
tion. The very first speech of the newly elected leader of the
governing Social Democratic Party in 1996 struck that note. Win-
win solutions were seen as possible, growth could be greened, and
the perspective of national gain from such a strategy was evident.
The Local Investment Programmes introduced in 1997 certainly
built on the possibilities to achieve green growth and greening of
technology. The programmes for eco-cycling introduced in the
early 1990s and later expanded, are in many cases built on utilis-
ing the commercial potentials of recycling and reusing goods and
materials. These measures, as well as the quest for increased eco-
efficiency, and the early introduction and subsequent expansion
of green taxation could all be interpreted as fully within the logic
of competitive markets.
However, the evidence indicating that Sweden has proceeded
beyond ecological modernisation is strong. The use of sustainable
development as both a valid concept and a long-term objective for
environmental policy can be found as early as around 1990 in the
major governmental bills. This was followed by a stream of
governmental bills and parliamentary decisions establishing
sustainable development as the overarching objective across tradi-
tional societal sectors from about 1996 on. The Cabinet’s reports
to Parliament on the state of the environment shifted from
discussing sectoral and/or medial pollution problems to outlining
measures for sustainable development within and across such
boundaries. There was a comprehensive integration of all resource-
related legislation into one major code, building explicitly on the
objectives and principles contained in sustainable development,
thus providing strong legal ground for all other environmental
measures. Sweden’s swift introduction and development of Agenda
21 activities after the Rio summit also points in the same direction. 
Furthermore, the spatial, temporal and social justice aspects of
sustainable development are in clear evidence in the Swedish case.
Several of the opening arguments of the Cabinet Bill on National
Environmental Objectives, passed by Parliament in 2001 imply
that Sweden has indeed incorporated sustainable development as
a high-profile, officially sanctioned standard against which envi-
ronment and development initiatives can be weighed. After
having quoted the Brundtland Commission’s definition of
sustainable development, the Cabinet states that 
Straddling the fence 211
2579Ch8  12/8/03  11:57 AM  Page 211
Work for the environment must be seen in a dynamic and global
perspective. Experience shows the difficulty in foreseeing future
environmental problems. (Thus) the precautionary principle, as
expressed in the Environmental Code, should have precedence . . .
an ecologically sustainable development in one part of the world
cannot be had at the expense of environmental and social welfare
in some other part. (Cabinet Bill 2000/01:130, p. 11 f.)
Now, could not all this be dismissed as nothing but some
rattling at the fences, ‘a rhetorical cover for a policy stance that
in practice looks much more like “ecological modernisation”’
(Lafferty and Meadowcroft 2000b:451)? The most crucial part of
assessing the Swedish case in this respect is the NEO process of
management by objectives. Although founded on the principles
and rules of the Environmental Code, and despite its long-term,
cross-generational perspective on social justice and sustainable
development, it depicts many of the trappings of ecological
modernisation. The 15 National Environmental Objectives are
very broad in character. Their operationalisation into sectoral,
regional and local targets with specified deadlines for achieve-
ment is subjected to negotiations and agreements among
authorities and important producer and consumer interests in
various socio-economic sectors. 
Evidently, there is a possibility that issues of market competi-
tiveness might enter this process, and lead to a watering down of
the NEOs to make them compatible with that logic. However,
there are several nuts and bolts installed into the process to keep
it on track towards solving the major environmental problems
within one generation. The interim targets are formulated by
Parliament, thus formally binding and committing agencies and
actors further down the line that are involved in the process of
developing goals and targets to carry forward and deepen the
quest for ‘sustainability’. Having invested so much in the NEO
process, it is most probable that agencies and authorities also
come to feel morally bound to use sustainability as the common
yardstick for their work. 
My conclusion is that the direction of the Swedish movement
is clear: ‘True sustainable development has been broadly accepted
as a legitimate goal – and this has a determinate normative and
policy content’. (see Lafferty and Meadowcroft 2000b:452 f.) The
Swedish example shows beyond doubt that it is possible for
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advanced industrial nations to go beyond ecological modernisa-
tion and commit future policy-making and implementation to the
full range of sustainability issues. At the same time, it shows that
the ways and methods for getting further can be both varied and
as yet indeterminate in terms of outcome. A most interesting
aspect of Sweden’s movement towards sustainability is that so
much of future ‘environmental work’ (the Cabinet’s term) is to be
entrenched in the governmental bureaucracy and their negotia-
tions with affected organised interests to further elaborate these
objectives. Within the NEO process of management by objectives,
present bureaucrats actually uphold the function as ‘ombudsmen’
for future generations. If it turns out that the sub-goals and
targets come to reflect judgements of administrative feasibility
and implementability as much as considerations of levels and
conditions necessary for sustainable development, this would
affect the autonomy of future generations. We then come up
against the ultimate question guiding this study: What are the
prospects for autonomy and democracy within multi-level and
long-term binding ecologically rational governance aimed at
saving the integrity of the commons?
Getting over in style? The prospects for democracy in ecological
governance 
We started out from the normative argument that ecologically
rational governance for sustainability must be sought within the
limits drawn by democracy and the value of individual autonomy.
We assumed that ecologically sustainable development is not
possible to achieve without conflicts over how to use or not use
scarce resources. There will be winners and losers in that process.
The necessary redistribution of resources, positions and power
cannot gain political legitimacy if it is not decided upon and
implemented through democratic procedures open to public
scrutiny and participation. 
Sweden’s progress towards sustainability has been achieved
with a somewhat mixed record in terms of democracy and partic-
ipation. True enough, there are comparatively generous rights of
citizen access to information, policy-making and implementation
of issues related to the management and quality of natural
resources. Furthermore, Sweden has been at the leading edge in
engaging citizens in Local Agenda 21 activities. It is equally true,
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however, that much of the future ‘new environmental work’
seems to be copied from the corporatist arrangements evolving
when building the social welfare state. A dominant strategy is for
government to seek consensus and agreements with established
and securely entrenched organised interests, while the role of indi-
viduals is to a considerable extent seen as that of customer and
consumer reacting to carefully orchestrated policy incentives and
market signals. It is furthermore true that the projected water
management organisation to be introduced in order to implement
the EU Framework Water Directive involves a centralisation of
power and authority at levels above the present local and regional
ones in Sweden.
Could it be that effective governance for sustainable develop-
ment implies some basic problems or conflicts with democracy?
As pointed out in the analysis of the spatial dimension (see
Chapter 2), an ecologically desirable adaptation to natural scales
means that ecological governance is inherently multi-level in char-
acter. We end up with a system of nested enterprises, all the way
from ‘super-local’ eco-system management units to global regimes
for such gigantic problems as climate change. This of course also
means that the issue of what is the ‘appropriate’ distribution of
authority, participation and influence becomes crucial if we want
both effective and democratic ecological governance. 
At issue, then, is what standard should be applied to determine
what is appropriate. When the standard of functional effective-
ness is applied, the logic may easily become one of centralisation.
The argument is two-pronged. Most problems facing rational
ecological governance – such as diffuse pollution affecting eco-
systems over long distances, and climate change – are such that
their effects and consequences cannot be contained and handled
at the level of origin. Their solution demands treatment at
national and often international levels. This is further accentuated
by the increasing demands for internationally and globally valid
common regulations and conditions for economic activities.
Ecologically motivated measures to save, protect and manage
natural resources and environmental quality should thus as far as
possible be common across not only regional but also interna-
tional political and administrative boundaries. 
Applying the principle of functional effectiveness to distribute
authority, participation and influence will have repercussions for
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democracy. There are different constituencies at different scales,
meaning that democratic participation is faced with differing
opportunities and obstacles at each level. The further up author-
ity is moved for the sake of functional effectiveness, the more
difficult it may be for ecological governance to actually be
rational in the sense of valuing individual autonomy and democ-
racy. The principle of subsidiarity could be applied here. As I
interpret this principle, it is applicable within any multi-level
system of governance. In its most general form, it means that
authority to take action should be allocated to the level where the
objectives of a given policy can be sufficiently achieved. The
application of subsidiarity would then be a decentralising force. If
lower levels can sufficiently handle an issue related to ecological
governance, then that is where authority should be allocated.
Needless to say, this will have positive implications for the possi-
bility of citizen and interest participation in governance (see
Weale et al. 2000:494).
It is interesting here to compare the patterns of ecological
governance we have found in Sweden to those of the European
Union. The authors of a recent study of EU environmental policy
conclude that the complex EU system of ecological governance
has gained capacity to make significant choices for the European
environment. Environmental concern has moved from obscurity
to centre stage in EU very much because the strive to widen and
consolidate the single market has made member states see it as
functionally effective to support common approaches and meas-
ures to ecological problems, as much as or more than opting for
subsidiarity as the guiding principle. However, the procedures by
which this centralisation has come about – government level
negotiations to find contingent majorities, Commission initia-
tives, little input or participation from the European Parliament,
etc. – are such that environmental issues have not been subjected
to political competition and are characterised by low democratic
accountability. They may thus not fully ‘approximate the interest
of the citizens of Europe’ (Weale et al. 2000:437, 440). 
It seems as if both subsidiarity and functional effectiveness
have been applied as guiding principles in the emerging system of
ecological governance in Sweden. There has been some scaling
down of authority to local government. There was an initial
and strong move to incorporate citizens in the Local Agenda 21
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activities. There will be moves to arrange new entities at the local
and ‘super-local’ level with respect to the management of ecosys-
tems such as small water catchments. And there is, as we have
seen, a comparatively generous and liberal formal regulation of
citizen access to the public policy process. 
Yet, important as these signs of subsidiarity may be for the
democratic and participatory character of ecological governance,
there are very strong indications of functional effectiveness as a
major principle for distributing authority, participation and
opportunities to influence such governance. The LIP process
involved traditional local and business elites, but was exception-
ally centralised in that the Cabinet itself made the implementing
decisions on how to allocate funds. The NEO process builds very
much on developing nation-wide targets and deadlines in co-oper-
ation with organised sectoral – read producer – interests. 
From the perspective of functional effectiveness, these patterns
of incorporating crucial socio-economic interests in processes to
reach nation-wide agreements on measures could be seen as
efforts to secure progress towards sustainability. However, prob-
lems of democratic accountability and legitimacy arise if
ecological governance comes to involve specific channels for
compromise and accommodation between government and
organised sectoral interests. As was seen from the recent study of
organised interests’ access to the policy process in Sweden, the
stages to which citizens have access provide mostly for symbolic
participation, whereas the most resourceful organised interests
can wage real influence.
It would seem as if both the EU and the Swedish processes
tend to follow a similar pattern. There is a push upward in
terms of the levels and scales where final decisions are taken, as
well as where and by whom participation and influence is exer-
cised. This could spell difficulties for how to get over to the
greener side in a democratically acceptable style, i.e., through an
open political process with lively public participation and rich
possibilities to hold those involved accountable. In a wider
perspective, the similarities of the two processes point to a
feature of modern advanced societies that further studies of
ecological governance must address, i.e., the fact that they are
so highly and thoroughly organised. 
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Governing the commons; negotiated ecological governance in
modern highly organised societies
This high degree of organisation colours the ultimate lessons from
Sweden’s struggle towards ecologically rational governance. On
the side of sustainability, Sweden’s experience points to the polit-
ical readiness to incorporate the conceptual framework of
sustainable development into the political process, as well as
much of the arsenal of measures seen as necessary for its practical
implementation. At the same time, we have found that the
Swedish governmental efforts to implement sustainable develop-
ment seem to follow the maxim of minimum coercion and
maximum consent; the dominant form for ecological governance
is co-operation with organised interests and persuasion of the
general public. 
While having advantages in terms of sustainability, this gover-
nance pattern is also problematic. First, as a co-operative,
agreement-seeking and long-term directed strategy, the Swedish
NEO (read management by objectives) process may ease the
implementation of sustainability measures. However, it may at
the same time be based on policies setting the stakes lower than
those claimed necessary by those possessing expert knowledge, all
because of the value policymakers put on political feasibility and
acceptance among target-groups. Second, the co-operative, agree-
ment-seeking and long-term directed NEO strategy is formally
based on easy access and rich opportunities for participation,
which would speak in favour of democracy in ecological gover-
nance. However, the real pattern found in crucial policy-making
processes is one of special and resourceful highly organised inter-
ests, talking the right ‘technocratic’ language, and getting further
into the corridors of power than citizen and action groups
promoting broad societal and value changes.
This latter characteristic seems to be particularly at odds with
much of the argument put forth on the relationship between
sustainability and democracy in the discourse of green political
theory. Ecologically rational governance for sustainability is said
to necessitate a new communicative rationality in a discursive
democracy characterised by lively citizen involvement (see
summarising discussion in Barry 1999:226 ff.). At the risk of
sounding somewhat biased, I would argue that many green polit-
ical theorists have approached this issue almost wholly from an
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individualistic and pluralistic angle. Their view comes close to
classic liberalism. The democratic political system consists of
elected representatives and electing citizens with the latter stand-
ing in a direct, individual relationship to government. Insofar as
there are discussions and examples of organisations in civil
society as intermediary aggregators of group interest, they mostly
concern associations in a civil society working to protect individ-
uals from both the state and the market, not to positively
influence future governance (see Barry 1999:237). 
This means that many of the normative designs of governance
for sustainable development often tend to neglect, or perhaps
better put, wish away the existence in advanced societies of strong
socio-economic and other interest organisations. Across all possi-
ble expressions of human life we find special interest
organisations, actively fighting to influence public policy with
whatever resources they have and appearing wherever they can
get access to processes of governance seen as relevant to their
interests. This further means that empirical studies of ecological
governance that do not take into account that modern society is
thoroughly organised are also bound to miss important points.
There is also evidence from comparative research implying that
industrially advanced countries with high capacities for environ-
mental policymaking and implementation seem to favour
‘sophisticated forms of governance based on high public-private
interaction instead of command-control regulation or self-regula-
tion’ (Enevoldsen 2001:104). To sum up this line of argument, the
democratic state in modern advanced societies is increasingly
engaged in establishing some form of ‘negotiated social gover-
nance’ with large hierarchically managed organisations (Hirst
2000:20).
This thoroughly organised character of modern advanced soci-
eties must thus be given close attention when we analyse how
ecological governance is organised to deal with both sustainabil-
ity and autonomy. Greening the commons to achieve sustainable
development in such thoroughly organised modern societies as
Sweden does indeed resemble a steeplechase. The commons is
criss-crossed by enclosures claimed or defended by strongly
organised special interests, often with historically gained status as
keepers at the gates to specific natural resources. To prevent these
claims from becoming fences that place the greening of society
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beyond political feasibility, negotiations with those interests have
to be carried out, and resulting agreements must be made politi-
cally legitimate. 
Of central concern, then, is how inherently multi-level ecolog-
ical governance is organised to allow for interplay between
governmental authority and organised interest activities (neces-
sary for the successful implementation of adopted policies) and
still preserve the political legitimacy and accountability of ‘nego-
tiated’ ecological governance. Two things are of crucial
importance here. First, it must be remembered that not all organ-
isations are as internally democratic as to provide citizens with
appropriate opportunities for participation and influence.
Second, the democratic government should preserve the ultimate
authority and remain the ultimate source of legitimacy for such
elaborate division of labour in the greening of the commons. 
The most salient lesson from the review of the Swedish case is
that it points to both opportunities and conditions for securing
the legitimacy of negotiated ecological governance. Founded
on a base of broadly co-ordinated regulation, where the
Environmental Code covers the full spectrum of the society-envi-
ronment relationship, the Swedish approach to ecological
governance has involved organised interests from all walks of life.
This holds all the way from policy formulation and selection of
strategies to the implementation of detailed measures all the way
down to the ecosystem level. As shown in the preceding chapters,
this negotiated form of ecological governance has promoted
policy and action beyond ecological modernisation and towards a
path of sustainable development. 
We have argued that the selection and success of the negotia-
tive approach to ecological governance is very much a matter of
path dependence. Organised interests engaged in activities with
potentially heavy impact on natural resources and the environ-
ment, such as industry, agriculture and transport are historically
used to participating in negotiations with government on policy
formulation and implementation ever since the building of the
social welfare state. This inherited legitimacy of co-operative
negotiated governance has both directed the construction, and
legitimised the continued process of ecological governance in
Sweden. Here, it seems appropriate to return to the 1997 words
of Prime Minister Göran Persson when setting the ‘Sustainable
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Sweden’ programme in motion. The Swedish welfare state – the
People’s Home – was built through ‘broad consensus on the
conditions for production, increased standards of living, and
security for everyone.’ In a similar way, he said, ‘[w]e will realise
the vision of a green welfare state’. 
The attentive reader might object that the negotiated approach
could lead to the stakes being set lower than might be necessary
for sustainability. After all, the strongest and most resourceful
interests involved in negotiating the actual implementation of the
NEO strategy of management by objectives are those who stand
to lose substantially from a more radical change of values that
some deem crucial to ‘real’ progress towards sustainable develop-
ment. These interests are also the ones found to get closest to
influencing government and the way its authority should be used
to direct future developments. 
To this it must be said again that it is too early to judge how
far negotiated ecological governance will help Sweden in retain-
ing the integrity of the commons. What could be said, however, is
that just as no country could get over to the greener grass on the
other side alone, no national government could command its
people to sustainability. Legitimacy for a unilateral commandeer-
ing system of ecologically rational government would be hard to
accept in democracies valuing individual autonomy. To this
should be added what research on implementation convincingly
shows, i.e., that interest participation increases the effectiveness
and efficiency of governance.
What is the real problem for the latter approach is that the
unevenly distributed resources and historically achieved power
positions of different affected interests may detract from the legit-
imacy of negotiated ecological governance. Again, the historic
record is an important conditioning factor. The success and legit-
imacy of negotiated governance are crucially dependent on the
degree of trust and reciprocity on both sides of the public-private
divide. When such values are part and parcel of the collective
memories among actors in negotiated governance, there is a
potential for getting over the fence to attain ecologically rational
governance, i.e., one that both values democracy and individual
autonomy and still retains the integrity of the commons.
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